PATTERNS OF POWER

Japanese Taiwan

THE COMPLETE STUDY

1895 — 1905 — 1947

Thomas J. Bryan
with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed.

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PREFACE

PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The collaboration

This is a case study in the Patterns of Power series, applying the series' framework to the island of Taiwan, from the cession of 1895 to the rising of 28 February 1947, with the account carried forward where the record requires it. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the seam that manages the belief on which the whole depends, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Taiwan was chosen for three reasons, and each turned out to do work the collection could not have got elsewhere.

The first is that it is the control case for the two Japanese studies already in this collection. One state, three acquisitions in twenty-six years, overlapping personnel, and three different answers. Hokkaidō had no native elite to co-opt and formation was imposed; Okinawa had a complete elite and formation was imposed on one half and rationed on the other; Taiwan had three million Han with a literate canon of their own, and formation was withheld for forty years. Running the same imperial doctrine against three different materials is as close to a controlled experiment as this method is ever likely to get, and one of the earlier collection's findings does not survive it.

The second is that this colony was governed *outside* the metropole's constitution rather than inside it. Okinawa was a prefecture, within the state and outside the general law by a proviso. Taiwan was governed by a Governor-General empowered to issue ordinances having the force of law, under an enabling statute the Imperial Diet passed in 1896 and then argued about for twenty-five years. That gives the collection its cleanest available reading of how exclusion is administered by a state that genuinely believes in law — and, because the enabling act required periodic renewal, its clearest instance of a forum manufactured by accident.

The third is that this island held two conquered populations under one administration, on entirely different terms, at the same time. The Han majority of the western plain and the indigenous peoples of the mountains were governed by one governor-general in the same decades under two bodies of law, behind a physical guardline, and everything this study found follows from that. It is the only case in the collection in which the framework's central fork can be observed running twice inside a single colony.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction and the judgement of the whole, and held the collaboration to its disciplines; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying load-bearing quotations, dates and figures by search against sources reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Taiwanese application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry: setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground and letting the distance speak. A treaty article disposing of three million people in a subordinate clause, providing that those who did not leave would at Japan's option be deemed Japanese subjects, beside a merchant opening the gates of Taipei two days before the transfer was complete. A book about Japanese rule published in London in 1907 with a preface by the chief civil administrator, beside a political party dissolved in 1931 with its communication to the League of Nations among the stated grounds. A colonial census taken in October 1905, fifteen years before Japan counted itself, beside a franchise granted in 1935 on a five-yen tax qualification the metropole had abolished for its own citizens a decade earlier. A land register that made a cultivator the owner of his field, beside eighty kilometres of electrified fence behind which a people were found to own nothing for want of

documents. The study lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion.

Three limitations are structural and are stated here rather than buried. The first is linguistic: a great part of this record exists only in Japanese and in Chinese, much of it in Meiji administrative Japanese, and every load-bearing document named in these modules has been read in secondary summary or in translation rather than in the original. Where a module rests on such a document it says so in its sources note. The second is documentary, and three items in particular are flagged in the closing module as unresolved: the texts of the fifteen parliamentary petitions of 1921–1934, which are the single most valuable outstanding source for this case; the order in which the foreign advisers' memoranda of 1895 and the draft of the enabling law were produced; and the absence of any total, anywhere this study could reach, for the indigenous dead of forty years of mountain campaigns.

The third is political. The assessment of the Japanese colonial period is a live domestic argument in Taiwan and a live international one, and the island's status is among the most contested questions in the world. Material exists in three languages written to serve present positions on every side, including the position that Japanese rule was benign by comparison with what followed and the position that it was not. Where this study rests on a claim bearing on any of that, it quotes the instrument, reports the competing readings as each side states them, and does not adjudicate.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — treaties, ordinances, official reports, parliamentary records, period publications — are quoted exactly, in the original and with a translation, at the length the argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording is the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited. Where a module quotes nothing, it says so.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution or figure is invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed; contested figures are given as ranges, and this case has many — the casualties of 1895, the dead of the Yunlin clearance, the deaths under the bandit ordinance, the toll

of the mountain campaigns, the number of Taiwanese who served in the Japanese forces, and the dead of 1947, where the estimates differ by a factor of six and the counting is itself a political act.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation. It names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its recurring watchword is *legibility is not pardon*.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case. One real contribution built across twelve modules is worth more than twelve asserted ones, and this study makes one.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law. Where the evidence overturned an earlier finding of this collection, the reversal is made in the open and recorded in the closing module.

What Taiwan added to the framework

Because this is the collection's only case of two conquered populations held under one administration on different terms, it was able to observe the framework's central fork running twice in one place. Chief among the refinements the study contributed: that a colony has as many floors as the conqueror has objects, so that a conquest with an implausibly long tail is frequently two conquests running concurrently of which only one was ever going to end; that the price of a floor is set as much by the ground's disease ecology as by the defenders, an expeditionary force here losing between fourteen and twenty-eight men to fever for every one killed by the enemy; that where the previous order leaves neither a standing army nor an officialdom in post, the cost of conquest migrates neither to the battlefield nor to the registry but disperses into the districts; that part of a floor is frequently laid by the collapse of the order being displaced, and the man who opens the gate is the first entry in the settlement; that there is a fifth settlement fiction whose job is neither dispossession nor the binding of an elite but fiscal legibility, which is recognisable because it *pays*, and that a conqueror who compensates is buying a permanent register rather than exercising restraint; that the characteristic first expense of capturing a revenue system is not a tax but a survey, and the survey is the more intrusive instrument because a levy touches a man once a year

and a register decides what he owns; that where a conqueror finds no elite to inherit he manufactures one, and that a manufactured proprietor is not brittle in the way a forged chief is, because a title deed requires nobody to believe in the man who holds it; that the most binding instrument for manufacturing such an elite is not land but a government security, since a bondholder cannot detest a government without detesting his own holdings; that a state seeking admission to a club of powers writes its robe in the club's language and pays for it in visible institutions, so that what an administration troubled to have translated is the address on the envelope; that the cheapest robe of all is one the conquered wrote for an earlier conqueror and the previous colonial power has already canonised; that a population venerating its own founding conquest has left a door standing open, because the next conqueror can enter by claiming the founder; that where a legitimating doctrine is scientific rather than sacred it will tend to *forbid* the assimilation of the conquered rather than command it, because a claim about what a population is cannot be revised as easily as a claim about what it ought to believe; that formation is imposed where the conquered are few enough to absorb and carry no formation apparatus of their own, and withheld where either condition fails; that the agency delivering a formation is the fastest read on what the conqueror wants, so that where the schoolmaster is a security officer the population has been classified as something to contain rather than employ; that where a colonial school teaches the conquered order's own canon it is bidding against a rival institution, and the date the canon leaves the timetable is the date the bidding stopped; that the counter-elite is manufactured in whichever capacity channel the conqueror cannot import; that in any statute imposing collective liability the exemption list is the caste map, drafted by the order itself; that where a subject has a genuine alternative use for his own labour the extractor cannot command but must bid, so that indexing, lending and binding are the measure of how real the alternative was, and a colony with two crops is dearer to hold than a colony with one; that the benefit column can contain items which were never offered and cannot be refused, of which epidemiological benefit is the type case, reaching the order's enemies exactly as it reaches its collaborators; that a colony's terms of trade with its metropole are set by the metropolitan franchise rather than by the world price, so that a staple the metropole's own electorate produces will be restrained however efficiently the colony grows it; that a successful colony exports its technique and its personnel and thereby builds its own successor; that whether a censorship file is empty measures who was permitted to own a printing press rather than what was hidden; that where the metropole is near and freight is cheap the metropole is the

colony's free press; that a colonial dismissal is a metropolitan legislature's correction of first resort because it is free, so that its speed is never a measure of conscience; that an order which acquired its colony for standing has a third seam, and the test is what it punishes out of proportion; that a renewal requirement in a colonial enabling act is a liberty-producing device, because a periodic obligation to justify is a forum; that the reliable test of a colonial court is not the win rate but the class of defendant that cannot be reached; that where exclusion is administered by a qualification rather than by a name, the interval between the metropole's abolition of that qualification for itself and its imposition on the colony is the size of the exception stated in years; that the residue of liberty reaches only the parties to the quarrel, so that a population which is nobody's faction receives none of it; that a floor can empty without cracking, by signature, while the garrison stands intact; that a conquest which builds an apparatus manufactures the seizable apex its own successor will use; that where a successor inherits an extractive apparatus without the constraints that made it bearable the apparatus becomes the fault line, and the fault line runs through whichever instrument touches the most people most often; that a preserved order does not escape the metabolic note but enlarges and postpones it, the accumulation being the population increment, and that where a colony is transferred intact the note falls due on the successor rather than at the taking; and that where a colonial administration is required to be self-supporting, everything it builds after the subsidy stops is bought with the revenue of the governed.

And one finding stands above the rest, because it is the one the twelve modules were actually building. **The default's coverage map and the floor's expense map are inverses of one another.** Wherever the settlement gave a man something he would lose if the arrangement ended, the order was cheap and required no persuading; where it gave nothing, the order paid in soldiers, permanently. A register in one place and a wire in the other — and the wire was there precisely because there was no register.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the two orders on the eve of 1895. *One Field, Two Owners.* A Han settler society on the western plain that was itself a conquest — Dutch, then Zheng, then Qing, laid over the plains aboriginal peoples across two centuries until it was

simply the world; a Qing state whose answer to the mountains had been a boundary line drawn in 1722 and redrawn four times because it kept failing; a tenure in which one field had two owners and neither held a thing that could be sold; and a province barely a decade old, constituted in reaction to Japan's own raid of 1874 and still mid-survey when it was ceded.

1 — The Floor of Force. ***The Gate Opened From the Inside.*** A transfer conducted on a ship because the Qing commissioner would not land; a five-month campaign in which the enemy killed a few hundred men and the fever killed thousands; a capital that cost nothing because its merchants went out to fetch the army in; then seven years of district-by-district killing on the plain, and a second and entirely different floor laid in the mountains that was still producing bodies thirty-five years later.

2 — The Settlement. ***The Column Marked Proprietor.*** An enabling statute chosen in 1895 from a menu of foreign advisers' briefs; a survey that measured 777,850 *kō* in 1,647,534 parcels; an ordinance of May 1904 that abolished the large rent and paid for it; and, five months after the landing and fifteen years before any investigation of title, a declaration that the forest belonged to the state unless a claimant could produce documents.

3 — The Robe. ***His Mother Was From Hirado.*** A book published in London in 1907 for readers who did not govern the island; a census taken in the colony fifteen years before the metropole counted itself; a doctrine of biological principles that licensed the whole apparatus of investigation and forbade the assimilation it might otherwise have justified; and, in Tainan, a shrine to a conqueror the conquered had already made a god, requiring its new owners to supply one genealogical fact about a man dead two hundred and thirty-three years.

4 — Formation. ***Five Per Cent of the Boys.*** Two school systems under two ordinances; the conquered order's own classics kept on the colonial timetable for forty years as an inducement and removed in April 1937; mountain children schooled out of the police post that held their fathers' rifles; three thousand Taiwanese asking in 1914 to be assimilated and having their society dissolved and its members detained; and one profession left open because the colony could not import enough of it.

5 — The Cost Column. ***Cane for the Company to Weigh.*** A collective-liability system inherited from 1733, costing nothing, and exempting Japanese residents by name; a policeman represented as a Buddha at an exhibition in 1925 and called the

emperor of the farmers by the countryside in the same year; a grower who could not choose his buyer and could plant rice instead, and the three instruments the companies used against that fact; and a benefit — the end of plague — that reached the men shouting at the police in a cane field at Erlin, without their consent and beyond their power to decline.

6 — Extraction. ***The Sugar King's Next Island.*** A revenue system captured rather than invented; sugar subsidised at the mill, monopolised at the district and protected at the metropolitan border; rice welcomed until the colony grew it well enough to injure four million Japanese voters; a camphor monopoly that explains the guardline; an opium monopoly whose revenue and whose cure were one lever; and a Taiwan sugar man who sailed for Saipan in 1921 and cleared the cane ground with labourers from Okinawa.

7 — Information and Suppression. ***Printed in Tokyo.*** A censor that existed and was used, including against Japanese publishers; a newspaper founded in Tokyo in 1923 because no Taiwanese might found one at home, shipped in and allowed back only on condition of adding a section the administration could read; four senior officials removed in eleven weeks when Japanese schoolchildren died, and none at all when thousands of Taiwanese did; and a party dissolved for writing to Geneva.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. ***The Bank the Bonds Built.*** A compensation issue the recipients did not trust and began dumping; a government that bought its own paper back to protect its credit and pressed the holders to borrow against it instead; a bank founded in June 1905 by the men whose ancient right had just been abolished, with the gate-opener of 1895 among its supervisors and the leader of the petition movement at its head; and, at the end of the chain, a population with no link in it at all.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. ***Five Yen.*** Three monopolies fused in one office by statute; every counterweight a Taiwanese could actually use located two thousand kilometres away; a court in which the conquered won against companies and could not reach an ordinance; a franchise of 229,049 men out of four million, on a qualification the metropole had abolished for itself ten years earlier; and three rings of inclusion, of which the third has no date.

10 — Change and Collapse. ***The Bureau They Did Not Abolish.*** An island the Americans decided not to invade; a floor that emptied by signature while the garrison

stood intact; three hundred thousand Japanese repatriated with two suitcases each while the registers, the railways and the Monopoly Bureau stayed; and, on the evening of 27 February 1947, the Bureau's agents striking a widow in the same quarter of Taipei whose merchants had opened the gates in 1895.

11 — The Grim Accounting. ***Two and a Half Million, and Then Six.*** The sword column in full and in ranges; a metabolic note accumulated for fifty years and called in the eighteen months after the handover by a currency decision, a monopoly board and a civil war in another country; works bought with the taxes of the people who received them; the end of footbinding and the comfort-women system, both invisible to every instrument this method owns; and one column with no figures in it at all.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. ***The Wire and the Register.*** What the case confirms, what it bends and the one earlier finding it breaks; the single contribution the twelve modules were built to produce; and the strongest case that none of this was a conquest, stated at full strength from the argument that is actually made, and answered.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

LANDSCAPE

ONE FIELD, TWO OWNERS

The two orders on the eve of 1895: an unfinished conquest of the western plain, a boundary line the state drew because it could not cross it, and a province ten years old built in answer to the power that was about to take it.

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What a stranger would have seen

An island of some thirty-six thousand square kilometres lying a hundred and thirty kilometres off the Fujian coast, running north to south for about four hundred kilometres, with a spine of mountains down its eastern two-thirds rising above three thousand metres and a broad alluvial plain along the west. On that plain, in the spring of 1895, lived nearly everyone: a population for which no reliable count existed — the first modern census, taken by the Japanese in October 1905, returned about three million, and estimates for 1895 run from roughly two and a half to three million — overwhelmingly speakers of southern Min from Fujian and of Hakka from eastern Guangdong, farming wet rice, pressing cane into sugar, and shipping tea, camphor and sugar out through Tamsui, Keelung, Anping and Takow to a world market that had reached the island only forty years earlier.

Behind them, up the slopes and beyond, lived perhaps a hundred thousand or so Austronesian-speaking people in several dozen mutually unintelligible languages, in villages that acknowledged no authority above themselves and had never paid tax to anyone. Between the two ran a line. It had been drawn on the ground and on the maps by the Qing state in 1722, redrawn repeatedly through the eighteenth century, and it marked not the edge of the empire's claim but the edge of its reach.

This is what Japan acquired by Article II of the treaty signed at Shimonoseki on 17 April 1895 — a document whose operative sentence performs the transfer in the flattest possible commercial register: *China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the following territories together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property thereon* — followed by three lettered items, of which the second is *The Island of Formosa together with all Islands appretaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.* The instrument disposes of an island and its three million inhabitants in a subordinate clause and a list, and it does not mention them again until Article V, which grants the inhabitants two years to sell their real property and go, and provides that those who have not gone *shall at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.* The choice offered was to leave. The option to stay and become Japanese belonged to Japan.

To understand what that instrument was actually transferring — what the new owner would find when he arrived to take possession — one has to look at how the western plain came to be Chinese, and at what the Qing state had and had not managed to do with it in two hundred and eleven years.

The plain was somebody's conquest first

There is no aboriginal baseline on this island either, only a series of takings, each of which became for a time the way things were.

The Dutch East India Company established itself at Tayouan on the south-western coast in 1624 and held the surrounding country until 1662, ruling through the villages of the Siraya and neighbouring plains peoples, taxing the deerskin trade, and — decisively for everything that followed — importing Chinese labourers from Fujian in numbers to grow rice and cane on ground the plains peoples had used for hunting. The company was expelled by Zheng Chenggong, a Ming loyalist commander driven off the mainland by the Qing, whose family then ruled the south-west for twenty-one years as a garrison state, settling its soldiers on the land in military colonies and financing itself on the same trade.

The Qing took it from his grandson. Shi Lang sailed from Tongshan on 8 July 1683 with some three hundred warships and twenty thousand men, destroyed the Zheng fleet off Penghu within ten days, received the offer of surrender on 5 September and the formal capitulation at Taiwan on 3 October. What followed is the first thing worth holding, because it establishes the register in which the island's Chinese rulers thought

about it for the next two centuries: the court seriously debated abandoning the place, removing the population to the mainland and leaving the island empty. The argument against keeping it was that Taiwan was 海外丸泥 — a pellet of mud beyond the seas — inhabited by people not worth defending and costing money to no purpose. Shi Lang, who had spent ninety-eight days there and seen the sugar and the rice and the strategic position, argued the other way, and carried it; the island was formally annexed in the spring of 1684 and administered as Taiwan Prefecture of Fujian Province.

So the Han order on the western plain, which by 1895 was simply the world to the several million people living inside it, had been laid down within living memory of documented events: a Dutch labour import, a Ming loyalist's garrison, and a Qing annexation that the annexing court had nearly declined. It was two hundred and eleven years old at the cession. That is old enough for a man's great-great-grandfather to have been born under it and for nobody to remember otherwise — old enough, that is, for the built thing to have become real, which it thoroughly had. It was not old enough for the state that nominally ran it ever to have finished the job.

The line the state drew because it could not cross it

Begin with the mountains, because what the Qing did there is the cleanest possible statement of what it could afford.

The empire's answer to the peoples of the interior was not conquest. It was a boundary and a prohibition. In 1722, after the rising led by Zhu Yigui the previous year had shown Beijing how little it knew of the hill country, the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang closed the hillsides to migration and demarcated a line — the first *fanjie*, the aboriginal boundary — beyond which Han settlement was forbidden. The line was marked on the ground and drawn on the official maps, and it was revised again and again through the century as settlement leaked past it, in red and then in other colours, each redrawing an admission that the last one had failed. After the great rising of Lin Shuangwen in 1786 the court separated Han property from aboriginal property outright: land held by Han was taxable, aboriginal land was not, and the remainder went to garrisons manned by the plains peoples themselves.

The taxonomy that went with the line is the tell. The state distinguished 熟番, cooked or cultivated aborigines, who had submitted, paid, and could be dealt with,

from 生番, raw aborigines, who had not. The distinction was administrative rather than ethnographic — it recorded what the state had got, not what the people were — and it is the reason the eastern two-thirds of the island appears in Qing records as territory claimed but not administered. That gap is not a scandal in Qing terms; the empire held plenty of ground that way. But it was a fact on paper, and in 1874 a foreigner in Japanese employ read the paper and saw what it was worth.

Every three years an uprising

On the plain the state's grip was firmer and still nothing like a machine that ran itself.

The proverb of the period is 「三年一小反，五年一大亂」 — a small revolt every three years, a great disorder every five. It circulates in the sources as a common saying and is attributed variously, including to officials who served on the island; whether any one man said it first, it was repeated because the record supported it. Over the Qing's two centuries there were something on the order of a hundred risings against the magistrates, and beneath them a constant substratum of 分類械鬥, armed feuding sorted by native place and speech — Quanzhou men against Zhangzhou men, Hoklo against Hakka — quarrels carried across the strait from Fujian and Guangdong and fought out on new ground. Zhu Yigui in 1721, Lin Shuangwen and the Heaven and Earth Society in 1786 with fifty thousand men and most of the south in his hands for the better part of a year, Dai Chaochun from 1862 to 1865: these are the peaks, not the whole terrain.

The state's answer to this was not a larger garrison, which it could not pay for. It was the local strongman. When Dai Chaochun rose, the Qing had its army committed against the Taiping and nothing to spare, and it put the rising down substantially by using the militia of the great lineages — pre-eminently the Lin family of Wufeng in the centre of the island, whose men had already gone to the mainland to fight the Taiping and whose head was posthumously ennobled for dying there. The historian Johanna Meskill, whose study of that family across five generations is the standard account, traces its arc from frontier pioneers to armed strongmen to something the empire was prepared to recognise as gentry; the family's fortune was made in the same motion, in camphor and in land. The Lin house at Banqiao near Taipei made its money in rice, salt and moneylending and by 1895 its head, Lin Weiyuan, was reckoned the richest man on the island and had helped underwrite the provincial government's works.

Read the arrangement from the magistrate's side and the shape is plain. The empire did not hold the western plain with its own force. It held it by recognising, licensing and occasionally punishing men who held their own districts with their own armed followings, and by taking a share of what those men produced. The coordination on that plain never pooled into an apex a stranger could enter. It pooled at the level of the lineage and the market town, in a few dozen places at once, held by families whose title to their standing came from below and beside them.

One field, two owners

Which brings us to the ground itself, and to the arrangement that gives this module its name.

Land on the western plain had been opened by permit. A man of means would obtain authorisation to reclaim a tract — often ground to which a plains-aborigine community held a recognised prior claim, which he would settle by contracting to pay it a perpetual rent — and would then bring in tenants to do the actual clearing and cultivating. Those tenants, having done the work that made the ground worth anything, acquired a right in it that could not be taken away: they held, sold, mortgaged and bequeathed the cultivating right, while the original permit-holder retained a fixed claim on the annual crop. The Chinese term for the result is 一田兩主 — one field, two owners. The permit-holder was the 大租戶, the large-rent household; the cultivator was the 小租戶, the small-rent household; and beneath the small-rent holder there was frequently an actual working tenant paying him again. The large rent was fixed in perpetuity, by quota or by percentage, at rates fairly uniform across the island, and the large-rent holder had no power to interfere with what the small-rent holder did with the ground.

The plains aborigines were inside this structure as well, and not only as its victims. Where a community's prior claim had been converted into a perpetual rent, that rent — 番租, aboriginal rent — was itself an item of property, and in some arrangements the community held not the large rent but a small rent, which is to say a cultivating-side right of the more valuable kind. This matters more than it looks, because it means the first conquest of the plain had been settled, in part, by writing the conquered into the paperwork as rent-receivers, and their subsequent dispossession would run through the reclassification of that paperwork rather than through any act of seizure.

Set beside a European or Japanese title deed, the thing to notice is that there is no owner. There is a stack of claims on the same acre, each of them real, each transmissible, none of them exclusive, and none of them corresponding to a *thing* that could be handed over entire. Land here was not an object; it was a set of standing relations among persons, expressed in shares of a harvest, and it had been that way long enough that it was simply how land was.

A conqueror who wanted to sell that ground, mortgage it, tax it once at a known rate, or grant it to a company would first have to make it into something that could be sold — which is a legislative task, not a military one, and one the Qing had already begun.

The province that was ten years old

The last act of the order Japan displaced was an attempt, in its final decade, to become the kind of state that could do exactly that. And the thing that set the attempt in motion was Japan.

In December 1871 a vessel from the Ryūkyū Islands was wrecked on the south-eastern coast and most of its crew were killed by Paiwan villagers. Japan, which had dethroned the Ryūkyūan king in September 1872 and was in the middle of converting that kingdom into its own territory, took the killings as a grievance of its own. Charles Le Gendre — French-born, American, formerly United States consul at Amoy, hired by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1872 — supplied the legal argument, and it was built directly out of the Qing's own paperwork: because the empire did not exercise jurisdiction over the aboriginal territory, it had no sovereignty there; the territory was therefore unclaimed and open to anyone prepared to take up the burden of civilising it. On 30 August 1872 Kabayama Sukenori pressed the Japanese government to invade the tribal districts, and on 9 October he was ordered to go and survey the island. He reached Tamsui the following August dressed as a merchant and surveyed the eastern coast. The expedition sailed in 1874, occupied the south for some months, and withdrew when Beijing agreed to pay.

The Qing court read the lesson correctly and acted on it. Shen Baozhen, sent as imperial commissioner, argued that the island was coveted precisely because it was empty, and proposed to fill it: the quarantine was reversed, and in its place came 開山撫番 — opening the mountains and pacifying the aborigines. Roads were cut into the

hills; the ban on migration to Taiwan was lifted in 1875; in 1877 twenty-one guidelines for subjugating the aborigines and opening the mountains were issued; agencies were set up to recruit settlers. The administration was expanded from two prefectures into a denser grid of smaller units. Then in 1884 the French, at war with China over Vietnam, blockaded the island and occupied Keelung, and the case for treating Taiwan as a frontier rather than a backwater became unanswerable.

On 12 October 1885 the court ordered Taiwan detached from Fujian and constituted as a province in its own right — the sources differ on the date at which the separation was actually complete, some giving 1885 for the decree and 1887 for the formal establishment, and the difference should be held rather than resolved. Liu Mingchuan, the Huai Army commander who had held Keelung against the French, became its first governor. What he did in six years is the inventory Japan would inherit: a telegraph, the beginnings of a railway from Keelung southward, coal at Keelung, new forts, a new capital at Taipei, a modernised camphor administration, three military campaigns into the mountains between 1885 and 1887 that cost him a third of his men and brought perhaps a third of the aboriginal districts under some form of submission — and, above all, a land survey.

The survey, the 清賦 of 1886 to 1889, is the crucial item, because it was an attempt to do to the doubled tenure precisely what a modern fiscal state must do to it. Liu's officials measured the fields and registered them, and rather than abolishing the large rent they cut it by forty per cent and made the large-rent holder liable for the land tax on the remaining sixty — the formula preserved in the phrase 減四留六, reduce four and retain six. It was not, on the best recent reading, a concession forced on the government by the large-rent holders; it was an administrative compromise, and its effect fell hardest on the aboriginal rents, which were swept into the large-rent category wholesale. The survey was resisted. On 6 October 1888 landholders and militia in Changhua attacked the county magistrate who was carrying it out and had threatened capital punishment to force compliance. Liu was recalled in 1891 to a court that had grown tired of his expenditure and his politics; his successor Shao Youlian shelved much of the programme; and in 1894 Tang Jingsong, who had commanded in Vietnam during the French war, took the governorship — the office he would hold for rather less than a year before being persuaded to accept a presidency.

So the state Japan was about to acquire had existed, in its own right, for less than a decade. Its registers were four years old and incomplete in the south. Its railway ran a

short distance and badly. Its campaigns into the mountains had reached about a third of the districts they were aimed at. Its officials were, almost without exception, men from the mainland on rotating appointments who had come out to serve a term.

What the taker was

Meiji Japan in April 1895 was twenty-seven years old. It had a constitution promulgated in 1889 and a Diet sitting since 1890, a conscript army, a land tax reform two decades behind it that had turned village tenure into individual titles and a fixed money assessment, and two recent acquisitions of its own to look back on: Hokkaidō, taken in hand from 1869 and settled by a colonisation office; and the Ryūkyū kingdom, whose king it had deposed in 1872 and whose territory it had converted into a prefecture in 1879, using as part of its warrant the very settlement that had ended the 1874 Taiwan expedition.

It was also, in the spring of 1895, a country whose own courts could not try a foreigner. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which ended extraterritorial jurisdiction, had been signed in London on 16 July 1894; it did not come into force until 17 July 1899. Two weeks after the signature, Japan went to war with China. So the state that took possession of an island of three million people, and legislated for them, and appointed a governor-general with the power to make law for them, could not at that moment exercise its own law over a British subject in Yokohama. It acquired its first overseas colony inside the four-year interval between the promise of equality among the powers and the delivery of it.

What it wanted from the island was not, at the moment of taking, a single settled thing. The Imperial Navy had pressed for Taiwan as a southern position commanding the approaches between the East and South China Seas; the Imperial Army had pressed for southern Manchuria as a buffer against Russia; the treaty took both, and the accounts suggest that Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu had not made Taiwan the point on which they would break the negotiation. Six days after ratification, Russia, France and Germany required the return of Liaodong, and Japan gave it back for a further thirty million taels. What remained of the war's territorial winnings was the island, and the two hundred million taels. Kabayama Sukenori — who had urged the invasion of Taiwan in 1872, had been ordered to survey it in the same month, and had

walked its eastern coast in disguise — was promoted to full admiral on 10 May 1895 and appointed its first Governor-General.

Twenty-two years after he came to look at it as a merchant, he was sent back to govern it.

Reading the eve of 1895 against the framework

The framework expects a conqueror to arrive over a naturalised former conquest — an order built by somebody's sword long enough ago that nobody alive experiences it as built, running cheaply on the conviction of the people inside it, and therefore offering the newcomer either a seat he can occupy or nothing at all. Taiwan does not fit that expectation cleanly, and the misfit is the first thing this study has to contribute.

What Japan met was a conquest **caught in the middle of its own build**. On the plain, the Han order was thoroughly real — two centuries deep, the world to everyone in it, defended by people whose ancestors had made it — and that half of the expectation holds exactly. But the *state* over that order had never reached the cheap pole. It was still paying, every generation, in risings it suppressed with borrowed militia, in feuds it did not attempt to police, in a boundary line across its own island redrawn four times because it kept failing, and in a taxonomy of subjects sorted by whether they had submitted. And in its final decade it had begun, under external pressure, to build precisely the apparatus that a cheap hold requires: a survey, a register, a telegraph, roads into the districts it had never entered.

Three refinements follow, and they are one refinement seen at three depths.

First, the question a conqueror actually faces is not only whether the previous order left a seizable apex, but **how old that apex is** — because an office ten years old has the paperwork of authority without the habits of obedience that make paperwork cheap to operate. Taiwan's provincial governorship was a real office with real subordinate posts and a real tax roll, and it was young enough that nobody on the island had grown up owing anything to it. What transfers in such a case is the file, not the deference. A conqueror who mistakes the one for the other will report home that he has assumed a going concern and then discover he is paying for a garrison.

Second, and more useful: **what an unfinished conquest hands its successor is not a chair but a survey.** The most valuable thing on the island in 1895 was not the

governor's seat, which was about to be vacated in any case, but the four-year-old cadastral registers, the household rolls, the classification of the interior into submitted and unsubmitted districts, and the road cuttings — the accumulated legibility that the previous state had bought at its own expense and would not be taking with it. The framework has treated administrative complexity as the variable predicting whether a conqueror preserves what he finds. Taiwan suggests the sharper form: a conqueror preserves the *information*, which is dear and slow, far more readily than he preserves the *men*, who are replaceable — and where the previous state was itself mid-reform, the information arrives conveniently recent and the men conveniently absent.

Third, on the mountains. The prior order's answer to a people with no seizable apex was neither manufacture nor conquest but **a line and a prohibition** — the cheapest response available, which buys a boundary instead of a submission and leaves the whole problem standing for whoever comes next. That should be added to the short list of things a state does when it meets coordination it cannot capture, alongside grinding attrition and the sponsored strongman, because it is plainly the commonest and it is systematically invisible: it produces no campaign, no treaty, no casualty figure, only a map with a coloured line on it and, a century later, a successor state that must decide whether to honour the line or cross it.

And one observation that will have to be tested rather than assumed as this study proceeds. The instrument of transfer describes what is being handed over as *territories together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property thereon.* The most valuable public property on the island was not a fortification. It was a filing system, four years old, which the treaty did not think to name.

A note on sources.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki is quoted exactly from the English text as published in *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, volume 28, and reproduced by the "World and Japan" database of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and the University of Tokyo; Articles II and V are given in that text's own spelling, including its errors. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 16 July 1894 and its entry into force on 17 July 1899 are from the same database and from the standard treaty record.

The Chinese terms are given as they appear in the scholarly literature: 一田兩主, 大租戶, 小租戶 for the doubled tenure; 減四留六 for the formula of Liu Mingchuan's

land clearance; 番界 for the aboriginal boundary; 熟番 and 生番 for the administrative categories; 分類械鬥 for subethnic feuding; and the proverb 「三年一小反，五年一大亂」, which circulates as a common saying of the period and is attributed variously, including to serving officials, so that no single attribution is relied on here. The phrase 海外丸泥 is given as the four characters in which the case against retaining the island circulates; the fuller sentence, of which several English and modern-Chinese renderings exist, has not been collated against a classical original for this module and is therefore reported rather than quoted, and should be verified before it is used again.

Dates and figures from the standard record: the Dutch presence from 1624 to 1662; the Zheng regime to 1683; Shi Lang's sailing on 8 July 1683, the surrender of 5 September and capitulation of 3 October, and formal annexation in the spring of 1684; the quarantine and first aboriginal boundary of 1722; the separation of Han and aboriginal property and the aboriginal garrisons following the rising of 1786; the risings of Zhu Yigui in 1721, Lin Shuangwen in 1786 and Dai Chaochun from 1862 to 1865; the 1874 expedition and the settlement by which the Qing paid five hundred thousand taels; the lifting of the migration ban in 1875 and the twenty-one guidelines of 1877; the French occupation of Keelung in 1884–85; Kabayama Sukenori's urging of invasion on 30 August 1872, his survey order of 9 October 1872, his arrival at Tamsui on 23 August in merchant's dress, and his appointment as Governor-General on 10 May 1895; Liu Mingchuan's land clearance of 1886–89, the Changhua rising against it on 6 October 1888, his recall in 1891, and Tang Jingsong's appointment in 1894.

Two figures are contested and given as ranges. The date on which Taiwan became a province is given in the sources as 1885 (the imperial decree, dated 12 October) and as 1887 (the completed separation from Fujian); both are reported. The island's population in 1895 is given as approximately two and a half to three million; the first count of any reliability is the Japanese census of October 1905, which returned about three million, and every pre-1895 figure is an estimate.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Johanna Menzel Meskill's *A Chinese Pioneer Family: The Lins of Wu-feng, Taiwan, 1729–1895* for the passage of a frontier lineage from strongmen to gentry; Emma Jinhua Teng's work on Chinese travel writing and the imagining of Taiwan for the terms of the annexation debate of 1683–84; Robert Eskildsen on Le Gendre's international-law argument and the character of the 1874 expedition; and the recent Chinese-language reassessment of

減四留六 as an administrative decision rather than a concession extracted by the large-rent holders. The reading of the tenure structure draws on the legal-historical literature on "one field, two owners" in the Ming and Qing and on the work identifying the aboriginal small rent as a category distinct from the large rent — a distinction that will matter in the settlement module and is flagged here because both the colonial administration and much later scholarship collapsed it.

MODULE 1

THE GATE OPENED FROM THE INSIDE

The floor of force: how much organised violence it took to seize the island, who paid for it, and why the same administration in the same decade laid two entirely different floors on two different populations.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The transfer, conducted at sea

On 2 June 1895 the sovereignty of Taiwan passed from the Qing empire to Japan aboard a ship anchored off the Keelung coast. The Qing commissioner, Li Jingfang — adopted son of the man who had signed at Shimonoseki — conducted the formality afloat because he was not willing to land. The contemporary American consular account records that the ceremony took place on shipboard because the Chinese delegate feared what the inhabitants would do to him.

That is the first fact about this floor and it is worth pausing on. A province of some three million people was handed over by a man who would not set foot on it, to a man who had walked its eastern coast twenty-two years earlier in a merchant's clothes. Nothing about the transaction required the consent, or even the presence, of anyone who lived there. Article V of the treaty had already disposed of that question: the inhabitants had two years to sell their land and leave, and those who remained would, at Japan's option, be deemed Japanese subjects.

Three days earlier the Imperial Guards Division had already gone ashore at Sandiao Point on the north-eastern coast. The transfer was a formality performed behind an army that was already landing.

Five months, and what actually killed the army

The campaign that followed ran from the landing on 29 May to the capitulation of Tainan on 21 October — five months to cross an island four hundred kilometres long. It was fought by a force that began at about seven thousand men and rose, with reinforcements drawn from the divisions demobilising in Manchuria, to somewhere above thirty thousand by October, supported by a dozen or so warships and by military coolies in numbers the Japanese accounts record separately from the soldiers: Nogi's southern column alone landed at Fangliao with 6,330 troops, 1,600 coolies and 2,500 horses.

Against them stood a force the Japanese estimated at up to seventy-five thousand: remnants of the Qing garrison, Guangdong irregulars, the Black Flag veterans Liu Yongfu had brought from Vietnam, and — increasingly as the campaign went south — local militia raised by the lineages and the Hakka villages of the centre. The largest engagement fought on Taiwanese soil, at Baguashan near Changhua on 27 August, was a Japanese victory that broke organised resistance in the centre. Chiayi fell on 9 October. Three columns then converged on Tainan from north, north-east and south, and Liu Yongfu, having offered a conditional surrender that asked only that no Formosan be punished for having taken up arms, left for the mainland before the city fell.

Now the arithmetic, because it is the most important thing in this module and it is not what one expects of a five-month war.

Japanese battle deaths are given in the standard accounts as between 164 and 333, with between about 515 and 690 wounded. Japanese deaths from disease in the same campaign are given as between about 4,600 and 6,900. The ratio of men killed by the enemy to men killed by cholera, malaria and dysentery runs somewhere between one to fourteen and one to twenty-eight, depending on which count is used and whether the Pescadores operation of March — where a cholera outbreak killed something like fifteen hundred of the eleven thousand men landed — is folded in. The Imperial Guards Division is reported to have gone from roughly fourteen thousand men to about seven thousand fit for duty in the course of the campaign, without ever losing a battle. Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa, who commanded it, fell ill on 18 October and died at Tainan on the 28th, seven days after the city's surrender; a story circulated in

Taiwan that he had been mortally wounded at Baguashan, and the Japanese record is emphatic that he was not.

Formosan and Chinese losses were far higher and are much harder to establish. The Japanese recovered around seven thousand bodies from the battlefields; the usual estimate of total Chinese and Formosan dead, including civilians killed in reprisals, is around fourteen thousand, and some accounts give a range from six thousand upward. Over the whole period of the conquest and its aftermath, one standard account puts Japanese killed and wounded at 5,300 with 27,000 hospitalised.

Set those two columns beside each other and the character of the floor appears. The defenders inflicted, at most, a few hundred deaths on the invading army. The island's disease ecology inflicted thousands. What made this conquest expensive was not the resistance it met but the ground it was fought over — and the men who paid that price were mostly conscripts from Japanese villages who never saw an enemy.

The gate

And yet the capital was not taken. It was handed over, by the people inside it, to end a different problem.

The Republic of Formosa had been proclaimed on 25 May, with Tang Jingsong — the Qing governor, who continued to profess loyalty to the dynasty — installed as its president, and with the explicit purpose, as Tang described it, of delaying the Japanese long enough for a Western power to be drawn into defending the island. No power was. The Qing officials had been ordered to quit their posts on 20 May. When the Japanese took Keelung and moved inland, the republican leadership left for the mainland between 4 and 6 June, twelve days after the proclamation, and the garrison they left behind — Green Standard troops and Guangxi men, unpaid — turned to looting and burning Taipei.

At that point the merchants of Dadaocheng, the tea and commodity quarter outside the city wall, made a calculation. Koo Hsien-jung, a Lukang-born trader who had begun as a rickshaw puller and built a business shipping sugar and Keelung coal to Shanghai, went out with others — a Wanhua gentry figure named Chen Fa, representatives of the tea merchants' association — to meet the advancing Japanese and bring them in. On 6 and 7 June the gate was opened and Koo guided the troops into

Taipei. The first work of Japanese authority in the capital of its new colony, between 7 and 9 June, was suppressing a riot by the previous regime's own soldiers.

Koo's subsequent career is the whole mechanism in one biography. Head of the Taipei Security Bureau in 1896. A guide for the Imperial Guards Division's column that August. Monopoly business afterwards in salt, sugar and opium; a founder of the Changhua Commercial Bank; proprietor of the colony's principal pro-government newspaper; a member of the Governor-General's council in 1921; and in 1934 the first Taiwanese appointed by the emperor to the House of Peers. Whether he is a collaborator or a pragmatist has been argued in Taiwan for a hundred and thirty years, and his own stated logic was that the city was already burning and that what would be destroyed if the Japanese did not come in was the property and lives of its residents.

Two things must be held together here and neither cancels the other. The capital of the island cost its conqueror nothing, because the order he was displacing had dissolved before he reached it and its own troops had become the danger the inhabitants most wanted removed. And the resistance was entirely real: Baguashan was fought two months later with thousands of men, and the villages of the centre and south went on fighting after every organised force had gone. Between two and three hundred thousand people left the island in 1895 in the general flight; a further six thousand four hundred or so, mostly of the gentry, exercised the treaty's option, sold their property and departed by May 1897, out of a population of roughly three million.

Seven years of districts

Kabayama declared Taiwan pacified when Tainan fell. In December risings began in the north and continued, by the standard account, at something like one a month.

What followed is not a war and not policing, and the Japanese term for its objects — *dohi*, bandits — is the administrative decision that made it neither. In June 1896 the clearance operations in Yunlin killed, on the most-cited figure, some six thousand people; other estimates run very much higher, and the counting has never been settled. Under Nogi Maresuke, governor-general from 1896 to 1898, internal reports of prisoners dying under torture prompted review inside the administration itself. Then in February 1898 Kodama Gentarō arrived as fourth governor-general with Gotō Shinpei as his chief of civil affairs, and the character of the floor changed.

It changed in three ways at once, and they are worth separating because they are three different instruments.

The first was legal. The Ordinance for the Punishment of Bandits, issued in 1898, defined the offence broadly and set death as its ordinary penalty. Between 1898 and 1902 something on the order of twelve thousand people were killed as "bandit-rebels" — a figure to be held beside the six to fourteen thousand killed in the war of 1895 itself.

The second was administrative, and it cost almost nothing, because it was already there. Gotō, newly arrived, read a Qing administrative handbook in the original Chinese, found in it an account of the *baojia* system of household mutual responsibility that the Qing had extended to Taiwan in 1733, and had the work translated into Japanese by the government's own Commission for the Investigation of Old Customs. From 1898 the system was reconstituted as *hokō*: ten households to a *kō*, ten *kō* to a *hō*, with headmen answerable for what happened inside their groups and the whole community liable to collective fine when a member was convicted. Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took — and here is the tell in its cheapest possible form, a watching apparatus the conqueror did not design, did not import and did not have to justify, because it had been the furniture of village life on that plain for a hundred and sixty-five years. It appears in the colony's budget as almost nothing, which is precisely why a study that reads only the accounts will underestimate this floor.

The third was ceremonial. By 1902 unrest in Yunlin had outlasted seven years of suppression and two of the district's principal commanders were still at large. On 25 May the administration gathered more than two hundred and fifty men to surrender formally at six ceremonies across the subprefecture. Each man wore a white flower pinned to his chest, its size indicating his rank in the resistance. At the Douliu ceremony officers arrived, ostensibly to search for weapons.

The pattern held for a generation afterwards in smaller instalments: Beipu in 1907, where Hakka and Saisiyat insurgents killed fifty-seven Japanese and a hundred Hakka men and boys were killed in the reprisal at Neidaping; Luo Fuxing's conspiracy, broken in 1913 with executions running into the hundreds; and the Tapani affair of 1915, the largest Han rising of the colonial period, after which more than fourteen hundred of Yu Qingfang's followers were tried, some two hundred executed, and — according to accounts preserved locally rather than in the administrative record — villagers who

returned on a promise of pardon were assembled in a field, made to dig, and shot, with oral tradition putting the dead in that operation at five or six thousand.

Set this beside the earlier finding that where a conqueror takes over a functioning administration rather than a functioning army, the cost of the conquest migrates from the battlefield to the registry, and is measured in the number of officials who had to be made to sign. Taiwan will not fit that, and the reason is instructive. Japan inherited neither a functioning army nor a functioning officialdom: the army dissolved into looting and the officials had been ordered home. So the cost migrated neither to the battlefield after October 1895 nor to the registry. It dispersed into the districts, and stayed there for seven years, because there had never been an apex whose capture delivered the rest — only a plain of lineages, market towns and armed villages, each of which had to be dealt with separately.

What the metropole thought it was paying for

None of this was invisible at home, and the floor's pacing is legible against the budget rather than against anybody's intentions.

The colony did not pay for itself. In its first two years it drew something like thirteen million yen from the metropolitan treasury, amounting to more than half its cash receipts. That was money a state still building its own railways and paying for its own army did not have spare, and the public reaction was correspondingly cold. In 1897 a session of the Imperial Diet debated whether to sell Taiwan to France, and a figure of a hundred million yen circulated in that discussion. The conquest was, in other words, within eighteen months of being repudiated by the very audience whose belief was funding it.

It was not sold, and the pressure to stop drawing on Tokyo is a large part of what produced everything that followed — the land survey, the monopolies in camphor, salt and opium, and the calculation that the island had to be made to yield. Read the sequence in that order and the pacification, the survey and the monopoly are not three policies but one: a floor being laid on an overdraft, by an administration that had been publicly told the overdraft would not be extended indefinitely.

The second floor

Everything above concerns the western plain and the Han population. The mountains were a separate conquest, on a separate population, under a separate legal theory, and it ran twenty years longer.

The legal theory came first. In October 1895 the Government-General declared that all unreclaimed and forest land belonged to the state unless a claimant could produce documentary proof of ownership — and no survey or investigation of titles was undertaken for another sixteen years. The administration then carried forward the Qing classification of the indigenous into acculturated, semi-acculturated and unacculturated, treating the first as ordinary natives of Taiwan and placing the others outside the normal administrative units, where the government's own laws did not apply to them. The reasoning by which the mountain peoples were held to own nothing is reported in the scholarship in terms that leave little to interpret: they lived on government land, they had not submitted to government authority, and lacking political organisation in the form the administration recognised, they could not hold property at all. One study of the Government-General's position records it as holding that the mountain peoples, although human in biological and social terms, were animals so far as international law was concerned.

What went in behind the theory was the guardline — the *aiyūsen*, inherited in principle from the Qing boundary and then, unlike the Qing boundary, pushed steadily forward. By 1904 it had advanced some eighty kilometres beyond where Qing rule had left it. It was not a line on a map. It was a physical installation: outposts at intervals of roughly two hundred metres, patrols between them, electrified fencing, and mines. Sakuma Samata, who had been a young officer on the 1874 expedition, became governor-general in 1906 and held the post until 1915, longer than anyone else; he ran successive programmes of "aboriginal governance", of which the major one is usually dated 1910 to 1915, with a budget generally given as around sixteen million yen. Its object was stated without euphemism in the administration's own framing: to bring the mountain peoples to submission, to open their land, and to obtain the mountain resources — which meant camphor above all, of which the island was then supplying the great bulk of the world's production, and timber after it.

The resistance was proportionate. By 1903 the administration counted 1,132 incidents and about 1,900 Japanese dead. In 1914 the campaign against the Truku in

the eastern gorges took seventy-four days. A Bunun leader, Raho Ari, fought on for two decades after the gun-control measures of 1914 impounded hunting rifles in police stations, crossing the electrified line at will. A report of 1935 put Japanese deaths in the armed struggle from 1896 to 1933 at 7,081, and recorded 29,772 firearms taken from the indigenous by 1933.

And on 27 October 1930, thirty-five years after the landing, Seediq under Mona Rudao attacked the police posts and the public school at Musha during an athletic meeting, killing 134 Japanese and two Han Chinese mistaken for Japanese. The response used between two and three thousand troops with indigenous auxiliaries and, in the mountains, poison gas. Japanese colonial records give 644 Seediq killed or dead by suicide and 564 surrendered.

Now put the two floors side by side, because the comparison is the point of this module.

On the plain, the conqueror wanted a flow: rice, sugar, camphor brought down from the hills, a taxable population, a registered acreage. A flow requires producers who are alive and working, so the violence there was calibrated to submission — a criminal ordinance, a household register, a police station in every locality, surrender ceremonies, and a killing rate that fell away sharply once submission was general. In the mountains the conqueror wanted the ground and what grew on it. Ground does not require its occupants, and the violence there was calibrated to clearance — a moving fence, mines, artillery, confiscated rifles, and eventually relocation to allotments in the foothills amounting to a fraction of the land taken. Same administration, same decade, two populations, two wants, two floors at two prices under two bodies of law.

Reading the floor against the framework

Four things follow, and they are one thing seen at four depths.

First: a colony has as many floors as the conqueror has objects, and the number is a finding, not a detail. The framework has treated the floor as singular — the founding violence, laid once, priced once. Taiwan will not support that. What was laid here was two distinct apparatuses of coercion, differing in instrument, in legal warrant, in duration and in intended endpoint, because the administration wanted a flow off one population and the ground beneath another. Where a study finds a conquest with an

implausibly long tail, the first question to ask is not why pacification took so long but **whether there were two conquests running concurrently and only one of them was ever going to end** — because a floor laid to secure a flow can stop when submission is general, while a floor laid to clear ground stops only when the ground is clear.

Second: the defenders are one term in the price of a floor, and frequently not the largest. The framework asks what force was applied, by whom, to whom, and paid for with what. Taiwan adds a term the corpus has not priced: the ground itself. This army lost somewhere between fourteen and twenty-eight men to fever for every man the enemy killed, and its elite division was halved without losing an engagement. A conqueror's real question at the outset is not only whether the defenders can beat him but **what the country will do to his soldiers while he is beating them** — and where the answer is malaria, the floor becomes expensive in a way no assessment of the opposing force would predict.

Third, and this refines rather than confirms what an earlier case established. Where a conqueror takes over a functioning administration, the cost of the conquest migrates from the battlefield to the registry and is measured in officials made to sign. Taiwan gives the third position: where the previous order has *neither* an army left standing *nor* an officialdom left in post — the officials recalled by their own government, the garrison dissolved into looting — the cost migrates to neither. **It disperses into the districts**, and the conqueror pays it locality by locality for years, because there was no seat whose capture delivered the rest and no incumbent whose signature bound anyone. The capital in such a case may cost nothing at all. Everything outside it costs everything.

Fourth: some of a floor is laid by the collapse of the order being displaced, and the man who opens the gate is not incidental — he is the first entry in the settlement. A merchant went out of a burning city to fetch an army in, and thirty-nine years later sat in the upper house of that army's parliament. That sequence should be read as a single transaction with a long payment schedule, and the framework should expect it: **where a conqueror arrives during the disintegration of the previous order rather than against it, his earliest collaborators will be men whose property was at risk from the disintegration, and their reward will be the monopolies.** Which monopolies, and on what terms, is the next question this study has to answer.

One last observation, held open rather than resolved. Every instrument named above generates a record — a casualty return, an ordinance, an execution list, a budget line of sixteen million yen. The cheapest instrument in the whole apparatus generated none, because it had been running on that plain since 1733 and cost the administration a translation.

A note on sources.

Article V of the Treaty of Shimonoseki is quoted from the English text published in *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, volume 28. The detail that the transfer of 2 June 1895 was conducted aboard ship because the Qing commissioner feared the inhabitants is drawn from James W. Davidson's *The Island of Formosa, Past and Present* (1903), a contemporary account by the United States consul, now in the public domain and cited in the reference literature at pp. 293–295. The 1910 volume of the *Cambridge Modern History*, also public domain, gives a contemporary British summary of the campaign, including the report that over a hundred thousand men were said at the time to have been required for the suppression and that Japanese losses from battle and disease exceeded those of the entire Manchurian campaign; that figure for troop numbers is a contemporary claim rather than an establishment figure and is reported here as such, against the operational accounts which put the force above thirty thousand by October 1895.

Contested figures, given as ranges. Japanese battle deaths in the 1895 campaign, 164 to 333, with wounded given as 515 to 687; Japanese deaths from disease, approximately 4,600 to 6,900, with a further roughly 1,500 in the Pescadores cholera outbreak of March 1895; Chinese and Formosan dead, approximately 6,000 to 14,000 including civilians, against some 7,000 bodies recovered from the battlefields. Deaths in the Yunlin clearance of June 1896 are given as about 6,000 in the most commonly cited account and very much higher in others, and the counting is unsettled. Deaths under the bandit ordinance between 1898 and 1902 are given as approximately 12,000. Emigration in 1895 is given as 200,000 to 300,000; departures under the treaty option to May 1897 as approximately 6,400. Casualties in the Tapani affair of 1915 rest in part on oral tradition and are given as such. The Musha figures of 134 Japanese dead, 644 Seediq killed or dead by suicide and 564 surrendered are from Japanese colonial records and should be read as the administration's own count. The budget of the mountain

campaign is given in the reference literature as about sixteen million, and the currency is stated inconsistently across sources; it is reported here as yen with that caveat. The dates of the mountain programme are given variously as 1907 onward in two phases, 1909 to 1914, and 1910 to 1915; the variation is reported rather than resolved.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Murray Rubinstein's edited history of Taiwan for the sequence of the 1895 collapse, the flight, and the casualty totals; Andrew Morris on the Republic of Formosa and the opening of Taipei; Leo Ching on the Musha incident; Paul Barclay on the Mudan incident and the guardline; Wen-kai Ye's work on colonial land and indigenous property for the administration's reasoning about ownership in the mountains, including the characterisation of the Government-General's position on the standing of the mountain peoples in international law, which is that study's rendering and not a quotation from an instrument; and Daniel Botsman on punishment in the Japanese empire. The account of Gotō's adoption of the *baojia* system, including its translation by the Commission for the Investigation of Old Customs, follows the secondary literature on the *hokō*; the Qing extension of *baojia* to Taiwan in 1733 is from the same. The detail of the white flowers worn at the Yunlin surrender ceremonies of 25 May 1902 rests on a single newspaper account citing the work of Ke Kuang-jen and should be collated against a scholarly source before it is relied on further.

MODULE 2

THE COLUMN MARKED PROPRIETOR

The settlement: how ownership was decided once the island was held — which instrument, who was written in, who was written out, what they owed in return, and how much of the machinery was borrowed from the empires Japan had just joined.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

First, a statute that made a legislature

Before anything could be settled, somebody had to have the power to settle it, and the instrument that supplied that power is the one the whole colonial period turns on.

In March 1896 the Imperial Diet enacted the Law Relating to Laws and Ordinances to be Enforced in Taiwan, universally known afterwards by its number: Law 63. Under it the Governor-General of Taiwan could issue ordinances — *ritsurei* — having the force of law within the territory, and only those Japanese statutes he approved would apply there at all. A constitutional state with a written constitution six years old, a bicameral Diet sitting since 1890, and a legal establishment then in the middle of receiving the German civil code, voted to place three million of its new subjects outside its own legislature's reach and to hand the lawmaking power over them to a serving admiral.

The consequence for everything that follows is simple and total. Every instrument named in this module — the land survey regulations, the determination of the large-rent right, its extinguishment, the compensation bonds, the monopolies — is an ordinance of the Governor-General, not an act of a parliament. The ownership of an island was reorganised by decree, lawfully, by a decree power a parliament had voted to

create. The Taiwanese who spent the 1910s and 1920s petitioning against colonial rule understood this exactly, and made the repeal of Law 63 their first demand.

Where the design came from

Here the case gives the corpus something it has not had elsewhere: a paper trail of the choice being made.

In 1895 the body deciding Taiwan's status was the Taiwan Affairs Bureau, chaired by Itō Hirobumi, and it did what the Meiji state did with every other technical question of the period — it asked the foreigners on its own payroll. **Michel Revon**, a French jurist, argued the French answer: assimilation, Taiwan brought under the metropolitan constitution and administered as an extension of Japan proper. **William Montague Kirkwood**, an English lawyer advising the Ministry of Justice, argued the British answer: a separate legal order, a governor-general with wide discretionary power, and rule conducted so far as possible through the institutions already on the ground, the only thing shared between colony and metropole being subordination to imperial rule rather than to the constitution. **Henry Willard Denison**, the American adviser to the Foreign Ministry, was consulted as well, and the bureau read Alpheus Todd on parliamentary government in the British colonies. **Hara Takashi** wrote for the assimilationist side. He lost in 1895 and won in 1918, when as prime minister he installed the first civilian governor-general and set about extending the metropole's institutions to the colony.

The standard legal history of the colonial period states that Law 63 was enacted on Kirkwood's advice. That attribution should be held with the care it deserves: it is the settled scholarly account, but this study has not examined the drafting record, and the order in which the memoranda and the bill were produced is exactly the thing that decides whether 1896 records a selection or a ratification. It is flagged here as unresolved.

What is not in doubt is the *practice*, and the practice runs back through every Japanese acquisition of the period. Charles Le Gendre, a French-born American and former United States consul at Amoy, hired by the Foreign Ministry in 1872, supplied the international-law argument for the 1874 expedition and effectively planned it. Horace Capron, who had worked on the removal of Native American tribes and was Grant's Commissioner of Agriculture when Japan hired him, together with William

Smith Clark and others at Sapporo, supplied the technique for Hokkaidō. William Burton, a British sanitary engineer, was brought in for Taiwan's water and sewerage. Gotō Shinpei had studied in Germany in 1890.

But the shape of the borrowing is not what the phrase "borrowing" suggests, and the best recent scholarship is emphatic on the point. Assimilation and association were not fixed national characters — France assimilationist, Britain associationist — but two positions in a single argument running concurrently inside every empire, sustained by international congresses, university chairs in colonial policy, scholarly exchange and expositions. France's own theorists had turned against assimilation in the 1880s and 1890s partly out of admiration for British and Dutch indirect rule; Japan then took the associationist answer from an English lawyer whose own country's practice the French were studying. Japan was inside that conversation from the 1870s, not downstream of it, and its famous radical assimilation drive came only in the last years of the empire, after it had left the club.

So the honest description is neither imitation nor invention. It is **a documented comparative selection from a stock of templates that the selectors were themselves helping to produce** — and the reason it matters here is that the item selected determined the settlement. Association means ruling through what is already there. Ruling through what is already there means you must first find out what is there. And that requirement produced the instrument that did the actual work.

Finding out what was there

Because Law 63 left civil matters among local people to be decided according to local custom rather than the Japanese codes, the administration had a problem it could not decree its way out of: it did not know what local custom was.

In 1901 it established the Commission for the Investigation of Old Customs, under Okamatsu Santarō, a Kyoto law professor trained in the German tradition, to survey Qing customary law in Taiwan on a scale no Chinese government had attempted. The reasoning behind it is recorded in the scholarship without much decoration: by clarifying the ownership system the colonial government would be able to collect taxes effectively from the actual holders of land without provoking resistance and dispute, and once the colony was financially solvent the controversy about it in metropolitan Japan would subside. Okamatsu's preliminary report was published in 1902 and

translated into English under the title *Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of Formosa*.

Read those two sentences together and note what they contain. Preserving the conquered order's property law is being *argued for on the record, in advance, as the cheaper course* — cheaper in resistance, cheaper in revenue foregone, and cheapest of all in the political currency the administration was actually short of, which was patience in Tokyo. And the report was put into English, which tells you there was a third party being addressed: the powers whose recognition Japan had been pursuing since the Restoration, and who were watching to see whether an Asian state could run a colony.

The commission's other product was more direct still. Gotō, newly arrived and looking for a way to police the countryside without paying for it, had a Qing administrative handbook translated by this same commission and lifted out of it the household mutual-responsibility system that the Qing had extended to the island in 1733.

The survey

In September 1898 the Governor-General issued three ordinances at once — land register regulations, land survey regulations, and the constitution of a High Land Survey Committee to hear disputes — and established a Provisional Land Survey Bureau with Gotō Shinpei himself as its director and Nakamura Zekō as his deputy. Field work began on 17 September 1898 in three districts of Taipei chosen as trials, and ran for seven years.

The scale is worth stating in the bureau's own units because the scale is the argument. The survey mobilised on the order of 1.47 million person-days. It measured 777,850 *kō* of land in 1,647,534 separate parcels. It found, as every such survey finds, a great deal of cultivated ground that had never appeared on a Qing register at all — the *hidden fields* of the late Qing, whose absence from the rolls had been the province's chronic fiscal weakness.

And it was populated by a mechanism worth pausing on, because it is how a register gets filled without an army. Cultivators on land classed as official were required to come forward and declare themselves; the declaration entered them in the register, and failure to declare was treated as abandonment of the cultivating right. The state did not have to

compel anyone to be counted. It made being counted the condition of keeping what you had, and the population counted itself.

On every parcel there was a box headed 業主 — proprietor. The entire settlement is the question of whose name went into it.

Extinguishing the large rent

Recall what the surveyors found on the western plain: not owners but a stack of claims. A permit-holder with a fixed perpetual claim on the crop, the *dazuhu* or large-rent household; beneath him the *xiaozuhu*, the small-rent household, holding the cultivating right, which he could sell, mortgage and bequeath and which the large-rent holder could not touch; and beneath him, frequently, a working tenant. One field, two owners, and sometimes three. Nothing in that arrangement corresponded to a thing that could be entered once in a box and taxed once at a rate.

The administration resolved it in two ordinances. In 1903 an ordinance concerning the *determination* of the large-rent right fixed and registered every such claim on the island — classifying them as private, official, or belonging to local corporate bodies — which had the effect of turning a mass of varied customary entitlements, some taken as a share of the harvest and some as a fixed quantity regardless of harvest, into a schedule of known sums. Then in May 1904 a second ordinance concerning the *settlement* of the large-rent right abolished it, compensating the holders with public money raised under the Taiwan Enterprise Bond Law.

What happened at that moment is the whole module in one sentence. The large-rent holder — the descendant of the man who had obtained the reclamation permit, often the gentry family of the district — received paper. The small-rent holder — the cultivator, or the man who had bought the cultivating right from a cultivator — had his name written into the column marked proprietor, and became, for the first time in the island's history, the outright owner of a registered parcel with a known area, a known assessed yield and a known tax.

Two things follow from that and neither is visible in the instrument.

The first is that a registered parcel with a single owner is **mortgageable**. Before 1905 no one could pledge that land, because no one held a thing to pledge; afterwards a bank

could lend against it and a court could foreclose. The moment of transfer looks like a gift and reads in the record as a clarification.

The second is that the plains aborigines were written out. Their communities had held, in some districts, not the large rent but the small rent — the cultivating-side right, the more valuable one — as the settled residue of the first conquest of the plain. In the classification these aboriginal rents were swept wholesale into the large-rent category and extinguished with the rest, so that a people who had been rentiers under the Qing became, at the stroke of an ordinance, holders of a compensation bond. That reclassification was contested at the time by at least one community, which litigated, and the record of the dispute survives; the wider point is that no one was dispossessed by force in this operation and a great many people ceased to own what they had owned.

Where there were no documents at all

The mountains were settled by the opposite instrument, and settled first.

In October 1895, five months after the landing and before any survey existed, the Government-General declared that unreclaimed land and forest belonged to the state unless a claimant could produce documentary proof of ownership. No investigation of titles in those areas was undertaken for another decade and a half; the great forest and wild-land survey ran from 1910 into the 1920s, by which time the guardline had already been pushed forward and the question of who was in possession had been answered by other means.

This is vacancy, and it is the cheapest of all the settlement fictions for the reason the corpus has already established: it requires no counterparty. There is no negotiation, no grantee, no schedule of compensation, no bond issue, and therefore no treaty, no signature, and no clause deciding which language prevails. There is a declaration, a documentary standard that the people concerned had no way of meeting because their societies had never produced documents, and a silence in the record where a settlement would otherwise be.

What followed was allotment rather than title. From 1919 into the 1930s the mountain peoples were relocated to areas that would not obstruct forestry. In 1928 it was decided that each person should receive three hectares of reserve land; when the population turned out to be larger than the eighty thousand estimated, the allotment

was cut, and in the event was not adhered to. The land finally set aside amounted, on the standard reckoning, to about an eighth of what had been taken.

So: two populations, two settlements, two fictions, one administration, one decade. Where the object was a flow off living producers, the instrument bought out one layer of an existing tenure and issued a title. Where the object was the ground and what grew on it, the instrument declared the ground empty and issued nothing.

The monopolies, and the men who held them

The rest of the settlement was the disposal of what the state had reserved to itself.

Opium came first, in 1897, by the Taiwan Opium Decree — a licensed-user system that the administration justified as gradual suppression rather than prohibition, with a government pharmaceutical works established in Taipei in December of that year to manufacture the product it was licensing. Salt and camphor followed in 1899. In 1901 the three were consolidated into a Monopoly Bureau under the Governor-General. Tobacco was added in 1905 and liquor in 1922. Estimates of what the monopolies were worth vary with the period and the accounting: one official history puts their average share of the colony's annual revenue at about 17.5 per cent with a peak near 30, while other accounts, counting the years after tobacco and liquor came in, put it around 40 per cent for two decades. What is not in dispute is that they were among the two or three pillars of colonial finance, and that camphor mattered beyond the colony, because natural camphor was then the only economic feedstock for celluloid and most of the world's supply grew on that island.

Sugar was handled differently and more inventively. From 1902 the administration ran regulations encouraging the sugar industry with subsidy, and from 1905 it assigned each modern mill an exclusive raw-material collection district, within which cane could be sold to no one but that mill. That instrument did not grant land. It granted **a property in other people's crops** — a territorial monopsony, enforced by ordinance, over cultivators who remained the registered proprietors of their fields and could not choose their buyer. A grower's title to his land, freshly conferred, did not extend to a title to sell his cane.

Now the recipients, and the consideration. The great Japanese houses took the commanding positions — camphor distribution and, in time, the mills. Taiwanese were

admitted in quantity, but as licensees and distributors rather than as principals: Koo Hsien-jung, the merchant who had gone out of Taipei to bring the army in, held monopoly business in salt, sugar and opium, helped found a commercial bank, ran the government-aligned newspaper, sat on the Governor-General's council in 1921, and was appointed to the House of Peers in 1934.

What did any of them owe in return? Not armed service. Nobody in this settlement was left with a retinue, and nobody was expected to raise one — the same administration that issued the licences had spent seven years disarming the districts and would spend twenty more taking rifles off the mountain peoples. What was owed was compliance: tax collected, order kept, the register maintained, the newspaper aligned, the ceremony attended. Every one of the instruments involved — a monopoly licence, a mill's collection district, a seat on a council, an appointment to the upper house — was revocable by the authority that granted it.

Reading the settlement against the framework

First, and this is the module's principal contribution: a fifth fiction. The corpus has three, and has added a fourth from an earlier Japanese case. Taiwan's plains settlement is none of them. It did not declare occupied land empty; it did not confirm a grantee in possession of something he had never owned; it did not partition a collective holding. What it did was take a real, multi-layered, entirely genuine set of overlapping claims and **abolish all but one of them, paying the abolished party in paper** — and it did this not to dispossess, not to bind an aristocracy, and not to manufacture a market, but to make the ground *legible enough to tax at a known rate every year forever*.

Call the job **fiscal legibility**, and note the diagnostic that goes with it, because it inverts one of the corpus's habits. The other three fictions are recognisable by what they take without paying. This one *pays*, and the payment is not evidence of restraint. **A conqueror who compensates is buying a permanent register, and a register is cheap at the price, because the compensation is a single issue of bonds set against a land tax collected annually in perpetuity.** Where a study finds a colonial settlement that bought somebody out, it should ask what the purchase installed, not whether the price was fair.

Second, the fiction is selected by the same variable that set the floor. One administration, one decade, two populations, and two entirely different instruments —

a buy-out and a register where the want was a flow off living producers, a declaration of vacancy where the want was the ground and the timber and the camphor beneath the people standing on it. The corpus has held that the variable selecting between fictions is usually the depth of the naturalised order underneath. Taiwan says the prior question is blunter: **ask what he wants off this particular population, and the fiction follows** — because a fiction that pays compensation presupposes a counterparty you intend to keep, and vacancy is what you reach for when you do not.

Third, on the consideration, and here the case corrects an expectation. The corpus expects the modern colonial grant to buy political compliance with the military clause deleted, and Taiwan confirms that exactly. But it adds something the inherited-elite cases obscure. In Northern Nigeria or Buganda the settlement bound a class that already existed and already had title. On this island the senior Qing officials had been recalled and some six thousand four hundred of the gentry had sold up and left within two years. So the settlement did not bind an existing elite. **It manufactured one** — out of cultivators written into a column, and out of merchants who had made themselves useful at the moment of collapse. And a manufactured beneficiary is more reliable than an inherited one, for the reason the corpus already knows about title: his holding comes from the conqueror's register and the conqueror's court and from nowhere else, so he has no prior claim to fall back on if the arrangement ends. The framework has treated the forged intermediary as brittle because he commands no belief. That holds for a chief nobody kneels to. **It does not hold for a proprietor, because a title deed does not require anybody to believe in the man who holds it — only in the register.**

Fourth, on borrowing, since the case invites the question directly. The answer is neither copying nor independent invention. Japan hired a Frenchman, an Englishman and an American, read a Canadian constitutionalist on British colonial practice, took the associationist answer, and applied it to a Chinese customary tenure surveyed by a Japanese professor of German-trained law, using a Qing police handbook translated by his own commission. The framework should record the mechanism plainly: **the templates a conqueror chooses among are circulating stock, produced and revised by the conquerors collectively through congresses, chairs, journals and exhibitions, and the useful research question is never who copied whom but what was on the menu that year and who was in the room.** In 1895 the menu had two items, both of them arguments Europeans were then having with each other, and Japan bought the briefs before it chose.

One last thing to carry forward. The instrument that ended the doubled tenure was called, in its own title, a *settlement* of the large-rent right — the ordinary administrative word for tidying an account. It ran to a few clauses. It was preceded by a survey that mobilised a million and a half days of labour and by a commission of jurists that took several years to establish what the custom had been. **The tidying was the cheap part. Finding out what there was to tidy was the expense**, and it is the reason the register, once made, was the most valuable object on the island.

A note on sources.

The instruments named here are given by their Japanese titles as they appear in the Government-General's *Fuhō* and in the Taiwanese scholarly literature: the three ordinances of 1898 establishing the land register, the land survey and the High Land Survey Committee; Ordinance No. 9 of 1903, *concerning the determination of the large-rent right*; and Ordinance No. 6 of May 1904, *concerning the settlement of the large-rent right*, whose compensation was funded under the Taiwan Enterprise Bond Law. The figures for the survey — commencement on 17 September 1898, roughly 1,471,534 person-days mobilised, 777,850 *kō* surveyed and 1,647,534 parcels registered — are from Wu Micha's study of the survey, as is the account of the declaration mechanism by which non-declaration was treated as abandonment and of the threefold classification of large rents. Law 63 of March 1896 is described rather than quoted; this study has not seen its text and the description follows the standard legal-historical accounts.

Three matters are flagged as unresolved and should not be relied on further without checking. The attribution of Law 63 to Kirkwood's advice is the settled account in Tay-sheng Wang's legal history and is repeated throughout the subsequent literature, but it is at second hand and this study has not examined the drafting record; whether 1896 records a selection from the advisers' briefs or a ratification of a proposal they were asked to comment on is the question, and it is unsettled here. The total sum paid in compensation for the large-rent right, and — more interestingly — **who took up the bonds and what was subsequently done with them**, have not been established; that is the single most valuable outstanding fact in this module, because the destination of that paper determines whether the buy-out dispersed the old rentier class or recapitalised it inside the colonial economy. And the share of colonial revenue represented by the monopolies is given differently in different sources, at about 17.5 per

cent on average with a peak near 30 in one official account and around 40 per cent for two decades in others; both are reported.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Tay-sheng Wang's *Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945* for Law 63, the reception of Western law and the purpose of the old-customs investigation; John L. Hennessey's *Rule by Association* for the 1895 adviser competition and for the argument that assimilation and association moved concurrently within a co-produced trans-imperial culture rather than spreading outward from fixed national models; Wu Micha for the land survey and the large-rent ordinances; Wen-kai Ye for the treatment of indigenous property, the October 1895 declaration on unreclaimed and forest land, the later relocations and the reserve allotments; and the Taiwanese literature on the aboriginal small rent for the reclassification of those rents as large rents and the litigation it produced. Okamatsu Santarō's *Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of Formosa* (1902) is public domain and has been identified but not read for this module; it should be read before the robe is written, because it is the clearest surviving statement of what the administration told itself and told foreigners it was doing.

MODULE 3

HIS MOTHER WAS FROM HIRADO

The robe: the legitimating story, and the discovery that its most expensive version was printed in English for readers who did not govern the island, while the version for the governed was one the governed had already written.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What a story has to be made of

A legitimating story is not invented from nothing. It is a claim on some authority the audience already treats as rightful, which means the first question is never what the story said but whose recognition it was trying to buy — and an order with more than one audience will run more than one story, with no contradiction, because the audiences never compare versions.

Japan in 1895 had three audiences and knew it.

The first was the Western powers. Japan had spent twenty-seven years trying to be admitted to their company; it had signed the treaty ending extraterritorial jurisdiction on its own soil in July 1894 but would not enjoy it until July 1899; and within a week of the peace it had been made to hand Liaodong back by Russia, France and Germany acting together. It now held an island of three million people, and the open question in every foreign ministry and every colonial-policy chair in Europe was whether an Asian state could administer a colony at all.

The second was the Japanese public, taxpayers and Diet, whose currency was lawfulness and whose patience was short — short enough that in 1897 a session of the Diet debated selling the island to France.

The third was the three million people on the island. And for roughly the first two decades, the administration's considered position was that this audience did not require a story, because the story would not have worked.

Take those in order, because the expenditure tells you the ranking.

Printed in London

In 1905 Takekoshi Yosaburō, a popular historian and a Seiyūkai member of the Diet, published *Taiwan tōchi shi*, an account of Japan's administration of the island. In 1907 it appeared in London and New York from Longmans, Green — *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, translated by George Braithwaite, with thirty-eight illustrations, a map, and a preface by Baron Gotō Shinpei, Chief of the Civil Administration of Taiwan. It was reviewed in the *American Historical Review* and the *American Political Science Review*.

Two facts about that book matter more than anything in it.

The first is Takekoshi's own stated ambition, which was to do for Japanese colonial enthusiasm what he believed James Anthony Froude's *The English in the West Indies* had done for British — that is, to write the kind of book an imperial public reads about its own empire. The second is what actually happened: the Japanese original made little impression at home, and the English translation proved remarkably influential in the West, both at the time and in the historiography that followed for most of a century. The book that failed as domestic propaganda succeeded as an application for membership.

It was not alone. Okamatsu Santarō's preliminary report on the old customs of Taiwan — the survey of Qing customary law commissioned so that the administration could govern through it — was published in 1902 and translated into English as the *Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of Formosa*. Nobody on the island needed that report in English. Beyond the printed word there were the exhibitions: the Japan–British Exhibition in London in 1910 and the Colonisation Exposition in Tokyo in 1912, at which the empire's territories and their inhabitants were displayed to visitors as evidence of what the displaying power had become.

Apply the test the framework leans hardest on. An apex that already holds uncontested force and still pays a real, avoidable cost for legitimacy has told you, by the

expenditure alone, whose compliance it actually needed. Japan held Taiwan by force from 1895 and needed no one's permission to hold it. It paid a translator, a London publisher and an exhibition pavilion anyway. **The language a robe is printed in is the address on the envelope**, and this one was addressed to men in London, Paris and Washington who did not govern the island, would never see it, and could not have taken it away.

Lawful, and the argument that ran for twenty-five years

The metropolitan audience ran on a different currency, and it was the one the whole nineteenth-century Japanese project had been built to acquire: legality. A state that had rebuilt its codes on German models specifically to prove it was governed by law could not hold a colony in a manner its own public would recognise as lawless.

So the colony was acquired by treaty, transferred by ceremony, and legislated for under a statute the Diet passed — and the statute was then argued about for a quarter of a century. The *rokusan mondai*, the Law 63 problem, was a standing controversy in Japanese politics: whether the Governor-General's power to legislate by ordinance was compatible with a constitution that separated the powers. Hara Takashi and his party worked at it politically, chipping at the legal and political exceptions; the enabling law was amended in 1906 to provide that the Governor-General's ordinances should not conflict with Japanese law, and again in 1921 to confine his legislative power to matters the metropole had not covered. Hara, who had argued the assimilationist case and lost in 1895, became prime minister in 1918 and installed the first civilian governor-general.

Read that correctly. The metropolitan belief that rule must be lawful was genuine, and because it was genuine it was a constraint — not a decisive one, since Law 63 in some form outlasted the argument by decades, but a real one, and the elaboration is its measure. Nobody argues for twenty-five years about the constitutional standing of a decree power unless the constitution is doing work.

Alongside legality ran a fiscal claim, and after 1897 it was the more urgent of the two. The colony was to be the *model colony* — the possession that paid for itself and proved that the acquisition had been sound. Self-sufficiency was not merely an economic target. It was the answer to a Diet that had discussed selling the place, and it is why the survey, the register and the monopolies were pursued with the urgency they were.

Science, which justified the machine and forbade the assimilation

The third strand is the one that gives this case its particular character, and it belongs to one man.

Gotō Shinpei was a physician who had studied in Germany, and the doctrine he brought to the civil administration was that colonial government must proceed on what he called biological principles: investigate the society you have acquired before you legislate for it, and do not attempt what the organism will not sustain. From that came the Commission for the Investigation of Old Customs, the cadastral survey, the household register, the campaigns against plague and malaria, the medical school, and a colonial census taken every five years from 1905.

That census deserves a sentence of its own, because it is the cleanest instance in this module of an order paying for something it did not have to. The first modern census of Taiwan was taken in October 1905 and returned about three million people. Japan itself did not conduct a national census until 1920. **The colony was counted fifteen years before the metropole.** Nothing on the island required that. It was a demonstration of what kind of state was doing the governing, conducted for the benefit of people who read statistical yearbooks in Europe.

But hold the doctrine's other edge, because it is what makes this robe unusual. Gotō's biology licensed the entire apparatus of investigation — and the same doctrine held that the Taiwanese could not be turned into Japanese, that assimilation was not a policy choice but a biological impossibility, and that Japan should therefore follow the British associationist practice and govern the colony under a separate law. The doctrine that produced the register also produced the refusal to educate. **The story that justified the machine forbade the conversion**, and it did so on the ground that the material would not take it.

The god they did not have to make

Which leaves the conquered, and here the case produces its sharpest finding, because the one piece of the robe that was cut for them cost almost nothing and they had woven it themselves.

Zheng Chenggong — Koxinga — was born at Hirado in Japan in 1624 to a Chinese merchant-pirate father and a Japanese mother, Tagawa Matsu, of Hirado. He drove the Dutch out of Taiwan in 1662 and died the same year, and the Han settlers of the island made him something close to a founding saint: the Kaishan King, the opener of the land, worshipped as the man who had made their world.

The Qing, who had defeated his grandson, had a problem with this. Koxinga was a rebel against them by definition. They moved his tomb to Fujian in 1699 and suppressed his cult, and the people of Tainan went on worshipping him under another name.

Then in 1874 — the year of the Japanese expedition, in the middle of the crisis that produced the whole late-Qing programme of opening the mountains and pacifying the aborigines — the Qing reversed themselves. An imperial edict permitted the building of a proper shrine, and the rebel became the officially venerated Prince of Yanping, with a temple the state had authorised. The previous conqueror, under pressure from the next one, canonised the conqueror before him.

In 1897 the Japanese administration converted that temple into Kaizan Jinja, the first Shinto shrine on the island. It kept the name — *kaishan*, in Japanese *kaizan*, the opening of the land. A Japanese caption of the period describes the enshrined figure as *Taiwan kaitaku no shiso*: the progenitor of Taiwan's colonisation — using *kaitaku*, the same word the Meiji state had used for the opening of Hokkaidō.

Count what Japan had to supply. Not the shrine, which existed. Not the veneration, which was a century old and deep. Not the official sanction, which the Qing had granted in 1874. Not even the vocabulary, since the shrine's own name already said *opening the land*. It supplied one genealogical fact about a man dead two hundred and thirty-three years, and a torii.

And hold the discipline here, because it is the point at which this kind of analysis most easily goes wrong. Naming the Koxinga cult as available does not make it false or its adherents dupes. It was entirely real — real enough that Qing suppression could not end it — and it was real precisely because it had been built and had taken. What made it *available* was something else: it was a story about a conqueror. **A population that venerates its own founding conquest has left a door standing open, because the next conqueror can enter by claiming the founder rather than by displacing him.**

The god they did make, and who it was for

In September 1901 the administration completed a shrine on Jiantan mountain above Taipei, sited so as to overlook the whole city. Enshrined there was Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa, who had commanded the Imperial Guards Division and died at Tainan of fever in October 1895 — the most expensive single casualty of the conquest, whose end was likened to that of the legendary Yamato Takeru and who was made tutelary deity of the island. Beside him were enshrined the *Kaitaku Sanjin*, the three kami of pioneering: the same three deities that had been installed for the colonisation of Hokkaidō.

Ask the audience question and the answer is not the Taiwanese. Kitashirakawa meant nothing to a farmer in Changhua except as the commander of the army that had burned villages on its way south, and the three pioneer deities were the tutelary kami of Japanese settlement, imported entire from the northern colony. This shrine was for the settlers, the officials and the army — the coordinating class whose recognition an apex can least afford to lose, and whose currency here was the demonstration that the conquest had been a national undertaking blessed at the highest level. In 1920 a second shrine went up at Tainan, on the site where Koxinga had died, uniquely permitted to enshrine the prince alone.

So on one small piece of ground in Tainan the whole architecture is visible: an inherited god for the conquered, a manufactured god for the conquerors, a few blocks apart.

The story that arrived late

For about two decades the administration told the Taiwanese population very little. Schools were separate, Japanese for Japanese children and public schools for Taiwanese, and the doctrine said assimilation would not work.

Then it changed, and the timing is the finding. From 1919 and through the 1920s came *dōka* and the principle of homeland extensionism — Hara's argument, twenty-three years late. From 1937, with Japan at full-scale war in China, came *kōminka*: the Chinese-language sections of newspapers and classical Chinese in the curriculum removed in April 1937; Taiwanese opera, puppet plays and temple practices discouraged or banned; shrine worship pressed and domestic altars expected; and from

1940 a campaign to replace Chinese names with Japanese ones, taken up by about seven per cent of the population by the war's end.

What the conqueror wanted in 1937 that he had not wanted in 1907 was men. Between 1937 and 1945 more than two hundred and seven thousand Taiwanese were employed by the Japanese military, and roughly fifty thousand died or went missing. The story for the conquered arrived at the moment the conqueror needed something from them that force could not simply take.

Reading the robe against the framework

First, and this is the module's principal contribution: the primary audience was a third party that neither governed the island nor lived on it. The corpus expects a colonial robe cut for the metropole, whose belief funds and mans the enterprise. Taiwan's most expensive robe was cut for the Western powers, and the diagnostic is blunt and portable: **look at what an administration paid to have translated.** A state defending a possession writes for the people who pay for it. **A state seeking admission to a club writes in the club's language and pays in visible institutions** — a census before the metropole had one, a plague campaign, a report on customary law in English, a pavilion in London. Where a study finds a colonial regime translating its own administrative reports into a foreign language, it has found the audience it actually feared disappointing.

Second, the corpus's cheapest-robe finding survives Taiwan and can now be stated more precisely. The cheapest robe is one the conquered wrote for an earlier conqueror — and Taiwan adds two refinements. It is cheaper still when the *previous colonial power* has already sanctioned it, because the awkward work of converting a rebel into an official saint has been done by somebody else, on their budget, for their own reasons. And the reason such a robe exists to be picked up at all is that the conquered order was itself a conquest that took: **the veneration of a founder is the residue of an old taking, and it is the one part of a naturalised order that a newcomer can occupy without displacing anything.**

Third, and this is the contribution I would most want tested against the next case. Where an order's legitimating doctrine is *scientific* rather than sacred, it will tend to *forbid* the assimilation of the conquered rather than command it — and it will do so in good faith, on the evidence, at the cost of the cheapest rule available. A doctrine of

divine favour or civilising mission can always accommodate a convert, because belief is by definition changeable. A doctrine about what a population biologically *is* cannot, because the whole authority of the claim rests on its being a finding rather than a preference. Gotō's biology bought Japan its standing in the eyes of the powers and cost it twenty years of the formation that might have made the island cheap to hold. **The robe that best impresses a foreign audience may be the one that most reliably prevents the belief from taking at home**, and an order that runs such a doctrine will discover the cost late, when it wants soldiers.

Fourth, on timing. The story for the conquered appeared in earnest only when the conqueror needed something force could not extract. Formation withheld for forty years was not withheld out of doubt about its effectiveness; it was withheld because nothing the administration wanted before 1937 required it. What it wanted after 1937 was recruits, and a man will not reliably die for an order that has spent four decades explaining he could never belong to it.

One last observation, left standing. The shrine at Tainan enshrining the prince who died of fever was built on the spot where the previous conqueror had died — a conqueror the conquered had made into a god, and whose mother had come from an island off Kyūshū.

A note on sources.

Public-domain works are named exactly: Yosaburō Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, translated by George Braithwaite, with a preface by Baron Shimpei Gotō (London and New York: Longmans, Green, 1907), the English translation of *Taiwan tōchi shi* (1905), reviewed in the *American Historical Review* 13:1 (1907) and the *American Political Science Review* 3:1 (1909); and Okamatsu Santarō, *Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of Formosa* (1902). Neither has been read for this module; both are identified from the bibliographic record and the secondary literature, and the account of Takekoshi's stated purpose, of the divergence between the Japanese and English receptions, and of his lobbying position within the Law 63 controversy follows John L. Hennessey's study of that book. **No sentence in this module purports to quote either work**, and both should be read before the module is treated as final — Takekoshi in particular, since the preface by Gotō is the

most direct statement of the administration's self-description available in a language its intended audience could read.

Dates and institutional facts from the standard record: the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed 16 July 1894 and in force 17 July 1899; the Triple Intervention of 1895; the 1897 Diet session at which the sale of Taiwan to France was debated; Law 63 of March 1896 and its amendment by Law 31 of 1906 and Law 3 of 1921; the *rokusan mondai* and Hara Takashi's role, following Haruyama's work as reported in the English-language literature; the Japan–British Exhibition of 1910 and the Tokyo Colonisation Exposition of 1912; the quinquennial colonial censuses from October 1905, returning about three million; the Kaizan Shrine conversion of the Yanping Junwang temple at Tainan, dated 1897 in most accounts and 1898 in a period Japanese caption, which also styles Koxinga *Taiwan kaitaku no shiso*; the Taiwan Shrine completed September 1901 on Jiantan mountain, enshrining Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa with the *Kaitaku Sanjin*; the Tainan Shrine of 1920; the *kōminka* measures of April 1937 onward and the name-change campaign from 1940, taken up by about seven per cent; and the figures of over 207,000 Taiwanese in Japanese military employment 1937–45 with roughly 50,000 dead or missing.

Three cautions. Gotō's doctrine of "biological principles" is well attested as his own term and the substance of it — investigate before legislating, and treat assimilation as constrained by what the population is — is the settled account in the literature; the vivid metaphor about fish that circulates in connection with it has **not** been verified against a source reproducing Gotō's words and is therefore not used here. The 1874 imperial edict authorising the Yanping Junwang shrine is reported in the reference literature and in the shrine's own holdings but has not been examined; its wording would be worth having, since it is the previous conqueror's own act of canonisation. And the cause of Prince Kitashirakawa's death is officially malaria, with a persistent Taiwanese counter-tradition that he died of wounds; the Japanese record is emphatic and the counter-tradition is reported here as tradition.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Hennessey on Takekoshi, on the adviser competition and on Japan's participation in a co-produced trans-imperial colonial culture; Leo Ching on *dōka* and *kōminka*; Tay-sheng Wang on Law 63 and the reception of Western law; the architectural-historical literature on the Taiwan and Kaizan shrines, including Aoi Akihito's work on the transplanting of State Shinto and on the siting of the Taiwan Shrine within the planning of Taihoku.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 4

FIVE PER CENT OF THE BOYS

Formation, 1895–1945: a school system built not to reach the population, a rival system left standing for forty years, a second population schooled by its own police, and the one door the colony could not afford to close.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The arithmetic

In 1905, ten years after the landing, about five per cent of Taiwanese boys of school age and rather under three per cent of the girls were enrolled in the colonial common schools.

That figure needs a comparison to mean anything, and the comparison is close at hand. In the other island prefecture the same state had taken sixteen years earlier, the attendance rate in 1883 was 2.85 per cent — the lowest in Japan — and by 1899 it had reached forty-four per cent and was still climbing. Two low numbers, and they are not the same kind of number. The Ryūkyūan figure was a single school system failing, for reasons of money and doubt, to reach children it was intended to reach; the curve bent sharply upward the moment the doubt was settled. The Taiwanese figure is not a system failing to reach children. It is a system that had not been built to reach most of them, run by an administration whose senior official held on stated scientific grounds that reaching them would not work.

At the other end the numbers reverse. Primary education was made compulsory in Taiwan in 1943, and by 1944 enrolment stood at 71.3 per cent for Taiwanese children, 86.4 per cent for indigenous children, and 99.6 per cent for the Japanese children on the island — rates among the highest in Asia outside Japan itself. Something happened

in between, and the shape of the curve is the module's argument. The state did almost nothing for two decades, something for two more, and everything in the last eight years, and each of those decisions was made for a reason that had little to do with the children.

Two systems, not one ration

The structural break from the earlier Japanese cases is the first thing to establish, because everything else follows from it.

In Hokkaidō and in Okinawa there was one school system, into which the conquered were pressed and within which their portion was cut short — four years against six, no science, no geography, English withdrawn. In Taiwan there were two systems under two separate ordinances: *shōgakkō*, primary schools, for Japanese children, and *kōgakkō*, common schools, for Taiwanese. Not one ladder with the top rungs removed. Two ladders, and a child's ladder was determined before he entered it.

The corpus has been reading formation as a single apparatus delivered in two halves — the identity half that dissolves the old self, the capacity half that qualifies a man for a position — and has found that the proportions between them reveal what the conqueror wanted. Taiwan for its first two decades rationed both. The schools reached a twentieth of the boys; the ones they reached were taught Japanese and ethics; and the capacity ceiling was low enough that few Taiwanese reached secondary school at all.

But look at what was on the common-school timetable beside the Japanese language, because it is the most revealing item in the curriculum: **classical Chinese**. The colonial school taught the conquered order's own canon, and the reason recorded in the literature is plain — it was there to win over Taiwanese upper-class parents. A colonial administration put the classics of the civilisation it had displaced into its own classrooms as an inducement to attend, and left them there for forty years.

Note also what the ethics course was. *Shūshin*, moral training, was the Meiji state's own subject, and the Meiji state had built it substantially out of Confucian material. So a Taiwanese child in a common school was taught filial piety, loyalty, diligence and knowing one's place — his own inherited moral vocabulary — through the Japanese language, from a Japanese textbook, on a Japanese timetable, by a teacher paid by the Government-General. Nothing in the content was foreign to him. What had changed

was where it came from. The settlement had done exactly this to his father's land: the same fields, the same neighbours, a different register. Here it was done to a canon.

The finding that withheld the formation

Behind the two systems stands one man's doctrine, and it is the reason Taiwan breaks the pattern the corpus took from Hokkaidō.

Gotō Shinpei's position was that colonial administration proceeds on biological principles: you investigate the society before you legislate for it, and you do not attempt what the organism will not sustain. Applied to formation, that meant assimilation was not a policy option that had been weighed and rejected but a thing the material would not do. Japan should therefore follow the British associationist practice, govern the colony under a separate law, and not try to make Taiwanese into Japanese.

Set that against the same state's conduct elsewhere. In Hokkaidō from 1869 it schooled the Ainu compulsorily. In Okinawa from 1880 it opened a language institute in the government building before it had a school system, and pressed standard Japanese for sixty years. In Taiwan from 1895 it built separate schools and reached a twentieth of the boys.

One state. Three colonies. Three answers, and the Hokkaidō explanation cannot carry them. That study concluded that the Meiji state assimilated the Ainu because it was in the middle of assimilating everybody — a machine built to manufacture Japanese out of two hundred and sixty abolished domains, pointed at whoever was in reach — and predicted that a conquest made by a state still assembling its own nation will impose formation, while one made by a finished nation-state will withhold it. Japan in 1895 was the same unfinished state, four years further along. It withheld.

So the variable has to be restated, and Taiwan supplies both terms. **Formation is imposed where the conquered are few enough to absorb and carry no formation apparatus of their own; it is withheld where either condition fails.** The Ainu were perhaps fifteen thousand people with an oral culture and no schools. The Han Taiwanese were three million with a literate canon two thousand years old, a private school system already in place, and an examination tradition that had been manufacturing their gentry for centuries. Absorbing them would have meant building

an apparatus larger than the one the metropole had just finished building for itself, against a competitor that was already running.

The old order kept the field

And the competitor did keep running, which is the prediction this case was set up to test.

Most Taiwanese boys, for the first two decades and more, attended not the colonial common school but the *shobō* — the private Chinese schools, teaching the classics in the local tongue, the same institution that had prepared candidates under the Qing. A smaller number, boys and girls, went to Dominican and Presbyterian mission schools. The administration discouraged both and eventually prevailed: by 1920 only some seven thousand seven hundred pupils remained in them, and many of those were attending a common school as well.

The seed's prediction was that where the coloniser withholds his own formation, the old order simply holds the field, and Taiwan confirms it — with one correction that matters. The *shobō* was not a mass system. It was, like the Korean *sŏdang*, an elite institution, and its enrolment as a proportion of all children was never large. So what held the field was not popular education but **the reproduction of the gentry**. For a generation after the conquest, the class that mattered went on making its successors in classical Chinese, on its own money, in its own language, in buildings the Government-General did not own. That is why the administration put classical Chinese on its own timetable: not to be generous, but to compete.

The other school, and who ran it

Now the second population, and here the case produces the sharpest single fact in the module.

For the mountain peoples the administration did not use the education bureau. The schools for indigenous children in the interior were operated out of the rural police stations. The same post that ran the school controlled the rifles the men depended on for hunting — impounded between expeditions under the gun-control measures —

and operated the small barter stations through which the district's trade was channelled. Schoolroom, armoury and shop, one building, one officer.

For one conquered population the school was an instrument of the civil administration. For the other it was an instrument of the police, standing on a guardline, behind a wire.

And the outcome inverts what one would expect. By 1944 indigenous children were enrolled at 86.4 per cent against 71.3 for Taiwanese — the population the administration had declared outside the ordinary law, outside property, and on one recorded official view outside the standing of persons in international law altogether was, at the end, the more thoroughly schooled of the two.

There is nothing paradoxical in it once the variable is stated properly. The mountain peoples were few, had no writing, no canon, no rival schools and no examination tradition. They met both of the Hokkaidō conditions exactly. So **Taiwan runs the Hokkaidō case and its opposite inside a single colony, under one governor-general, in the same decades** — which is as close to a controlled comparison as this corpus is ever likely to get, and it is why the restated variable can be asserted with some confidence rather than proposed.

What the elite did about the ration

The Okinawan pupils of 1895 struck for six months to be taught English, and the corpus took from that a finding: where formation is offered on terms of kinship rather than permanent difference, the conquered attack the ration and not the formation. Taiwan tests that under harsher conditions, because here the terms offered were permanent difference, and the finding survives in an altered form.

The Taiwanese elite did not ask to be left alone. They asked for more, and when refused they paid.

Local leaders in Taichū campaigned for a middle school and met official reluctance to authorise one for Taiwanese boys; in 1915 Lin Hsien-tang and others put up the money themselves and it was founded. Where the Okinawan students had threatened a school with emptiness, the Taiwanese gentry bought one.

Then the harder episode. In December 1914 Itagaki Taisuke — one of the founders of Japanese parliamentary politics — inaugurated an assimilation society in Taipei in

response to appeals from influential Taiwanese, the Wufeng Lin family among them. Within a week over three thousand Taiwanese and forty-five Japanese residents had joined. Itagaki left the island later that month. Its leaders were then arrested, its Taiwanese members detained or harassed, and in January 1915 the society was dissolved.

Read what that is. Three thousand Taiwanese asked, in public and lawfully, to be assimilated — and the administration broke up the organisation and detained the members. **The demand to be admitted was answered with arrests.** Whatever else the colonial position was, it was not a civilising mission being obstructed by an unwilling population.

Integration, when it came, came as a quota. From 1922 the two systems were formally opened to both peoples on the basis of Japanese-language ability, which in practice meant the children of wealthy Taiwanese families with close ties to Japanese settlers, and the number of Taiwanese admitted to the formerly Japanese-only primary schools was capped at ten per cent. Competition drove those who could afford it outward: by 1922 at least two thousand Taiwanese were studying in metropolitan Japan, seven thousand by 1942.

The one door

There was one channel of high capacity the colony could not close, because it needed the product and could not import enough of it. The Governor-General's Medical School opened in 1899, and for decades medicine was the highest thing a Taiwanese could realistically become.

Chiang Wei-shui was admitted at twenty. In his first year he joined the Taiwan branch of Sun Yat-sen's alliance. He set up in practice, founded the Taiwanese Cultural Association in 1921, helped launch the petition movement for a Taiwanese assembly, co-founded the island's first modern political party in 1927, was imprisoned repeatedly, and carried the Musha incident and the opium monopoly to the League of Nations. He also wrote a short piece cast as a clinical case-note, examining Taiwan as a patient and diagnosing it as suffering from a starvation of culture — a colonial subject using the diagnostic form his colonial medical school had taught him to write up the colony.

He was not unusual. The Taiwanese political movement of the 1920s is, to a striking degree, a movement of doctors, for the plain reason that the medical school was where able Taiwanese were allowed to go.

The Hokkaidō study found that the tools an order issues for assimilation are the same tools by which the assimilated afterwards document what was taken from them. Taiwan sharpens that into something predictive. **The counter-elite is manufactured in whichever capacity channel the conqueror cannot do without** — and that channel can be identified in advance, because it is the one skill the metropole cannot export in sufficient quantity to the place it has taken. Find that skill and you have located, a generation early, the room the opposition will come out of.

The calendar, forty-one years late

The Okinawan module found that the state took the tongue and left the calendar — no prohibition of the sacred groves, no prosecution of the priestesses, no conversion effort, the lunar year kept in the villages throughout. For four decades Taiwan looks the same. The lunar calendar, the temple festivals, the ancestral rites, the personal names and the domestic gods were left alone, because none of them stood between a child and a classroom the state was not trying very hard to fill.

Then, from 1936 and in earnest from 1937, all of it was attacked at once. The temple reorganisation movement set out to consolidate, close and strip local temples. Classical Chinese came off the school timetable and the Chinese-language sections came out of the newspapers in April 1937 — the inducement withdrawn the moment inducement stopped being necessary. Households that spoke Japanese at home, took Japanese names and attended shrines were designated National Language Families and publicly honoured. Small shrines were built inside school compounds, and pupils were required to attend at the beginning and end of every term and on national holidays. From 1940 came the campaign to change names, taken up by about seven per cent of the population by the war's end.

And the temple campaign failed. Internal documents from the local worshipping associations show officials arguing for gradualism precisely so as not to provoke resistance; implementation varied wildly between districts; and in 1940 the incoming governor-general changed course. The scholarship on it is titled, without hedging, as a study of the campaign's failure.

So of the four classic instruments of formation — school, language, religion, calendar — this order used two hard, one late and one not at all successfully, and the one it abandoned was the one that reached into the household. The school has a timetable the state controls and a child who must attend. The ritual year is kept by adults, in houses, on days the state did not set.

Reading the formation against the framework

First, the variable proposed by the earlier Japanese case does not survive, and the replacement is testable. Formation is not imposed or withheld according to whether the conquering metropole has finished assembling its own nation. One state, three colonies, three answers, and the northern colony's rule predicts the wrong one here. The variable that does the work has two terms, and both must hold for formation to be imposed: **the conquered must be few enough to absorb, and must carry no formation apparatus of their own.** Taiwan establishes this rather than merely proposing it, because the colony contains both cases — three million Han with a literate canon and a private school system, from whom formation was withheld for forty years; and mountain peoples with neither, on whom it was imposed until their enrolment exceeded the Han's.

Second, and this is the module's most portable contribution: the agency that delivers the formation is the fastest read on what the conqueror wants from that population. Han children were schooled by the civil administration. Mountain children were schooled by the police, in the building that held the confiscated rifles and the barter counter. The corpus already knows to ask what proportions of identity and capacity a formation delivers. Add the prior question — *who is delivering it* — because where the schoolmaster is a security officer, the order has classified that population as something to be contained rather than employed, and the curriculum will not tell you so.

Third, on the old order holding the field. The prediction is confirmed, with a correction the corpus should carry: what survives a withheld formation is usually not the conquered's popular education but **the conquered elite's reproduction of itself**, which is far cheaper to sustain and much harder to compete with. And the diagnostic that follows is unusually clean. **Where a colonial school teaches the conquered order's own canon, it is not tolerance; it is bidding against a rival institution —**

and the date the canon is dropped from the timetable is the date the conqueror stopped needing to bid. In this case that date is April 1937, and everything else that happened that year says why.

Fourth, the counter-elite is manufactured in the capacity channel the conqueror cannot import. Not in the one he neglects, and not in the one he suppresses — in the one he must keep open for his own purposes and cannot staff from home. Here it was medicine, and a man trained in it wrote the colony up as a patient.

Fifth, on what the conquered asked for. The Okinawan finding holds and hardens. Offered permanent difference rather than kinship, the Taiwanese elite still attacked the ration rather than the formation: they funded a middle school when refused one, and in 1914 three thousand of them joined a society to ask for assimilation outright. The society was dissolved within weeks and its members detained. **A conquered elite's demand to be admitted is the cheapest thing an order can ever be offered, and an order that arrests the people making it has told you that the exclusion is not a stage but the arrangement** — which is the question the next module has to price from the bottom, because a man who has been refused admission still gets up in the morning and goes to work for the arrangement that refused him, and the reason he does is the ledger.

A note on sources.

This module quotes nothing exactly. Every instrument it turns on — the common school and primary school ordinances, the Taiwan Education Rescript of 1919, the integration measures of 1922, the compulsory-education provision of 1943, and the *kōminka* directives from 1937 — is a public-domain Japanese text, and none has been read here in the original; all are given in paraphrase from the secondary literature and should not be treated as anyone's wording. Chiang Wei-shui's essay in clinical form is likewise described rather than quoted; the renderings of it circulating in English are in copyright and none of their phrasing is borrowed here.

Figures, with their provenance. The 1905 enrolment of about five per cent for boys and under three per cent for girls, and the 1943 figures of 81 per cent of school-age boys and 61 per cent of girls, are from the doctoral literature on Taiwanese girls' education; the 1944 figures of 71.3 per cent Taiwanese, 86.4 per cent indigenous and 99.6 per cent Japanese are as given in the reference literature and derive from the Government-

General's own returns. The Okinawan comparison figures — 2.85 per cent in 1883, 44.05 in 1899 — are from the Okinawa study in this collection. The survival of some 7,700 pupils in *shobō* and mission schools by 1920, with the caution that many attended both, follows Myers and Peattie; the further caution that the *shobō* was an elite institution whose enrolment rate was never high, and should not be read as a mass alternative, follows the comparative work on public schooling in colonial Korea and Taiwan. The ten per cent cap on Taiwanese admissions to formerly Japanese-only primary schools, and the figures of at least 2,000 Taiwanese studying in Japan by 1922 rising to 7,000 by 1942, are from Rubinstein's edited history, as is the account of the assimilation society of December 1914 and its dissolution in January 1915.

Two matters are flagged. The operation of schools for indigenous children out of rural police stations, alongside the control of hunting rifles and the barter posts, rests here on a single line of secondary reporting; the Japanese term for these institutions is given in the literature but has not been verified against a primary source for this module, and the arrangement — which carries the module's second finding — should be confirmed before it is relied on further. And Gotō's doctrine of biological principles is well attested as his own term and in its substance, but the module does not attribute to him any specific sentence.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Murray Rubinstein's edited history for the school system, the assimilation society and the study-abroad figures; Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie on the private schools; Leo Ching on *dōka* and *kōminka*; Ming-cheng Lo on the colonial medical profession and the position of Taiwanese doctors between coloniser and colonised; Chou Wan-yao on the *kōminka* movement; and the study of the temple reorganisation campaign as a failure, including the internal documents from the district worshipping associations counselling gradualism and the change of course under the governor-general appointed in 1940.

MODULE 5

CANE FOR THE COMPANY TO WEIGH

The cost column, 1898–1945: an apparatus of watching that cost nothing and was written to apply to one race only, a farmer who had a second crop and therefore had to be bought rather than commanded, and a benefit nobody was able to decline.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The question, and the two things that change the answer here

Why does a man who is being dispossessed get up in the morning and go to work for the arrangement dispossessing him?

The usual answer has two halves: leaving has been made worse than staying, and enough of the benefit column has been filled that most days the ledger comes out the other way. Taiwan differs from the other Japanese cases in two respects that alter both halves, and everything in this module follows from them.

The first is that the Taiwanese farmer had a second crop. The Okinawan peasant had cane and nothing else; on coral limestone with thin soil there was one thing that could be turned into money and shipped. On the western plain of Taiwan there was cane and there was rice, and both had markets. A man with two crops cannot simply be told what to grow.

The second is that the Taiwanese did not leave. Twelve per cent of Okinawa's population went overseas in forty years and the remittances came to exceed the prefecture's revenue; the corpus took from that the sharpest available reading of a cost column — what people paid to be elsewhere is the price they had put on staying. Run

the same test here and it returns almost nothing, because the movement ran the other way. Taiwan imported labour. Chinese workers resident on the island rose roughly tenfold in the decades after 1905, and by the 1920s over twenty thousand Chinese immigrants had come in, to a territory their own government regarded as lost.

So the instrument that read Okinawa will not read Taiwan, and a different one has to be found.

The watching, inherited again — and this time written by race

Begin with what held the cost column up, because it is the item that never appears in the accounts.

In 1898 Kodama issued the Hokō Law and the regulations for its execution. Ten households formed a *kō*; ten *kō* formed a *hō*; headmen were local men, unpaid, entrusted with the household register. Changes in a household's composition were reported orally to the *hō* head, who sent monthly written returns upward giving the changes in population, his observations of the local people, and any unusual occurrence. Where a member was convicted of a serious offence, the whole *kō* could be fined. Adoption was not formally compelled and by 1902 it was practically universal.

Attached to it was the *sōteidan*, the village corps of able-bodied young men, raised under police supervision, and the collective labour obligation: *hokō* groups supplied unpaid labour for roads and public works. So the same institution that watched the village also built its roads and could be turned out as an auxiliary force, and none of the three functions cost the Government-General a salary.

Now the clause that matters most, and it is an exemption. The system applied to Han Taiwanese. Japanese nationals were exempt. Colonial officials were exempt. The indigenous were exempt, being outside the ordinary administration altogether.

That is a caste map, and it is not inferred from practice — it is in the instrument. **The cost column here was sorted by race in the enabling regulation itself**, so that two men living in the same street, subject to the same governor-general and the same courts, stood in entirely different relations to the question of whether their neighbour's offence could cost them money.

The corpus already holds that a preserved order arrives with its surveillance installed and will therefore appear in nobody's budget. Taiwan confirms that and adds the sorting. It also supplies the administration's own measure of the arrangement's success: cases of collective liability and criminal cases alike fell away before 1928, and the significance officials drew from it was that control had been achieved through the standing of local notables **without increasing the size of the police force**.

The man in the middle

That force was nonetheless the most conspicuous fact of daily life. The patrolman, *junsa*, was almost always Japanese; his assistant, *junsaho*, was usually Taiwanese. Between them they handled far more than crime: tax, sanitation, agricultural instruction, opium licensing, the supervision of the *hokō*, and the general conduct of the population.

Two names for that man survive from the same year and they are worth setting side by side.

In 1925 the administration mounted a Police and Sanitation Exhibition in Taipei, at which the policeman was represented in the form of a Buddha, hung about with the attributes of the powers he exercised. In the same period the Taiwanese press was reporting the name the countryside used for him: *tiansha huangdi*, the emperor of the farmers.

One office, one year, two portraits — one drawn by the administration for a public it was courting, one supplied by the people the office was pointed at. Neither is exaggerating. They are describing the same range of powers from opposite ends.

What the arrangement charged a cane farmer

From 1905 each modern sugar mill was assigned an exclusive raw-material collection district: cane grown inside it could be sold to that mill and to no one else, at a price the company set. The scheme was devised under Nitobe Inazō — the author of *Bushidō*, then head of the Government-General's bureau of productive industries and afterwards Japan's most prominent academic authority on colonial policy — and it is the purest

instrument in this study, because it grants a property in other men's crops without touching their title to the ground.

What followed was what follows from a monopsony. Prices set low, and disputes over the weighing. The saying that came out of it has been current in Taiwan ever since and is now printed on sacking in a museum: 「第一憨，種甘蔗乎會社磅」 — *the first fool is the one who grows cane for the company to weigh.*

But hold the arithmetic from the farmer's side, because the rice field is standing next to the cane field, and it changes the relationship completely.

A man who can plant rice instead cannot be ordered to plant cane. He has to be induced, and the record of the inducement is the *rice–sugar competition* — a standing problem in the colonial economy that the companies met with three instruments, each of which is an admission.

They **indexed the cane price to the rice price**, so that a farmer comparing the two would not simply switch. They **paid in advance**, which is to say they lent, so that a man who had taken the money was committed before the crop was in the ground. And they imposed a **three-year rotation**, which removed the choice from him for two seasons out of three.

Meanwhile the subsidies and production bonuses that had propped the cane price were reduced year by year, so that the price per unit fell while the yield per unit rose, and the advances — taken to meet rising costs and to raise output — accumulated as debt.

Read the three instruments together and they are a measure. **Indexing, lending and binding are what an extractor reaches for when he cannot compel** — and the elaborateness of the apparatus is the strongest evidence available of how real the farmer's alternative was. The tenant, who had least margin, ended deepest in it.

A cane field in Erlin, 22 October 1925

The cost column broke in one district and the record of the breaking is unusually complete.

In 1924 growers around Xizhou in Changhua, dissatisfied that the Rin Pon Gen sugar company was paying less than neighbouring mills, negotiated through the village

head, a doctor and grower representatives, and obtained a supplementary payment. On 28 June 1925 they formalised it: the Erlin Cane Growers' Association, some four hundred members, chaired by Li Ying-chang — a physician and a member of the Taiwanese Cultural Association — with a Taiwanese lawyer and a Japanese journalist as advisers.

In October the association put five demands to the company. Two of them are the whole argument: that the purchase price be **published before the cane was cut**, and that it be **fixed by agreement between company and growers**. The company's managing director refused, twice.

On 22 October the company sent about forty men — its materials staff, hired coolies, and police — to cut the cane in a member's field. The coolies, faced with the assembled association members, hung back and would not start. The company's materials chief then picked up a sickle and began cutting himself; the police drew their swords and moved to protect him; the farmers threw cane stalks and stones and shouted two questions. *Since when did the police become the company's running dogs?* And: *what is the reason for drawing swords?* Two or three of the younger men took the swords off the police. Reinforcements were sent for and the crowd had already dispersed. Arrests followed, including of an association officer who had not been present.

Everything in this study is standing in that field. The floor, in the form of drawn swords. The settlement, in the form of a title that did not include the right to choose a buyer. The extraction, in the form of a man from the company with a sickle. And the conquered, asking a question that names the relationship exactly and correctly, and getting no answer to it.

Four years later a company elsewhere on the island was made to apologise publicly over false weighing, after the matter was pressed through the Taiwanese press and the courts. The instruments the metropole had exported — a newspaper, a lawyer, a court — could be turned on the arrangement. They could not be turned on the district monopoly itself, because that was an ordinance.

What the arrangement returned

This has to be counted at full weight or the ledger is worthless.

Plague was eliminated. Malaria was brought under control. Cholera ceased to be the routine visitor it had been. Average life expectancy on the island reached around sixty years by 1945. The population roughly doubled under Japanese rule. Food production rose several-fold and cane output some fifteen-fold between 1895 and 1925; by the 1920s over half the arable land was served by dam-fed irrigation, culminating in the Chianan system; roads went from something like a hundred and sixty kilometres before the conquest to several thousand by the mid-1930s; a railway ran the length of the island and two modern harbours worked at either end of it.

Some of that was extraction wearing working clothes — a railway carries sugar, an irrigation system waters cane. But the mortality figures are not extraction. A child who did not die of plague did not die of plague.

And this is the analytical point the module has to make, because the framework's usual picture cannot hold it. The benefit column is normally treated as a set of inducements a subject weighs: he receives something, and in receiving it he becomes less willing to defect. **Public health is not like that. It cannot be refused, cannot be targeted, and does not require the beneficiary's consent or even his knowledge.** The man who shouted at the police in that cane field went home to a village where the plague had stopped coming, and he had not agreed to that and could not have declined it.

An order that suppresses an epidemic has filled the benefit column of every person within reach of the mosquito control, including the members of the growers' association and the men who were arrested. That is the cheapest legitimacy purchasable anywhere, and it is why this case is the hardest in the corpus to argue about — a point the last module will have to meet head on rather than dispose of.

Where the exits went

If nobody emigrated, what did the pressure do?

It went upward and outward through the one class that could afford a fare. Taiwanese students in metropolitan Japan numbered at least two thousand by 1922 and seven thousand by 1942 — an exit taken by sending sons into the heart of the empire to acquire what the colony rationed. Movement to China was possible but administratively priced: a passport was required to travel between Taiwan and the

mainland, and the petitioners of the 1920s listed that requirement among their grievances, beside Law 63 and the cane system.

For everyone else the exit was not geographic. It was the rice field — the standing option to grow something else, which is why the companies had to index, lend and bind. That was the residual: the last thing a man still had that made the arrangement survivable.

And there was a second residual, which cost the administration nothing to leave alone. The lunar year, the temple festivals, the ancestral rites, the household gods and the names. For four decades none of it was touched.

Both residuals were removed inside the same eighteen months. From 1936 the temples were reorganised, from April 1937 the classics came off the timetable and Chinese came out of the newspapers, from 1940 the names were changed; and the war economy took the crop decisions out of the farmer's hands altogether. **The residual was removed at exactly the point the order began needing soldiers**, and by 1945 some fifty thousand Taiwanese were dead or missing in Japanese service.

Reading the cost column against the framework

First, the inherited-surveillance finding holds and gains a clause. A preserved order arrives with its watching already installed and appears in nobody's budget — established in the northern islands, confirmed here in a form so pure that the administration's own measure of success was that the police force did not have to grow. What Taiwan adds is that **the inherited apparatus also arrives pre-sorted, and the sorting is written into the instrument as an exemption list.** So the portable test is simple: in any statute imposing collective liability, read the exemptions before the obligations. That list is the caste map of the order, drafted by the order itself, and it will tell you in one clause what a study of practice takes a chapter to establish.

Second, and this is the module's principal contribution: where a subject has a genuine alternative use for his own labour, the extractor cannot command — he must bid, and the instruments of bidding are a measure of how real the alternative was. Okinawa's peasant had one crop, and what the state did to him was set a quota. Taiwan's farmer had two, and what the companies did to him was index the price of one to the other, lend him money before the season, and bind him to a rotation. None of

those is necessary against a man with no choice. **Debt is the instrument of extraction where compulsion is unavailable**, and its appearance in the record should be read not as an intensification of control but as evidence that direct control was out of reach. The corollary is worth stating because it inverts an intuition: **a colony with two crops is dearer to hold than a colony with one, and the difference shows up as credit rather than as force.**

Third, the benefit column can contain items that were never offered and cannot be refused. The framework treats the benefit side as things a subject receives and weighs. Epidemiological benefit is not weighed, not chosen, and not declinable; it reaches the order's enemies exactly as it reaches its collaborators. **An order that breaks an epidemic acquires, at a stroke, a credit entry in the ledger of every person in the territory, including everyone it is currently prosecuting** — and it acquires it without persuading anybody of anything. Any accounting that reads the benefit column as a record of inducements accepted will misstate this case badly in both directions: it will fail to explain why the population did not leave, and it will fail to explain why the argument about this colony is still going on a century later.

Fourth, where the ledger cannot be read off the emigration returns because nobody left, read it off what the people who could afford to leave did instead. Here they sent their sons to the metropole, funded a middle school out of their own pockets, hired lawyers, founded a growers' association and printed a newspaper. That is the same measurement — what a man paid to change his position — taken on a population whose exit ran upward rather than outward.

Fifth, on the residual. The framework holds that arrangements break at the moment the residual is removed. In Taiwan the residual was doubled — a choice of crop and an untouched ritual year — and it survived forty years because leaving it alone cost nothing. Both were taken in the same eighteen months, and the reason was not that the administration had finally got round to them. **Where a study finds an order stripping a residual it had tolerated for decades, the question to ask is not what changed in its doctrine but what it has started needing from the population** — and the answer here was men.

One thing this module has only priced from below. It has established what the arrangement charged a household and what it returned. What the island actually

produced, where it went, who shipped it and who banked it — including where the compensation bonds of 1904 ended up — is the other half of the same account.

A note on sources.

Quoted exactly, in the original: the saying 「第一憨，種甘蔗乎會社磅」, current in Taiwan from the colonial period and reproduced in the museum and reference literature in slightly varying orthography (乎 / 給); the English is this study's own. The two questions shouted at Erlin on 22 October 1925 — *since when did the police become the company's running dogs* and *what is the reason for drawing swords* — are given as they are transmitted in the Taiwanese public-history accounts of the incident; they are reported speech recorded after the event rather than a document, and are presented here as testimony rather than as a verbatim record.

The *hokō* material — the Hokō Law and its implementing regulations of 1898, the three-tier structure, the unpaid headmen and the household register, the oral and monthly written reports, the collective fine, the near-universal adoption by 1902, the exemption of Japanese nationals, colonial officials and the indigenous, the collective labour obligation for public works, and the *sōteidan* under police supervision — follows Caroline Ts'ai's study of the system and the standard reference literature derived from it, together with Chen's earlier work. The observation that criminal and collective-liability cases declined before 1928 and that this was achieved without enlarging the police force is from the same literature. The distinction between *junsa* and *junsaho*, the representation of the police as a Buddha at the Taipei Police and Sanitation Exhibition of 1925, and the countryside's name for the policeman as *tiansha huangdi* are from a study of Taiwanese perceptions of the colonial policeman drawing on the *Taiwan Minbao*.

The Erlin material — the 1924 negotiation at Xizhou, the founding of the growers' association on 28 June 1925 with some four hundred members under Li Ying-chang, the five demands including publication of the price before cutting and its fixing by agreement, the two refusals, the events of 22 October, and the arrests — follows the Taiwan New Cultural Movement Memorial Museum's account and the Chinese-language reference literature, which agree on the sequence. The attribution of the raw-material collection district system to a scheme drawn up under Nitobe Inazō as head of the Government-General's productive-industries bureau is from the same museum

account. The three counter-instruments against the rice–sugar competition — pricing cane by reference to the rice price, the advance-payment system, and the compulsory three-year rotation — together with the decline in subsidies and production bonuses and the resulting accumulation of debt, are from the Chinese-language literature on the incident and its economic background.

Three cautions. The figure of ¥2,400 in *hokō* negligence fines appears in a secondary account without a stated period or base and is therefore not used in the body. A strand of Taiwanese local tradition holds that police were used to compel thumbprints on contracts transferring land to the sugar companies at below half its market value, and connects this to a poem written by Liang Qichao after his visit to Douliu during his tour of Taiwan in 1911 at Lin Hsien-tang's invitation; the visit is well established, but neither the poem's text nor the land-purchase allegation has been verified here, and both are noted rather than used. And the public-health and infrastructure figures — life expectancy of about sixty by 1945, the doubling of the population, the fifteen-fold rise in cane output between 1895 and 1925, over half the arable under dam-fed irrigation, and roads rising from about 164 kilometres to some 4,456 by 1935 — are as given in the reference literature and derive ultimately from the Government-General's own returns, which are the only source for most of them and were compiled by the party being assessed.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Caroline Ts'ai on the *hokō* system; George Kerr for the public-health and life-expectancy figures as they are transmitted in the reference literature; Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie on the colonial economy; and the Taiwanese scholarship on the cane growers' movement and the rice–sugar competition.

MODULE 6

THE SUGAR KING'S NEXT ISLAND

Extraction, 1896–1945: a revenue system the conqueror did not have to invent, a staple the metropole welcomed and a staple it resisted, a monopoly that made money by curing the men it sold to, and the technique that sailed on to build the colony that would undercut this one.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What there was to take

Five things, and they sort themselves into two groups that this study has now seen five times.

Off the western plain: cane, rice, and the tax on the land that grew them. Out of the mountains: camphor and timber. And running underneath both, a population of some three million that could be registered, licensed and charged.

The first group is a flow. It is drawn at a rate, it requires the producer to be alive and working next season, and it can be eased if it crosses a threshold. The second is a stock. Camphor is a tree; timber is a forest; neither is improved by the presence of the people standing among them. The framework's extraction fork — rate against dispossession, the native needed alive against the native in the way — does not describe two kinds of colony here. It describes two halves of one, and by this point in the study it has sorted the floor, the settlement, the formation, the cost column and now the surplus, always along the same line.

The revenue system he did not have to invent

Start with what a conqueror does about money in the first year, because the corpus has a sharp finding here and Taiwan tests it against a civilisation entirely unlike the one that produced it.

The finding is that a conqueror who inherits a working revenue system captures it, because capturing an existing stream is cheaper than building one and arrives with its own legitimacy; and that a conqueror who finds nothing to capture reaches for a flat charge on a countable object — a head, a hut, a roof — and thereby generates the census, the register and the responsible headman that become the order's characteristic burden. Lugard imposed no hut tax in Northern Nigeria because the Caliphate already had a cattle tax and an alms levy, and he took those.

Japan imposed no hut tax and no poll tax in Taiwan. It found a land tax, a monetised countryside in which silver and copper already circulated, and a set of Qing state monopolies — salt and sulphur still running, camphor lapsed — and it took all of them. The invented head tax, the tell of a thin fiscal substrate, is simply absent from this case.

But it took them in a particular way, and the difference is worth naming. Lugard captured the Caliphate's tax and ran it through the emirs largely as he found it. Japan captured the land tax and then spent seven years, a bureau under the chief civil administrator himself, and something like 1.47 million person-days making it legible — surveying 777,850 *kō* in 1,647,534 parcels and finding a great deal of cultivated ground that had never appeared on a Qing register. It also inherited a currency in disorder — chopped silver, copper cash and assorted foreign coin — and replaced it, chartering the Bank of Taiwan in 1897 and giving it note issue in 1899.

Where a conqueror finds a revenue system worth capturing, his characteristic first expense is not a tax but a survey — and the survey is by a wide margin the more intrusive instrument, because a tax reaches a man once a year and a register decides what he owns.

Sugar: subsidy, district, tariff

The sugar apparatus had three parts, and only two of them were visible from the island.

From 1902 the administration ran regulations encouraging the industry: subsidy for planting, for machinery, for the construction of modern centrifugal mills. From 1905 each mill received its exclusive raw-material collection district, within which cane could be sold to it and to nobody else at a price it set. And at the far end, invisible to any farmer in Changhua, Taiwanese sugar entered Japan inside the tariff wall while foreign sugar paid duty at the border.

Subsidise the producer, remove the seller's choice of buyer, and exclude the competition at the metropole. The first two are colonial policy; the third is metropolitan policy, and it is the one that made the other two pay.

The results were what such an apparatus produces. Cane output rose something like fifteen-fold between 1895 and 1925. By the 1930s Taiwan and Korea between them were supplying the great majority of Japan's sugar. Japanese sugar companies came to hold on the order of eight per cent of the island's arable land, and Japanese residents altogether — about five per cent of the population by the late 1930s — held perhaps a fifth to a quarter of the cultivated land, the better-quality part of it, and most of the large holdings.

None of that required anybody to be removed. The cane was cut by Taiwanese who owned their fields, held title conferred by the colonial register, paid tax on it, and could not choose a buyer. That is extraction as a rate, run at the edge of what the producer will bear, with the two dials — the credibility of the punishing force and the availability of exit — set exactly where the previous module found them.

Rice, and the limit that was not economic

Then there is the second crop, and it produced the finding this module did not expect.

In the 1920s the colonial agricultural service released *hōrai* rice, a *japonica* strain bred to suit both the island's climate and the Japanese palate, and rice exports to the metropole climbed. On any commercial reckoning this was a triumph: a colony supplying its metropole with the staple of its diet, cheaply, inside the tariff.

The metropole objected. Japanese rice growers — a large, organised, enfranchised interest — were being undercut by colonial rice inside their own market, and the rice-control arguments of the 1930s were the consequence.

Set that beside the sugar. Sugar was welcomed without qualification because Japan grew almost none; the colony was filling a gap in the metropolitan diet that no metropolitan voter was filling. Rice was resisted because Japan had millions of rice farmers and they had votes.

So the terms on which a colony may sell to its metropole are not set by efficiency, by the world price, or by anything the colony does. **They are set by the metropolitan franchise.** Ask of any colonial staple whether the metropole's own electorate produces the same thing: where the answer is no, the colony will be encouraged without limit; where it is yes, the colony will be restrained no matter how well it performs, and no argument available to it will make any difference, because it has no votes.

Camphor, and why there had to be a second floor

Camphor is where the extraction changes character, and it explains the rest of the study.

The camphor monopoly was established in 1899. Until synthetic production matured after the First World War, natural camphor was the only economical feedstock for celluloid, and most of the world's supply stood on that island. Camphor comes from trees, and the trees were in the mountains — which is to say, in the territory the administration had declared state land in October 1895 for want of documents, behind the guardline it pushed eighty kilometres forward by 1904, in the districts where the schoolmaster was a policeman and the budget line was sixteen million yen for a five-year campaign.

The camphor monopoly is the reason for the second floor. Not the whole reason, but the load-bearing part of it: the wire, the mines, the outposts every two hundred metres and the seventy-four days in the Taroko gorge were the cost of getting to the trees. And when the Seediq rose at Musha in October 1930, the grievance recorded in the standard accounts is their treatment as labour in camphor extraction.

Here the fork is stock. There is no rate to ease, no threshold to stay below, no producer whose survival next season the extractor requires. There is ground with a commodity growing on it and people standing in the way, and the two dials no longer tune a rate — they set the speed of clearance.

Five modules have now sorted this colony along one line, and the line was drawn by a single question asked at the outset: what does he want off this

particular population. The answer produced two floors at two prices, two settlement fictions, two school systems under two agencies, two cost columns with two exemption lists, and now two extraction regimes. One question generates the shape of the whole apparatus, and a study that establishes it early can predict most of what follows.

The monopoly that cured its customers

Opium is the item this method has the most trouble with, and it should be set out plainly rather than resolved.

At the conquest something like a tenth of the population smoked opium; under the late Qing the trade had been legalised and had at one point supplied around half the island's revenue. Japan neither prohibited it nor let it run. From 1897 it licensed users — men certified by physicians as addicts could be prescribed and supplied — prohibited sale to anyone else, manufactured the product in a government works, set the price high, and published detailed annual statistics of consumption, revenue and registration.

Over fifty years the habit was substantially eliminated. It was eliminated by a state that was selling the drug, and the instrument of elimination was the price — which is to say that the revenue and the cure were the same act. A lower price would have suppressed less and sold more; a higher price suppressed more and sold less; there was no setting at which the administration was doing one and not the other.

This is the second item in this study with that structure. The first was public health: an epidemic broken is a benefit that reaches the order's enemies without their consent and cannot be declined. Here the extraction and the benefit are not merely simultaneous but identical, performed by one lever.

A method that cannot say *this was extraction and it was also a benefit, and neither fact disposes of the other* will misdescribe this colony in one direction or the other, and both directions are wrong.

Follow the goods, and then follow the capital

The goods went to Japan: duty-free, in Japanese bottoms, sold to Japanese refiners and consumers, financed by a bank the colonial government had chartered. That is the ordinary answer and it is correct as far as it goes.

But follow the money one step further and something more interesting appears. The Bank of Taiwan opened at Amoy in 1900 and then at Hong Kong, Fuzhou in 1905, Shantou in 1907, Canton in 1910, Shanghai in 1911, Singapore in 1912, and eventually in dozens of places across South China and Southeast Asia. The colony's own bank became the instrument of Japanese commercial expansion southward. **The surplus did not merely arrive in the metropole. It became the working capital of the next expansion.**

And so did the men. Suzuki Shōten, a trading house, grew large on Taiwan camphor oil and moved from there into Taiwan sugar. Matsue Haruji — Tokyo Institute of Technology, then a master's in sugar chemistry at Louisiana State, then a Philadelphia refinery — directed the Niitaka Sugar Refining Company in Taiwan from 1915 to 1921 and greatly expanded its output. In early 1921 he went to look at Saipan and Tinian, which the war had just delivered to Japan as a mandate, spent some weeks on the soils and the climate, and on 29 November 1921 founded the South Seas Development Company with Suzuki backing and capital from the Oriental Development Company. He cleared the ground with labourers brought in from Japan and from **Okinawa**. He was called the Sugar King, his company was spoken of as the South Manchuria Railway of the south, and in 1934 they put up a statue of him on Saipan.

Now read that against the finding this corpus already holds. The Okinawa study established that a metropole with two colonies will not protect the older one's single commodity from the newer one's: Japan taxed Okinawan black sugar from 1901 while capitalising Taiwanese centrifugal sugar, and the older prefecture had nothing else to sell and no standing in which to object. Its surplus people left, twelve per cent of them, and the remittances came home.

Some of them cut cane on Saipan, for a company built by a man from the Taiwan sugar industry with money made in Taiwan camphor, on ground taken from a third people.

Reading extraction against the framework

First, the capture-don't-invent finding holds across civilisations, and gains a clause. A conqueror who finds a working revenue system takes it; one who finds none invents a head tax and thereby builds the surveillance he will be paying for ever after. Northern Nigeria established it, Taiwan confirms it in a completely different fiscal

culture — no hut tax, no poll tax, an inherited land tax and inherited monopolies. What Taiwan adds is the price of the capture: **the characteristic expense of taking over a revenue system is not the tax but the survey**, and the survey is the more intrusive of the two, because a levy touches a man annually and a register determines what he owns for good.

Second, the extraction fork is not a description but a predictor, and it should be moved to the front of the method. Rate on the plain, dispossession in the mountains, in one colony, in the same decades. And the same variable has now sorted the floor, the settlement fiction, the formation and its delivering agency, the cost column and its exemptions, and the surplus. **The question of what the conqueror wants off each population should be settled in the landscape and then used to predict the rest**, because on this evidence it generates the shape of the entire apparatus, and a study that discovers it in the extraction module has done five modules of work it could have done once.

Third, and this is the module's new finding: a colony's terms of trade with its metropole are set by the metropolitan franchise. Sugar was encouraged without limit because no Japanese voter grew it. Rice, once the colony grew it well, was resisted because millions of Japanese voters did. The Okinawa study found that a one-crop colony is hostage not to the world price but to the metropole's next acquisition; Taiwan supplies the domestic half of the same proposition. **Of any colonial staple, ask first whether the metropole's own electorate produces it.** Where it does, no amount of colonial efficiency will help, and the colony has no instrument with which to argue, because the argument is settled in a chamber it does not sit in.

Fourth, a successful colony exports its technique and its personnel, and thereby builds its own successor. Okinawa was undercut by Taiwan; Taiwan's sugar men, Taiwan's trading capital and Taiwan's camphor fortunes built the South Seas sugar industry, using labour displaced from Okinawa. **A metropole's colonies are a sequence rather than a set of separate transactions, and the transmission belt is the men.** So the question to ask of any mature colony is where its experienced administrators and managers went next — because that is where the next colony's apparatus came from, and whose terms of trade are about to deteriorate.

Fifth, held open rather than resolved: some instruments are the extraction and the benefit at once, performed by a single lever. The opium price suppressed the

habit and produced the revenue, and there was no setting of it that did one without the other. The mosquito control that protected the plantation protected the villages. This is not hypocrisy and it is not vindication; it is a structural feature of orders that extract by administering rather than by taking, and the last module will have to hold both halves in one hand without letting either cancel the other.

One item this study has now failed to establish twice, and it should be recorded as an open question rather than left to be forgotten. The large-rent holders bought out in 1904 were paid in public bonds. **Where that paper went — whether it dispersed the old rentier class or recapitalised it inside the colonial economy, in the sugar companies, the commercial banks or the land the Japanese firms were accumulating — determines whether the settlement broke the Taiwanese gentry or converted it.** That is the hinge of the module on elite coordination, and it is the next thing to find.

A note on sources.

This module quotes nothing. Every instrument it turns on — the sugar industry encouragement regulations of 1902, the raw-material collection district system of 1905, the camphor and opium monopoly ordinances, the Taiwan Bank Act of 1897 and the note-issue authorisation of 1899 — is a public-domain text, none has been read here in the original, and all are given in paraphrase from the secondary literature.

Figures and their provenance. The survey totals — 777,850 *kō*, 1,647,534 parcels, approximately 1.47 million person-days — are from Wu Micha's study, as reported in an earlier module. The fifteen-fold rise in cane output between 1895 and 1925, the share of Japan's sugar supplied by Taiwan and Korea by the 1930s, the eight per cent of arable held by Japanese sugar companies, the twenty to twenty-five per cent of cultivated land held by Japanese residents constituting about 5.4 per cent of the population, and the monopoly share of colonial revenue — given variously as averaging about 17.5 per cent with a peak near 30, and as around 40 per cent for two decades after tobacco and liquor were added — are all as given in the reference literature and derive ultimately from the Government-General's own returns, compiled by the party being assessed. The opium material — roughly a tenth of the population smoking at annexation, the licensed-addict system, the high price as the instrument of suppression, the detailed annual publication of consumption and revenue, and the substantial

elimination of the habit over fifty years — follows the econometric literature on opium demand in colonial Taiwan and Hung Bin Hsu's work on the monopoly.

The Bank of Taiwan's branch openings — Amoy 1900, Fuzhou 1905, Shantou 1907, Canton 1910, Shanghai 1911, Singapore 1912 — are from the study of the Government-General and prewar Japanese economic expansion into South China and Southeast Asia. The Matsue Haruji material — his training, his direction of the Niitaka Sugar Refining Company in Taiwan from 1915 to 1921, his survey of Saipan and Tinian in early 1921, the founding of Nan'yō Kōhatsu on 29 November 1921 with Suzuki Shōten involvement and Oriental Development Company capital, the recruitment of labour from Japan and Okinawa rather than from the islanders, and the statue of 1934 — is drawn from the Northern Marianas historical literature and the Japanese business-history accounts, which agree on the substance; his birth year is given as 1876 in most sources and 1878 in one, and the discrepancy is noted rather than resolved.

Three matters remain open. The destination of the 1904 large-rent compensation bonds is still not established, and is flagged again in the body. The *hōrai* rice chronology and the metropolitan rice-control debates of the 1930s are given here from the general literature and would repay a documentary check, since the argument that the colony's terms of trade were set by the Japanese farm vote rests on them. And the claim that the Musha rising arose from grievances over camphor labour is the standard account and is reported as such; the Seediq had a great many other grievances, and no single cause should be asserted.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie on the colonial economy; Harry Fuess on the Government-General and Japanese economic expansion southward; Hung Bin Hsu on the opium monopoly; Wu Micha on the land survey; and the Taiwanese literature on the sugar industry and the rice–sugar competition.

MODULE 7

PRINTED IN TOKYO

Information and suppression, 1898–1944: a censor that existed and was used constantly, an opposition that escaped it by publishing in the metropole and importing itself, a scandal that removed four senior officials in eleven weeks, and the one audience the order could not afford to have hear.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What this station usually finds, and what it finds here

Run this question over the European colonial cases — how did the order control what could be known and said about it — and the expectation is a censor: an office, an index, a file of prosecutions. What turns up instead is thin and strange. There is censorship, sometimes heavy, but it faces inward at the conquered rather than homeward at the public paying for the conquest; and toward the metropole there is mostly nothing, because nothing was needed. The facts travelled. They were printed in official reports and debated in parliaments, and they moved nothing. The dominant register at the metropolitan end was not suppression but inattention.

Taiwan does not do that, and the ways in which it fails to are the module.

There was a censor here, and it was busy. It worked continuously for nearly fifty years, it was pointed at Japanese publishers as readily as at Taiwanese ones, and it succeeded. The metropolitan end was not inattentive either: in 1931 a colonial scandal removed the Governor-General, his chief civil administrator, the head of the police bureau and a prefectural governor inside eleven weeks. And the order defended, above both of those, a third channel that the European cases do not have at all.

The censor that existed and was used

The apparatus was a permit system. Publication required the Government-General's permission, and permission could be withdrawn.

The order's own instrument came first. In 1896 a paper was founded in Taipei by men associated with the Satsuma faction and within three weeks was serving as the administration's gazette; a rival appeared; the two quarrelled; and in 1898 Kodama resolved the matter by having both bought and merged. The *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* began publication on 6 May 1898 and became the largest-circulation paper on the island for the whole colonial period. It carried two pages of Chinese from 1901, ran a separate Chinese-language edition from 1905 to 1911, and returned to the two Chinese pages afterwards. Gotō, who had watched a civil society at work while studying in Germany and understood what a newspaper was for, built around it a public of prosperous Japanese residents and cooperative Han notables — and issued new colonial press laws partly to reach British-owned publications that had been sheltering behind extraterritoriality.

Now the instructive case, because it establishes that the censor was not merely a device for managing natives.

Between 1900 and 1904 a Japanese-run paper in Taiwan took an oppositional line, set itself to watch the government and publish what it found, and was banned repeatedly for disclosing scandals. In March 1904 the Governor cancelled its publication permit. It had lasted under five years.

Taiwanese, meanwhile, were not permitted to found newspapers at all.

Set that beside the finding from the other island prefecture, where the censorship file is famously empty — a censor that prosecuted editors across Japan for fifty years and was never once pointed at Okinawa, because the first newspaper there had been founded by the deposed king's fourth son and opened with the governor's own overseer in the editor's chair. The suppression in that case was subcontracted, in the colony's own voice, against the colony's own people.

Taiwan had no such arrangement, because the Taiwanese gentry had not been admitted to the press. So the file is full. **Whether a colonial censorship record is empty or thick is not a measure of how much was hidden. It is a measure of who**

was permitted to own a printing press — and before concluding from a thin file that an order was lightly censored, establish that.

The way round it was the metropole

What the conquered did about this is the most useful thing in the module.

Taiwanese students in Tokyo began publishing in 1920 — a magazine, then another under a different name — and on 15 April 1923 they founded the *Taiwan Minpao*, entirely in Chinese, in Tokyo. The reason recorded in the Taiwanese accounts is flat: the Governor-General would not let Taiwanese start a newspaper in Taiwan, so they started one where he could not stop them.

It was printed in Japan and shipped to the colony. Its Taiwanese distribution office stood next door to Chiang Wei-shui's clinic in Taipei, and he pressed subscriptions on everyone who came through. Circulation passed ten thousand by 1925. Issues were seized and banned on arrival — seven or eight of them over the run, on one account. It came out fortnightly, then every ten days, then weekly, and it was the only organ of Taiwanese opinion in existence.

In August 1927 the administration allowed it to move to Taiwan. The condition attached was that it add a Japanese-language section.

Read that condition, because it is exact. The paper could come home once the administration could read it.

And read the whole manoeuvre against the sharpest of the European cases. In French Indochina the censorship was calibrated by the language a thing was printed in: the French-language press in Saigon was near-free, the Vietnamese-language press required prior authorisation, and so to speak freely a Vietnamese had to write in French. In Taiwan the calibration was by *geography*: metropolitan press law was milder than colonial ordinance, so to speak freely a Taiwanese had to publish in Tokyo.

Same mechanism, different axis. **Colonial censorship closes whichever channel reaches the conquered as a mass and tolerates the same content in a channel that reaches only the few or the far.** What Taiwan adds is the workaround the conquered found, and it is available wherever a colony is close to its metropole and freight is cheap: **the metropole is a free zone, and the answer to a colonial censor is to publish**

inside it and import yourself. Any study of a nearby colony should look for the opposition press in the metropolitan city before concluding there was none.

The scandal that worked

On 27 October 1930 Seediq from six communities attacked the annual athletic meeting at the public school at Musha and killed 134 Japanese and two Han Chinese mistaken for Japanese.

A press blackout was imposed. Then two thousand troops went in with artillery; the army air corps flew bombing runs; and mustard gas was dropped on people armed with muskets, spears and bows — in breach of the protocol Japan had signed in 1925, and in what is generally described as the first use of chemical weapons in Asia. Of some twelve hundred Seediq involved, 644 died, of whom about 290 killed themselves. The survivors were confined on a river island under surveillance and their lands handed to groups that had assisted the administration; in 1931 a further massacre reduced them again.

And the metropolitan sensor fired. The handling of the affair was debated in the Diet, and on 16 January 1931 the Governor-General, Ishizuka Eizō, resigned — together with his chief civil administrator, the chief of the police bureau, and the governor of Taichū prefecture.

Eleven weeks from the rising to the removal of the colony's four most senior officials. Measured against the European colonial record, where an atrocity typically yields a debate, a committee and nothing else, that is extraordinarily fast.

So the metropolitan threshold in this empire stood lower. Or did it?

Apply the rule the corpus already owns: the exposure threshold is a function of whose ledger the correction lands on. Then look at what was actually being punished.

The dead at Musha, at the point the Diet became agitated, were Japanese — officials, settlers, women and schoolchildren at a sports day, in a district the administration had been reporting as pacified for a generation. The failure under examination was a failure to protect them, and the underlying discovery was that thirty-five years of reassuring returns about the mountain districts had been worthless. The correction — dismissing a governor-general and three officials — cost no Japanese voter, taxpayer or interest anything whatever.

The control case is fifteen years earlier. At Tapani in 1915 the administration tried, executed and, on the local tradition, shot into pits a number of Taiwanese that runs into the thousands. No governor-general resigned.

The cheapest correction available to a metropolitan legislature is the dismissal of a colonial official, and it is therefore the correction that happens — regardless of what the scandal was nominally about. Four resignations in eleven weeks is not evidence that the Diet minded the gas. It is evidence that Japanese had died and that sacking somebody was free.

The audience the order actually defended

Which leaves the third channel, and it is the one the European cases do not have.

The Taiwanese People's Party, founded in 1927 by Chiang Wei-shui and others, spent its four years demanding local autonomy, freedom of speech, proportional representation on councils and a Taiwanese constitution, and achieving almost none of it. Its one clear success came by a different route entirely. It filed complaints with the League of Nations about the colonial opium licensing; the League sent a representative to investigate; and the administration was obliged to find budget for addiction treatment centres.

It then did the same thing about Musha, alerting the international community to the use of chemical weapons.

In February 1931 the party was banned. Among the reasons the authorities stated for the ban was precisely that: that it had alerted the international community to Japan's use of chemical warfare in suppressing the rising.

Set the whole sequence out. A party may demand a constitution, autonomy and free speech for four years and be tolerated. It writes to Geneva twice, and it is dissolved and its founder harassed until his death from typhoid that August.

This is the module's contribution, and it follows directly from what the robe module established. The colonial seam is normally drawn with two ends — what is said at the metropole and what is done in the colony — and the order's work is keeping them from meeting. **An order that acquired its colony in order to be admitted to a club of powers has a third end, and it is the one it will defend hardest**, because that audience holds the only thing the conquest was undertaken to obtain, which was

standing among the powers, and it is the only audience whose approval cannot be manufactured at home.

The same administration that had a book about its own rule translated and published in London in 1907 banned a political party in 1931 for writing to Geneva. The outward channel was not closed. It was reserved.

And the conquered found it, which is the second half of the finding. **Where an order's robe is addressed abroad, the most effective instrument available to the conquered is the foreign audience** — not because foreigners will intervene, but because the order has already told everyone, by what it spent, that this is the opinion it cannot afford to lose.

How the argument ended

Not by censorship, in the end.

In April 1937 the Chinese-language sections were removed from the newspapers and classical Chinese came off the school timetable. On 1 April 1944 the colony's papers were merged into a single wartime organ.

A generation of Taiwanese had been taught to read Japanese and had been progressively deprived of the ability to read anything else; and then there was one paper. The seam was closed by making the population unable to read any account but the state's, which is cheaper than suppression and leaves nothing in the file.

Reading the information module against the framework

First, the emptiness of a colonial censorship file measures who was allowed to publish, not what was hidden. The corpus already holds that where a conquered elite has been co-opted the file is empty because suppression was subcontracted in the colony's own voice. Taiwan supplies the other half: where the conquered elite is **not** admitted to the press — where no Taiwanese might found a paper and even a Japanese-owned opposition sheet had its permit cancelled — the file is thick, and the thickness is a fact about ownership rather than about brutality. The diagnostic that follows is one line: **before reading a thin suppression record as evidence of a mild regime, find out who held the licences.**

Second, censorship is calibrated by the reach of the audience, and the axis of calibration varies with the geography. Indochina calibrated by language, so a Vietnamese wrote in French to be free. Taiwan calibrated by distance, so a Taiwanese published in Tokyo. In both the rule is the same — close the channel that reaches the conquered as a mass, tolerate the same content where it reaches only the few or the far. **The corollary, which Taiwan supplies and the corpus should carry: where the metropole is near and freight is cheap, the metropole is the colony's free press**, and the opposition will be found there. The condition on which that paper was allowed home — that it add a section the administration could read — is the mechanism stated by the administration itself.

Third, the metropolitan sensor fires on the cheapest available correction, not on the gravest available fact. Four senior officials removed in eleven weeks looks, beside the European record, like a legislature that cared. What produced it was the death of Japanese civilians and the availability of a punishment that cost the metropole nothing. Thousands of Taiwanese dead at Tapani in 1915 produced no resignations at all. **A colonial dismissal is the correction of first resort precisely because it is free, and its speed should never be read as a measure of metropolitan conscience.**

Fourth, and new: the seam has three ends where the conquest was undertaken for standing. A state that took a colony to prove itself to a club of powers must manage, besides its own public and its conquered population, the opinion of that club — and on the evidence here that is the seam it will protect most fiercely, because it is the one that holds the asset the whole enterprise was for. **The test is what the order punishes out of proportion.** This one tolerated four years of constitutional demands and dissolved a party for corresponding with an international body. Where a study finds that pattern — domestic criticism endured, foreign appeal prosecuted — it has identified an apex whose robe faces outward, and it has simultaneously identified the conquered's sharpest instrument, because the order has already disclosed, by what it spent on translation and exhibition, which audience it cannot afford to lose.

One thing this module has established and not yet used. Everything above concerns what could be said, by whom, and to which audience. **Who was permitted to say things — the party officers, the newspaper directors, the association chairmen, the men with monopoly licences and council seats — is a smaller and more interesting list than it first appears**, and how those men and the administration's own factions held together without instruction is the next question.

A note on sources.

This module quotes nothing. The instruments — the colonial press ordinances, the publication permit system, and the 1931 dissolution order against the Taiwanese People's Party — are public-domain texts, none read here in the original, all given in paraphrase.

Dates and particulars. The *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō*: founded 6 May 1898 from Kodama's purchase and merger of two rival papers, two Chinese pages from 1901, a separate Chinese-language edition 1905–1911, Chinese content removed in 1937, publication ceasing 1 April 1944. The Japanese-run opposition paper of 1900–1904, repeatedly banned for disclosing scandals and closed in March 1904 by cancellation of its permit, follows the Taiwanese library and reprint literature. The *Taiwan Minpao*: predecessors in Tokyo from 1920, founded in Tokyo on 15 April 1923 wholly in Chinese, published from Tokyo until July 1927, relocated to Taipei from August 1927 on condition of adding a Japanese-language section, reorganised and renamed in March 1930; circulation past ten thousand by 1925; the distribution office beside Chiang Wei-shui's clinic. Musha: the attack of 27 October 1930 and 134 Japanese dead; the press blackout; two thousand troops, artillery, aircraft and mustard gas in breach of the 1925 protocol; 644 Seediq dead of about 1,200 involved, some 290 by suicide; the confinement of survivors and the further killings of 1931; the Diet debate and the resignations of 16 January 1931.

Four cautions. The names of the officials who resigned are given as Governor-General Ishizuka Eizō with his chief civil administrator Hitomi Jirō, the police bureau chief and the head of Taichū prefecture; one widely-copied secondary source names a different governor-general and civil administrator entirely, and that version is not followed here, but the discrepancy should be resolved against a Japanese official list before the passage is relied on. The characterisation of the Musha gas as the first use of chemical weapons in Asia is given in the literature as an allegation and is reported as such. The detail of the press blackout rests on secondary reporting and has not been traced to an order. And the League of Nations episodes — the complaint over opium licensing, the visit of a League representative, the resulting provision for treatment centres, and the citation of the party's international communication about the gas among the stated grounds for its dissolution — follow the standard accounts of the

Taiwanese People's Party; the League's own records would settle the dates and the form of the complaints and have not been consulted.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Tanigawa Shun on Gotō's colonial media system and the construction of a controlled colonial public sphere; Ming-cheng Lo on the Taiwanese People's Party and the doctors within it; Robert Tierney and the contributors to the recent collected volume on the Musha Incident for the suppression and its political aftermath; and the Taiwanese public-history and library literature for the newspapers.

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MODULE 8

THE BANK THE BONDS BUILT

Elite coordination and the default, 1904–1945: what happened to the paper the conquest paid out, the chain audited link by link, ten years of open war between two Taiwanese factions, and the one proposition neither of them ever put in issue.

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The question this module asks

The men at the bottom of an order are held down. That part is solved, and the previous modules have priced it.

The interesting question is one level up. An arrangement of this kind contains a governor-general, a metropolitan treasury, a rotating officialdom, a settler population, four or five great trading houses, a native landlord class, a licensed professional stratum, a village headman working for nothing and a policeman who is his neighbour's cousin — and most of these parties dislike a good many of the others. Nothing coordinates them. There is no meeting at which they agree to hold the arrangement together.

And yet it holds, because each of them, in defending the thing that makes his own position what it is, defends the whole by default. That is the proposition to test, and Taiwan tests it unusually well, because this study has been carrying an unanswered question since the settlement module: the large-rent holders were bought out with government bonds in 1904, and nobody had established where that paper went.

It went into a bank, and the way it got there is the clearest instance of the default the corpus has yet produced.

What happened to the bonds

The ordinance of May 1904 extinguished the large-rent right and compensated its holders with public bonds — thirty-year paper at five per cent, issued under the Taiwan Enterprise Bond Law.

Then something the administration had not planned for happened. The recipients did not want it.

A government bond was a novel object in Taiwan; nothing in Qing practice had accustomed anybody to holding a thirty-year claim on a state. It was also 1904, and the state in question was at war with Russia. Former large-rent holders across the island concluded that a promise redeemable in 1934 by a government that might lose a war was worth taking a loss to be rid of, and they began dumping the paper below face value. The dumping was general enough to move the price, and a visibly failing government bond was a direct injury to the Government-General's own credit and standing.

Its response had two halves and both are worth watching.

It began buying the compensation bonds back itself, to hold the price up and steady public confidence in its paper. And it began actively urging Taiwanese notables to stop selling and instead **pledge the bonds as collateral at the Bank of Taiwan**, borrow against them, and start enterprises.

On 5 June 1905, gentry of central Taiwan led by Wu Ju-hsiang subscribed 220,000 yen and incorporated the Chang Hwa Bank at Changhua — founded expressly to deal with the compensation-bond problem, and the first bank in the island's history raised on Taiwanese capital. Among its supervisors was Koo Hsien-jung of Lukang, the merchant who had gone out of Taipei in June 1895 to bring the Japanese army in. From 1908 the bank's affairs were joined by Lin Hsien-tang of the Wufeng Lin family, who came in time to lead it; there is a bronze of him in the head office to this day.

Stop and read what that sequence actually is.

The state abolished a property right that had existed for two centuries. It paid in paper. The people it paid distrusted the paper and tried to escape it, and their escape threatened the state's credit. So the state bought the paper back to protect its own standing, and simultaneously converted the sellers into borrowers, shareholders and bank directors — which is to say, it turned a class whose ancient claim it had just

extinguished into a class holding a direct financial stake in the solvency of the government that extinguished it.

Nobody was persuaded of anything. The Government-General was protecting its credit. The gentry were protecting the value of what they had been handed. The Bank of Taiwan was lending against good collateral. Each party acted from his own position, and the aggregate was an arrangement in which the former rentiers of central Taiwan now had a portfolio reason to want the colonial state to remain solvent for thirty years.

A landlord can detest a government and keep his land. A bondholder cannot detest a government without detesting his own holdings.

The chain, audited link by link

Now run the whole chain and ask at each link: does this man, in defending his own position, thereby defend the arrangement?

The metropolitan treasury. After the subsidy years the colony ceased to draw and began to remit, and the Diet that had discussed selling the island in 1897 had nothing further to say. Position defended: a possession that costs nothing.

Japanese consumers. Sugar inside the tariff wall, cheaper than the world price would have made it. They never had to think about it, which is the point.

Japanese rice growers. The one link that pulled *against* the colony — and, being enfranchised, the one that won. The exception proves the mechanism: a metropolitan interest whose position is injured by the colony will act, and will be heard, in exact proportion to its votes.

The Governor-General. Legislating by ordinance under an enabling law renewed every five years, answerable upward and to nobody in the colony. Position defended: the widest executive discretion in the empire.

The colonial officialdom. Careers unavailable at home, seniority faster, authority larger. The colony was an outlet, and an outlet is the classic discharge for a metropolitan surplus of ambitious men.

Japanese settlers. About five per cent of the population holding perhaps a fifth to a quarter of the cultivated land, the better part of it and most of the large holdings — and

exempt by name from the collective-liability system that bound their Taiwanese neighbours. Two things to defend, and the second was written into the regulation.

The sugar companies. Subsidised at the mill, granted a district in which no grower could sell elsewhere, and protected at the metropolitan border. Three separate favours, none of which survives the end of the arrangement.

Taiwanese landlords and the new proprietors. Title conferred by the colonial register, enforceable in the colonial courts, mortgageable at the colonial banks — and, for the former large-rent holders, a bond portfolio besides.

The *hokō* headman. Unpaid, which looks like a defect until one asks what he got instead: the standing of the man the administration deals with, and the certainty that if he did not do it a policeman would.

The Taiwanese assistant patrolman. A salary and formal authority over his neighbours, in an order where the patrolman above him was almost always Japanese and the ceiling was therefore visible.

Taiwanese doctors. A licence, an income, and the highest standing a Taiwanese could ordinarily reach.

The cane grower. A registered title, an advance payment before the season, and a cane price indexed to the rice price. Not a good bargain; a bargain nonetheless, and one that disappears if the arrangement does.

Down that whole chain the answer is yes — sometimes enthusiastically, mostly grudgingly, always structurally.

Then look at where the chain stops.

The mountain peoples had no link. No exemption to defend, because they were outside the system that granted exemptions. No title, because they had been found to hold none. No licence, no seat, no bond, no salaried post, no council. There was nothing whatever in the arrangement that they would be worse off without.

And that is where the order spent force for forty years — a guardline pushed eighty kilometres, a wire, mines, a sixteen-million-yen campaign, seventy-four days in the Taroko gorge, and, thirty-five years in, mustard gas.

The default's coverage map and the floor's expense map are inverses of one another. Wherever the chain reached, the order was cheap and needed no persuading;

wherever it did not reach, the order paid in soldiers, permanently. That is not a coincidence and it is not two findings. It is one mechanism seen from its two ends, and it is the most useful thing in this module for reading any other case: **find the population that the settlement gave nothing to defend, and you have located, in advance, where the garrison will be.**

Ten years of open war among people who agreed about everything that mattered

Now the elite war, which is the proper instrument for measuring a default — because what a default consists of is whatever survives people with every incentive and every resource to attack it.

The Taiwanese Cultural Association was founded in October 1921 by Chiang Wei-shui, Lin Hsien-tang and others. From 1921 the petition movement began: fifteen petitions to the Imperial Diet over fourteen years, presented through sympathetic Japanese politicians, asking for a representative assembly for Taiwan. When the League for the Establishment of a Taiwan Parliament sought registration at the Taipei police headquarters in January 1923 it was refused; the members went to Tokyo, where a police office approved it the following month — the same geographic arbitrage that had put their newspaper in Tokyo.

Against them stood other Taiwanese. In 1923 Koo Hsien-jung founded a Public Interest Society in opposition to the movement, and in 1924 convened a rival island-wide gathering of notables. For a decade the two camps fought in public: the man who had opened the gate in 1895 against the man who was petitioning the Diet, both Taiwanese, both made by the conquest, both in due course appointed to the House of Peers.

That is a real quarrel with real stakes, conducted by men with money, newspapers and organisation, over a decade. So: what did it leave untouched?

Neither side, in fourteen years, proposed the independence of Taiwan, or its return to China, or the termination of Japanese sovereignty. Koo's faction defended the administration outright. Lin's faction asked for a legislature — **inside the Japanese empire, under Japanese sovereignty, constituted by the Japanese Diet** — and said so

explicitly and repeatedly, partly because the alternative visibly on offer elsewhere in the empire was armed anti-colonial revolution and they wished to be distinguished from it.

The corpus already holds, from the other island prefecture, that a co-opted elite's maximal public demand locates the boundary of the default and will always concede the conquest, because it names the largest thing they can ask for without forfeiting what they have already been given. That finding was made against a co-opted **dynasty** — the deposed royal house asking to be made hereditary governors of a Japanese prefecture.

Taiwan is the harder test, and the finding survives it. Here there was no dynasty to co-opt; the Qing officials had gone home and the gentry had been remade into proprietors and bondholders by the conqueror's own instruments. And the manufactured elite drew the same boundary in the same place.

Why they asked for a parliament instead of equality

The origin of the demand is the sharpest thing in this module, and it is easy to walk past.

The movement did not begin as a demand for a Taiwanese assembly. It began in 1918 as a campaign to **repeal Law 63** — to abolish the Governor-General's ordinance power and bring Taiwan under the ordinary law of Japan. That is the assimilationist demand: full metropolitan equality, the same statutes, the same rights.

It was redirected. Lin Cheng-lu argued that repealing Law 63 would deliver Taiwan into the metropolitan legal order and dissolve whatever made Taiwan a distinct thing at all — and that the movement should instead demand a Taiwanese parliament, restoring to Taiwan a legislative power of its own inside the empire.

So the elite was offered, in principle, the road to being simply Japanese, and chose instead to be separately governed.

Read that with the framework's own instrument rather than sentimentally. A colonial legislature for Taiwan is a chamber that Lin Hsien-tang and men like him would sit in. Metropolitan equality is a franchise in which three million Taiwanese would be a rounding error among sixty million Japanese, and in which the standing of a Taichung landlord would be precisely nothing. **The demand for autonomy was also, and without any contradiction, a defence of the demanders' own position** — and it is not necessary to decide which of those it "really" was, because the framework's whole

point is that they do not compete. A man defends what makes him what he is, and what made Lin Hsien-tang what he was, was Taiwan.

What he actually got, after fourteen years and fifteen petitions, was the local elections of 1935: half the seats elected on a restricted property franchise and half appointed, the first elections held anywhere in Japan's colonies. And the men who won them were substantially the men who had been the administration's notables all along.

Classifying the case

Against the Menu, the classification is not close.

It is not **assume-the-chair**: there was no chair. The provincial governorship was ten years old, its senior occupants withdrew to the mainland, and some six thousand four hundred of the gentry sold up and left within two years. The office existed and the incumbents evaporated.

It is not **export**, though the colony served as an outlet for metropolitan careers; not **prevent**, since the administration recruited Taiwanese into the police, the schools and the medical service; and only incidentally **rotate**, though governors-general averaged short tenures.

It is **Co-opt**, and the consideration is political compliance with the military clause deleted — the modern colonial form, exactly as the corpus predicts. Nobody in this settlement was left with a retinue. The same administration that issued the monopoly licences had spent seven years disarming the plains and twenty more taking rifles off the mountains, and every instrument it granted — a licence, a district, a council seat, a peerage, a bank charter — was revocable by the authority that granted it.

But Taiwan adds an instrument the corpus has not recorded, and it should be added to the family.

Where a conqueror finds no elite to inherit, he manufactures one; and the most binding instrument for manufacturing one is not land but a financial claim on the colonial state itself. Land binds a man to a register and a court. A government bond binds him to the government's *solvency*, which is a far tighter tie, because it cannot be defended locally, cannot be hidden, cannot be worked, and is worth exactly nothing the day the arrangement ends. The Buganda chief with eight square miles and the Sokoto emir with his courts both had something that would survive the British; the Changhua

landlord with thirty-year paper at five per cent had something that would not survive the Japanese by a single day.

And note how the tie was tightened: not by design but by accident, when the bonds began to fall and both parties discovered they had the same interest in the price.

Overproduction, and where the fracture came from

The order's exposure to a surplus of unplaceable claimants was real and it was managed by omission.

On the Taiwanese side, the medical school produced more qualified men than the administration had positions for Taiwanese, and every other high channel was rationed. That is elite overproduction with the outlet closed, and it produced exactly what the framework predicts: a counter-elite. It did not produce a rising, because the surplus discharged into private practice, journalism, a cultural association and a newspaper printed in Tokyo — expensive to the order in argument, cheap in force.

On the Japanese side the colony was itself the outlet, and the top of the chain turned out to be its weakest link rather than the bottom. When Musha exposed a generation of false reporting about the mountain districts, the Diet removed the Governor-General, his chief civil administrator, the police bureau chief and a prefectural governor inside eleven weeks — because those were the positions whose sacrifice cost the metropole nothing.

The arrangement was not ended by any of this. It was ended by a war fought elsewhere, and the module on collapse will have to say so.

Reading the default against the framework

First, the module's principal contribution, and it answers the question this study has carried since the settlement. Compensation paid in government securities is not merely a price. **It is a co-optation instrument, and a tighter one than a land grant, because it converts the compensated party's interest from a thing he holds into the solvency of the party that compensated him.** The mechanism completed itself here by accident: the paper fell, the state bought it back to protect its credit, pressed the holders to borrow against it rather than sell, and the holders founded a bank. Within a

year the men whose two-hundred-year-old rent-right had been abolished were shareholders in the colonial economy, and one of them would spend the next thirty years leading the loyal opposition. **Where a study finds a colonial buy-out, it should not stop at the price. It should ask what the paper was afterwards used to buy.**

Second, the default's coverage map is the inverse of the floor's expense map. Every link in the chain from the metropolitan treasury to the cane grower had something that the arrangement's collapse would take away, and the arrangement held there without instruction. The mountain peoples had nothing — no exemption, no title, no licence, no seat — and that is precisely where the order maintained a wire, a minefield and a permanent campaign for forty years. **These are not two findings. Find the population the settlement gave nothing to defend, and you have located the garrison before you look for it.**

Third, the maximal-demand finding survives a harder test than the one that produced it. It was established against a co-opted dynasty; Taiwan runs it against an elite the conqueror had himself manufactured out of registers and bonds, in an argument conducted publicly for a decade by two hostile Taiwanese factions with money and newspapers. Fifteen petitions in fourteen years, and none of them asked for anything that did not presuppose Japanese sovereignty. **A conquered elite's maximal public demand marks the boundary of the default whether the elite was inherited or built, and the manufactured one draws it in the same place** — which is a stronger result than the original, because a manufactured elite has less to lose and still did not ask.

Fourth, a refinement on why. This elite began by demanding metropolitan equality and abandoned it in favour of a colonial legislature, on the stated ground that equality would dissolve Taiwan's distinctness. The framework should record that plainly and without cynicism: **a conquered elite offered assimilation may refuse it, because assimilation abolishes the thing it is the elite of.** The demand for autonomy and the defence of one's own standing are not two motives to be told apart. They are one position, and the framework predicts them together.

Fifth, on the Menu. Co-opt, consideration compliance, no armed capacity retained, promotion distributed to persons rather than to groups — a council seat in 1921, a peerage in 1934, a bank supervisorship in 1905, a medical licence, a monopoly distributorship — so that no faction could sustain a demand that would cost its own

members their prospects. The one addition Taiwan makes to the family is the security: **the bond, as distinct from the estate, as the instrument of manufacture.**

One thing this module has established and cannot yet use. Every one of those instruments — the licence, the seat, the charter, the peerage — was granted by an authority answerable to nobody in the colony, and the elite's whole fourteen-year campaign was an attempt to change that and failed. **What counterweights existed that the administration did not own, and whether the residue of that argument amounted to anything a man could actually use, is the liberty question**, and it is next.

A note on sources.

This module quotes nothing. The instruments — the ordinance of May 1904 and the Taiwan Enterprise Bond Law, the *hokō* regulations, the consultative council of 1921 and the local government reform of 1935 — are public-domain texts and are given in paraphrase.

The bond material is the load-bearing new evidence and its provenance should be stated exactly. The thirty-year term at five per cent, the panic selling of the compensation bonds below face value, the attribution of that panic to the novelty of government paper in Taiwan and to the Russo-Japanese War, the Government-General's decision to buy the bonds back in order to stabilise their face value and public confidence, and its active encouragement of Taiwanese notables to pledge the bonds as collateral for loans from the Bank of Taiwan to found enterprises, are drawn from the Taichung City cultural-heritage account of the founding of Chang Hwa Bank. The founding particulars — 5 June 1905, capital of 220,000 yen subscribed by central Taiwan gentry led by Wu Ju-hsiang, head office at Changhua, Koo Hsien-jung of Lukang and Chen Chih-fen among the supervisors, the first bank raised on Taiwanese capital, the move of the head office to Taichung in 1910, and Lin Hsien-tang's involvement from 1908 and later leadership — are from the same source and from the Chinese-language reference literature, which agree. **This chain rests on Chinese-language public-history and reference sources rather than on the bank's own records or the Government-General's financial files, and the causal claim that the buy-back and the loan policy were a deliberate response to the dumping should be**

confirmed against those before it is treated as settled. It is the single most consequential factual claim in this module.

The petition movement — fifteen petitions between 1921 and 1934 presented through sympathetic Diet members, the refusal of the League's registration in Taipei in January 1923 and its approval in Tokyo the following month, the movement's origin in the Law 63 repeal campaign of 1918 and Lin Cheng-lu's argument for redirecting it, the petitioners' insistence that they worked within rather than against the framework of colonial rule, and the outcome in the half-elected local councils of 1935 — follows the standard accounts and the Japanese-empire teaching materials that reproduce the documents. **The petition texts themselves have not been read for this module.** They are the single most valuable outstanding document in this study, and the characterisation of the demand as presupposing Japanese sovereignty, though uncontested in the literature, should be verified against the wording before the closing module relies on it.

Koo Hsien-jung's Public Interest Society of 1923 and the rival notables' gathering of 1924 are from the Chinese-language reference literature and are reported here in outline; the details of that quarrel would repay a proper reading and have not had one.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Chou Wan-yao on the petition movement; Ming-cheng Lo on the professional stratum and the political associations; Caroline Ts'ai on the *hokō*; and the economic-history literature for the confiscation of land whose ownership could not be established to the administration's satisfaction and its transfer to Japanese enterprises, a figure given as approximately twenty per cent, which bears on the settlement module and is recorded here for that purpose.

MODULE 9

FIVE YEN

Plurality or foreclosure, 1896–1945: three monopolies fused in one office by statute, real counterweights that existed two thousand kilometres away, a court the conquered could win in and a class of defendant they could not reach, and a franchise qualification the metropole had abolished for itself ten years earlier.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The question, and the instrument that answers it in one clause

Liberty is not a matter of what an order says about itself. It is a matter of whether violence, wealth and trusted information sit in one hand or in several hands that can check one another — and where they are fused, there is no liberty regardless of the rhetoric, while where they are split among factions that need protection from each other, the residue of their quarrels hardens into rights.

Taiwan answers the first half of that in a single statute, and the answer is unambiguous.

Under Law 63 the Governor-General issued ordinances having the force of law in the territory, and only those Japanese statutes he approved applied there. He commanded the police and, for most of the period, was a serving general or admiral. He ran the Monopoly Bureau, the land register, the survey, and the public-bond issue. He controlled publication by permit, and the island's largest newspaper had been created by his predecessor buying two rivals and merging them.

Violence, wealth, information. One office, answerable upward to Tokyo and to nobody whatever inside the colony. That is foreclosure written into an enabling act, and no amount of talk about a model colony changes it.

But the interesting thing about this case is not the foreclosure. It is that the foreclosure had an edge, and the edge was close.

The counterweights existed, and they were somewhere else

Japan itself was plural, and increasingly so. It had a written constitution, an elected lower house, competing parties that formed governments, courts, a large and argumentative press, and from 1925 universal male suffrage at twenty-five.

Taiwan lay inside the Japanese state and outside its constitutional order, and the line between the two was Law 63.

So the counterweights that a Taiwanese could actually reach were real, and every one of them was in Japan.

The newspaper was founded in Tokyo in 1923 and shipped in, because no Taiwanese was permitted to found one at home. The League for the Establishment of a Taiwan Parliament applied to the Taipei police in January 1923 and was refused; its members went to Tokyo and a police office there approved it the following month. Fifteen petitions were presented to the Imperial Diet between 1921 and 1934, through Japanese members willing to introduce them. When the Taiwanese People's Party wanted an authority that could embarrass the Government-General over opium, it wrote to Geneva.

Every effective act of Taiwanese politics in this period was performed outside Taiwan.

Where a foreclosed colony is attached to a plural metropole, the counterweights are not absent. They are non-resident — and liberty becomes, quite literally, a function of transport and postage. The political history of such a colony is partly a history of who could afford the fare, which is why the men in the photographs of the petition delegations arriving in Tokyo are landlords, doctors and lawyers, and why the movement's leader was the head of a bank.

The forum, and the clause that kept the argument alive

The corpus already holds that a legitimating formula becomes something functionally like a right only where an institution exists that is obliged to hear people repeating it back — that the residue of liberty requires a forum, and the forum is what plurality

actually supplies. Taiwan supplies a forum and it is worth naming the mechanism that kept it open.

Law 63 was not permanent. It required renewal by the Diet at intervals, and that periodic renewal is what gave the Taiwanese case a recurring, calendared occasion on which the colony's constitutional position had to be argued in a chamber that had to sit and vote. The Law 63 problem ran in Japanese politics for a quarter of a century; Hara Takashi built a career partly on it; the statute was amended in 1906 and again in 1921; and the Taiwanese movement itself began, in 1918, as a campaign for its repeal.

None of that was designed to produce liberty for anybody. It was a drafting compromise between men who thought the colony needed a free hand and men who thought the constitution meant something.

A sunset clause in an enabling act is a liberty-producing device whether or not anyone intended it, because it manufactures a periodic obligation to re-argue — and an argument that must be had every few years, in a chamber with a public gallery and a press, is a place where a grievance can be lodged. Where a study finds a colonial enabling statute with a renewal requirement, it should expect to find the conquered's politics organised around the renewal dates.

A court the conquered could win in

Now the harder half, because the answer is not simply that there was nothing.

Taiwanese could sue and did. The Erlin cane growers retained a Taiwanese lawyer and a Japanese journalist as advisers before they ever confronted the company. In 1929 a sugar company was made to apologise publicly over false weighing, after the matter was pressed through the Taiwanese press and the legal process. The plains-aborigine communities whose small-rent rights had been swept into the abolished category litigated, and the land bureau — which had begun by denying the category existed — was eventually obliged to recognise it and to broker settlements.

That is not decoration. Law cannot serve as legitimation unless it genuinely constrains: the powerful must really be held to their own rules a great deal of the time, or the belief that makes rule cheap will not hold. Officials sometimes lost. Companies sometimes apologised. These are the mechanism working, not embarrassments to the analysis.

And now the limit, which is exact.

A Taiwanese could sue a sugar company for cheating on the scales. He could not sue the raw-material collection district, because the district was an ordinance, and there was no court in the empire with jurisdiction to set aside an ordinance of the Governor-General on the ground that it was unjust. He could win against a party inside the arrangement. He could not reach the arrangement.

The reliable test of a colonial court is not whether the conquered ever won. It is what class of defendant they could not reach — and where the unreachable class is the executive's own legislation, the court is a genuine counterweight against private power and no counterweight at all against the order.

Five yen

Which brings the module to the number that gives it its title.

In 1925 Japan abolished the property tax qualification for the metropolitan franchise. Universal male suffrage at twenty-five; the electorate went from roughly three million to about twelve and a half million.

In 1935, after fourteen years of petitions, the colony was given elections for the first time. Half the seats on the city and township councils were elected; the other half were appointed by the prefectural governors. The vote belonged to men aged twenty-five and over who had paid five yen or more in tax in the year — 229,049 people out of a population of some four million. Turnout was ninety-five per cent.

The following year the prefectural assemblies were elected, half of them, by an electoral college composed of local councillors — half of whom had themselves been appointed. About 0.073 per cent of the population was eligible to take part.

And the composition of that electorate is the finding. Japanese residents made up about five per cent of the population, and more of them qualified than the arithmetic of their numbers would suggest, because the qualification was a tax threshold and they were the richer population. Yang Chao-chia, who had spent years persuading the administration to hold these elections at all, protested the franchise to the Governor-General and got nowhere; he was later knifed by a pro-government assailant. The top vote-getter in Taipei received 1,245 votes.

Now state the mechanism plainly, because it is the cleanest instance the corpus has.

Nobody was denied the vote for being Taiwanese. There was no racial disqualification, no clause naming the islanders, nothing a Diet member could be embarrassed by. There was a tax threshold, applied to everyone identically, and the justification offered for it — that a franchise should rest on a demonstrated stake — was the ordinary justification of nineteenth-century liberal constitutionalism everywhere.

It was also a qualification that Japan had abolished for itself ten years before it imposed it on the colony.

The corpus holds that inside a constitutional state exclusion is administered by exception rather than by denial, and that the justification offered will be *true*, because the state manufactured the disqualification. Taiwan adds the measuring rod. **Where an order excludes by qualification rather than by name, the interval between the date the metropole abolished that qualification for itself and the date it imposed it on the colony is the size of the exception, expressed in years.** Here it is ten.

Three rings, and one that was never admitted

Ask *plural where* and *foreclosed where*, because an order can be both at once in different places, and this one was in three.

Japanese residents in Taiwan were exempt by name from the collective-liability system, sent their children to separate schools, held a fifth to a quarter of the cultivated land while being a twentieth of the people, and were over-represented in the only electorate that existed. Inside.

Han Taiwanese were bound by the *hokō*, schooled separately and later on quota, admitted to the courts, admitted after 1935 to a quarter-elected local council if they paid five yen, and admitted in 1921 to a consultative body whose members the Governor-General appointed. Partly in, on terms.

The indigenous peoples were outside the ordinary administration altogether — the government's own laws did not apply to them, they were held to own no property, they were not in the *hokō*, and they never at any point received a vote of any kind. Their children were schooled by the police. Outside entirely.

The dates of admission are the arrangement's own ranking of what each group was worth, and the third ring has no date.

And that connects directly to what the previous module found about the chain of positions. The residue that becomes rights is a by-product of quarrels among parties who count — settlers against officials, companies against growers, the metropolitan Diet against the Government-General, one Taiwanese faction against another. **A population that is not a party to any of the quarrels receives none of the residue**, because there is nobody whose defence of his own position happens to protect it. That is the structural reason the mountain peoples got a guardline and never got a franchise, and it is the same finding as the coverage map, seen from the liberty side.

What it cost to use what there was

The Taiwanese Cultural Association ran from 1921 and was banned in 1931. The Taiwanese People's Party was dissolved in February 1931, with its communication to an international body among the stated grounds. Chiang Wei-shui was imprisoned repeatedly and died in August of that year. The Taiwan Local Autonomy Alliance, which had actually obtained the 1935 elections, dissolved itself in 1936. Elections were held again in 1939 and 1940; the 1944 round was cancelled for the war, and the sitting councillors simply continued until the surrender.

In April 1945, with the empire four months from its end, Taiwanese were finally given seats in the House of Peers and the metropolitan franchise was extended to the colony.

The speed with which a threshold is removed once the metropole's accounting changes is the proof that it was always a throttle. Twenty-four years of petitions produced a five-yen qualification. Four months of impending defeat produced the franchise.

Reading the liberty variable against the framework

First, foreclosure and plurality can be separated by a jurisdictional line rather than by a period. This order was foreclosed in the colony and attached to a metropole that was becoming genuinely plural in the same decades. The consequence is that **liberty**

here was not absent but non-resident — every counterweight the conquered could actually use was in Japan, and the political history of the colony is consequently a history of journeys, postage and freight. The diagnostic: where a study finds a colony's opposition press, its political associations and its petitions all located in the metropolitan capital, it has not found a weak opposition. It has found the jurisdictional line, and it should map the line rather than the movement.

Second, a renewal requirement in a colonial enabling act is a liberty-producing device. Law 63 had to be re-argued; the argument ran for twenty-five years; and the conquered's own movement was born inside it. Nobody intended this. **A sunset clause manufactures a periodic obligation to justify, and an obligation to justify is a forum** — which is what the corpus means when it says the residue requires one.

Third, the sharper test of a colonial court is not the win rate but the unreachable defendant. Taiwanese won against companies and against the land bureau, and the wins were real. No one could reach an ordinance. **A court that constrains private power while leaving the executive's legislation unchallengeable is a genuine counterweight and not a check on the order at all**, and both halves of that sentence have to be said together.

Fourth, and this is the module's new instrument: exclusion by qualification can be measured. Where an order excludes by a threshold rather than by naming a race — and constitutional states nearly always do, because a threshold is defensible in a chamber and a name is not — take the date the metropole abolished that same threshold for itself and subtract the date it imposed it on the colony. Here: universal male suffrage at home in 1925, a five-yen tax qualification in the colony in 1935. **Ten years is the exception, stated as a number**, and it is available in almost any case where the metropole legislated for itself first.

Fifth, the residue reaches only the parties to the quarrel. Rights accumulate as the by-product of factions protecting themselves from each other, which means the benefit falls on those who are in the fight. The Han Taiwanese elite was in the fight — badly outmatched, but in it, with money, newspapers, lawyers and a chamber to petition — and it obtained, in the end, a quarter of a local council. The mountain peoples were not a faction in anybody's quarrel, and they obtained nothing at any date. **The distribution of liberty inside an order follows the distribution of the quarrels, not the distribution of the suffering.**

One thing this module has established and cannot resolve. Everything the conquered obtained came from the metropolitan end of a line the conquest itself had drawn, and everything was still on offer at the metropole's discretion in 1945. What actually ended this order, and whether anything the Taiwanese did contributed to the ending, is the next question — and the answer will bear on whether any of the above was liberty or only its residue.

A note on sources.

This module quotes nothing. Law 63 and its amendments, the local government reform of 1935 and the electoral regulations are public-domain texts given in paraphrase; none has been read here in the original.

Figures. The 1935 local elections: held 22 November 1935, half the city and township councillors elected and half appointed by prefectural governors, franchise limited to men of twenty-five and over paying five yen or more in annual tax, 229,049 eligible out of a population of about four million, turnout ninety-five per cent — from the Government-General's own 1936 summary of the reformed local system as reported in the reference literature. The 1936 prefectural elections: 76 of 152 seats, indirect election by an electoral college of some 3,600 local councillors of whom half were appointees, about 0.073 per cent of the population eligible. The 1939 and 1940 rounds and the cancellation of 1944 are from the same body of material. The metropolitan comparison — the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act of 1925 removing the property tax qualification and enlarging the electorate from roughly three million to about twelve and a half million — is from the standard Japanese legal-political literature.

Three cautions. The statement that proportionally more Japanese than Taiwanese residents qualified under the five-yen threshold is as reported in the Taiwanese press-history literature and follows from the tax base, but this study has not seen a breakdown of the 1935 register by nationality and the claim should be verified before it is relied on further. The renewal interval for Law 63 is given in the teaching literature as five-yearly; the statute's actual renewal history is more complicated than that summary and should be checked against the Diet record. And the April 1945 extension of the metropolitan franchise and House of Peers seats to Taiwan is reported in outline in the reference literature; its terms have not been examined here, and since the closing modules will want to make something of the timing, they should be.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Chou Wan-yao on the petition movement and the autonomy alliance; Ming-cheng Lo on the political associations; Tay-sheng Wang on Law 63, the colonial courts and the reception of Western law; and E. P. Thompson's finding that law cannot legitimate unless it genuinely constrains, which is the guard rail against reading the Taiwanese court victories as fraud.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 10

THE BUREAU THEY DID NOT ABOLISH

Change and collapse, 1937–1947: an order that ended undefeated on its own ground, a floor that emptied by signature while the garrison stood intact, an apparatus that outlived its builders, and the instrument that destroyed the successor.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What actually cracked the floor

Nothing on the island did.

There was no rising in 1945. The armed resistance had been broken by 1902 on the plain and by the 1930s in the mountains; the political movement had been dissolved between 1931 and 1936; the last elections held under the order returned the administration's own notables on a franchise of a quarter of a million men. The order was not overthrown, was not exhausted by anything happening in Taiwan, and did not fracture from within.

It ended because the state that owned it lost a war fought somewhere else.

And it did not even lose that war *here*. The Americans considered invading Taiwan and chose the Philippines and Okinawa instead; the island was bypassed, blockaded and bombed. From late 1944 the ports, railways, factories and cities were hit from the air; by 1945 agricultural output stood at about half its 1937 level and industrial output was down by a third; three of the four power stations were destroyed, over two hundred factories bombed, and only about forty per cent of the railway was usable. An estimated sixteen to thirty thousand civilians died in the raids. But no Allied soldier landed, no Japanese unit on Taiwan was defeated in the field, and on 15 August 1945 the Governor-General still held the island with an intact garrison.

That is the corpus's proposition in its cleanest available form. **Structural change comes from inside the hierarchy** — and here the hierarchy in question was not even in the colony. A decision taken in Tokyo, forced by events at sea and in the Pacific, ended a fifty-year arrangement in which the people governed by it had had no vote, no assembly with power, no press of their own on the island, and no say whatever.

What the Taiwanese did contribute was soldiers. Between 1937 and 1945 more than two hundred and seven thousand of them were employed by the Japanese military, and roughly fifty thousand died or went missing; 27,863 are recorded and enshrined at Yasukuni. That is the ruled in their customary role in these endings — present in enormous numbers, as soldier and as body count, and absent as agent.

A floor that emptied without cracking

The mechanism deserves naming precisely, because it is unusually pure here.

A floor can crack — the enforcer's capacity to apply organised violence is destroyed, and everyone can see it. Or a floor can *empty*: the enforcer retains every soldier, every rifle and every police post, and loses only the credible expectation that he will use them. The second is an accounting event rather than a military one, and it is dateable.

On Taiwan the date is the surrender. Some hundreds of thousands of Japanese, service and civilian, were still on the island; the police stations were manned; the *hokō* had been formally wound up only months earlier; nothing had been taken from the Government-General by force. What was taken was the warrant. On 25 October 1945 the last Governor-General handed the administration to Chen Yi at the Taipei public hall, and on 26 October the Republic of China declared Taiwan a province — a unilateral act the Allied powers did not recognise, since no peace treaty had been concluded.

Then the Japanese were removed. About three hundred thousand civilians, on some counts nearer three hundred and fifty, were repatriated between February and May 1946, each permitted two pieces of luggage and a thousand yen. With them went roughly twenty thousand technicians and ten thousand professional staff, because every senior position in the colony had been held by a Japanese.

The people went. The machine stayed.

What was kept

Here is the inventory the second administration inherited, unbroken: the household registers; the cadastral register and the land tax built on it; the police stations in every locality; the school buildings and the teachers' training; the railways and the harbours; the irrigation systems; the Bank of Taiwan; the four great sugar companies, consolidated in 1946 into a single state corporation; and the Monopoly Bureau.

The new authority kept them and ran them, and it did so for the reason every conqueror in this collection has done it. Capturing a working revenue system is far cheaper than building one, and it comes with its own habits of obedience attached. The Republic of China faced, in October 1945, exactly the accountant's question this whole method tracks — how to draw a durable revenue from these people without fighting every day — and it found, unlike Japan in 1895, that there was a chair to sit down in.

That closes a loop this study opened in the landscape. Japan in 1895 met a provincial apparatus ten years old whose occupants had gone home, and had to spend seven years and a million and a half person-days building a register before it could tax properly. **A conquest that builds an apparatus manufactures the seizable apex its own successor will use.** The recursion is not a metaphor here. It is a filing system, handed over in working order, with the drawers full.

The evening of 27 February 1947

The Monopoly Bureau was established in 1901, when Kodama consolidated the opium works, the salt bureau and the camphor bureau into one body. Tobacco was added in 1905 and liquor in 1922. At its height the monopolies supplied somewhere between a sixth and two-fifths of the colony's revenue, depending on the period and the accounting, and they were among the two or three pillars on which the colony's celebrated fiscal self-sufficiency rested.

It was not abolished in 1945. It was retained, staffed with new men, and pointed at the same population.

On the evening of 27 February 1947 an enforcement team of the Bureau — six investigators and four uniformed officers — went to the Tianma Teahouse in Dadaocheng, acting on information about a consignment of untaxed cigarettes. The

smugglers had gone. What they found was a forty-year-old widow named Lin Jiang-mai selling cigarettes at a stall. They demanded her stock; she protested that she lived on it; one of the officers struck her on the head with a pistol butt and left her bleeding on the ground. A crowd gathered; the agents withdrew; one of them fired into the crowd and killed a bystander.

The next morning a crowd of some two thousand marched on the Bureau's Taipei offices, then on the Executive Office, where the guards opened fire. Within days the rising had spread across the island, a radio station had been taken and the news broadcast, and local committees had formed.

Two things about the location should be recorded without comment. Dadaocheng was the tea and commodity quarter whose merchants had gone out of Taipei in June 1895 to bring the Japanese army in. And the instrument that lit the island in 1947 was the revenue monopoly the Japanese order had built to pay for itself.

The men who were killed

Chen Yi negotiated while requesting troops from the mainland. The 21st Division landed on 8 March, and what followed ran in two phases that the contemporary observers distinguished clearly: first indiscriminate firing in the streets, and then something more deliberate — the hunting down of students, intellectuals, businessmen, doctors, lawyers, journalists and members of the local councils.

That list is not a random cross-section. It is, almost exactly, the stratum this study has been tracking for four modules: the medical school's graduates, who had been the only Taiwanese permitted a high qualification; the men of the petition movement and its successor associations; the councillors elected on the five-yen franchise of 1935; the editors of a press that had been founded in Tokyo because it could not be founded at home.

The elite the Japanese order had manufactured, rationed and refused was destroyed within a fortnight by the order that replaced it.

The number of dead is contested and the counting is itself a political act. Contemporary foreign estimates spoke of at least five thousand; later official and scholarly estimates run from around ten thousand to twenty-eight thousand; some

accounts give over thirty thousand. The range is reported here as a range and this study does not adjudicate it.

Lin Hsien-tang — who had funded a middle school in 1915 when the administration would not authorise one, led fifteen petitions between 1921 and 1934, chaired the bank capitalised out of the compensation bonds of 1904, and was appointed to the House of Peers in the empire's final months — left Taiwan for Japan in 1949 and died there in 1956.

Dogs go, pigs come

In February 1947 the walls of Taipei carried a phrase that has been current in Taiwan ever since: **狗去豬來** — *the dogs go, the pigs come*.

The reading generally given with it is that the dog, whatever else it is, guards the house, whereas the pig only eats. It is a population's comparison of two conquerors, made by people who had no part in choosing either.

The seed of this study flagged the phrase as politically contested in present-day Taiwan, and it is. It is used to argue that Japanese rule was benign by comparison with what followed, and it is used against that argument on the ground that a saying produced in the worst months of 1947 is a judgement on 1947 rather than on 1895–1945, and that the people best placed to compare the two were also the people the second regime was killing. Both readings are held by serious people. This study reports them and settles neither.

What it will say is narrower and is the reason the phrase belongs in a module on collapse at all. **Where a territory passes from one conqueror to another within living memory, the ruled acquire the one instrument this method otherwise lacks: a controlled comparison, run on themselves.** Everything else in this study is inferred from records kept by the party being assessed. This is the only evidence in it that comes from the governed, about both governments, in their own words — and it is four characters long.

Reading the collapse against the framework

First, the crack was exhaustion, and it occurred in a hierarchy the colony could not reach. Not the ruled, not a colonial fracture, not an unabsorbed surplus of claimants. A metropolitan state committed itself to a total war against a coalition it could not beat, and the colony went with it. The Taiwanese contribution to the ending was two hundred thousand men in Japanese uniform and fifty thousand of them dead. **The corpus's claim that structural change is elite survives this case in its strongest available form**, because the elite in question was not even the colonial one — it was a cabinet and a general staff two thousand kilometres away, answering to pressures the governed could not influence, observe or vote on.

Second, a floor emptied without cracking, and the emptying is dateable to a signature. Every soldier and policeman remained; what ended was the credible expectation that they would be used. The corpus should keep this distinction sharp, because the two look identical in a chronology and are entirely different events: **the writing-off of a reach still physically possessed is an accounting act, and the most consequential actor in such an ending is frequently a clerk.**

Third, the apparatus is what survives, and it survives because inheriting is cheaper than building. The register, the police posts, the schools, the railways, the sugar corporation and the Monopoly Bureau all passed intact to a successor that used them at once. And that produces the recursion this study opened with, now closed: Japan in 1895 found an apex ten years old whose occupants had fled, and had to build. **The apparatus it built is the seizable apex the next conqueror sat down in** — which means a conquest's most durable product is not its robe, its settlement or its formation, but the machinery it leaves behind for whoever comes next.

Fourth, and this is the module's new finding: the inherited instrument that produces the rupture is the extractive one. The successor kept everything, and what destroyed it within eighteen months was not the police, the register or the schools but the monopoly — because a revenue monopoly is the one inherited institution that must be enforced against ordinary people in the street, individually, every single day, and because the successor operated it without the fiscal discipline and the published statistics that had made it tolerable. **Where a successor inherits an extractive apparatus without inheriting the constraints that made it bearable, the apparatus**

becomes the fault line — and the fault line will run through whichever instrument touches the largest number of people most often.

Fifth, the colonial status did not dissolve; it migrated. The Republic of China's annexation was not recognised for want of a treaty, and when the treaty came in 1952 Japan renounced Formosa and the Pescadores without naming a recipient. **Where one question about a territory must still be answered separately, the colonial status does not end — it moves into that question and lives there**, which the other Japanese island case established and this one confirms at a scale that has occupied foreign ministries for eighty years.

One thing this module has recorded and not yet weighed. It has given the sequence of the ending and the toll of the fortnight that followed. What the whole fifty years cost, on every side, against what it built — and how to hold both of those in one hand — is the accounting, and it is next.

A note on sources.

Quoted exactly, in the original: the four characters 狗去豬來, current in Taiwan from 1947 and reported as graffiti on Taipei walls in February of that year; the English is this study's own and the gloss about the dog guarding and the pig only eating is the reading commonly transmitted with the phrase rather than part of it.

The events of 27–28 February 1947 — the Monopoly Bureau enforcement team at the Tianma Teahouse in Dadaocheng, the widow Lin Jiang-mai, the pistol blow, the shot fired into the crowd and the bystander killed, the march on the Bureau and the Executive Office the following morning and the firing by the guards — are given as they appear consistently across the contemporary reporting and the modern accounts, including Peggy Durdin's despatch published at the time. The arrival of the 21st Division on 8 March and the two phases of the suppression follow the same sources.

The death toll is contested and is deliberately given as a range. Contemporary foreign estimates of at least five thousand, later figures from roughly ten thousand to twenty-eight thousand, and popular accounts of over thirty thousand, are all in circulation; the counting has been a political act in Taiwan for seventy years and this study does not adjudicate it. The same caution attaches to the reading of the phrase 狗

去豬來, which is used on both sides of a live argument about the Japanese period and is reported here with both readings and no verdict.

Other particulars from the standard record: the American decision to bypass Taiwan for the Philippines and Okinawa; the bombing damage of 1944–45, including agricultural output at about half its 1937 level, industrial output down by a third, three of four power stations destroyed, over two hundred factories bombed and about forty per cent of the railway usable, with civilian air-raid deaths estimated at sixteen to thirty thousand; the surrender ceremony of 25 October 1945 and the provincial declaration of 26 October, unrecognised by the Allied powers for want of a treaty; the repatriation of about three hundred thousand Japanese between February and May 1946 with two pieces of luggage and a thousand yen each, and the loss of some twenty thousand technicians and ten thousand professional staff; the consolidation of the sugar companies into a single state corporation in 1946; the figures of over 207,000 Taiwanese in Japanese military employment with roughly 50,000 dead or missing and 27,863 enshrined at Yasukuni; and the San Francisco treaty of 1952, in which Japan renounced Formosa and the Pescadores without naming a recipient.

Two flags. The exact date on which the *hokō* system was wound up is given in the literature as 1945 but has not been pinned to an instrument here. And the account of which occupational groups were targeted in the March suppression follows the standard narrative and the contemporary reporting; a proper prosopography of the victims — which would test directly the claim made here that the stratum destroyed was the one the colonial order had manufactured — exists in Taiwanese scholarship and has not been consulted for this module.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: George Kerr's contemporary account and the substantial later literature on the February 28 incident; Chou Wan-yao on the war years; and the Taiwanese scholarship on the retrocession and the takeover.

MODULE 11

TWO AND A HALF MILLION, AND THEN SIX

The grim accounting, 1895–1947: the sword column in full, a metabolic note that was never called by the order that ran up the debt, the works that were bought with the taxpayers' own money, and the column that has no figures in it at all.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Two columns, and they do not net off

Every conquest is charged twice. There is the sword column — the people killed taking the place and holding it — and there is a second column that is usually larger and almost never counted, because it is not made of violence at all.

Advanced coordination raises a population above the land's unaided carrying capacity. Irrigation, granaries, disease control, the movement of food from surplus to deficit districts: these things let more people live on the same ground than the ground would otherwise support, and the increment is real people. A conquest that breaks the coordination calls that note, and it is paid in famine and epidemic rather than in casualties.

Taiwan is the case where the note was accumulated for fifty years and was not called by the party that ran it up.

The sword column

Set it out, with its ranges, because the ranges are part of the finding.

The taking, 1895. Japanese battle deaths of 164 to 333 with something between 515 and 690 wounded; Japanese deaths from disease of roughly 4,600 to 6,900, plus

about 1,500 in the Pescadores cholera outbreak of March. Chinese and Formosan dead of approximately 6,000 to 14,000 including civilians killed in reprisals, against some 7,000 bodies recovered from the battlefields.

The holding, 1895–1915. The Yunlin clearance of June 1896, given most commonly as about 6,000 and in other accounts very much higher. Some 12,000 killed as "bandit-rebels" between 1898 and 1902 under the punishment ordinance, including the men who surrendered at the six ceremonies of 25 May 1902 wearing white flowers. A hundred Hakka men and boys at Neidaping after Beipu in 1907. Over a thousand executed in the wake of Luo Fuxing's conspiracy in 1913. At Tapani in 1915, some 1,400 tried and about 200 executed, with a local oral tradition of five or six thousand shot in pits after being promised pardon.

The mountains, 1895–1930. By 1903, about 1,900 Japanese dead in 1,132 incidents. A report of 1935 gave 7,081 Japanese killed in the armed struggle between 1896 and 1933, and 29,772 firearms taken from the indigenous by that year. At Musha in 1930, 134 Japanese and two Han killed in the rising, and 644 Seediq dead of roughly 1,200 involved, some 290 of them by their own hand.

The war, 1937–45. More than 207,000 Taiwanese in Japanese military employment; roughly 50,000 dead or missing. Sixteen to thirty thousand civilians killed in the air raids of 1944–45. Between one and two thousand Taiwanese women in the comfort-women system.

The handover, 1947. Estimates from at least five thousand to twenty-eight or thirty thousand, contested, and the counting a political act in Taiwan for seventy years.

Now the part of this column that matters most, and it is empty. **There is no total anywhere for the indigenous dead.** The 1935 report counted Japanese killed and rifles confiscated; it did not count the people on the other side of the guardline. Forty years of campaigns, a sixteen-million-yen five-year programme, artillery, mines, aircraft and gas, and the number of mountain people who died is not in any ledger, because the administration that kept the ledgers was not counting them. The corpus's instruments — casualty returns, extraction tonnages, displacement figures — are built to register what a state records, and this state did not record this.

The note that was not called

Now the second column, and the arithmetic is startling.

There were something between two and a half and three million people on the island in 1895. The first modern census, in October 1905, returned about three million. By 1940 there were 5.87 million, and by 1946, 6.09 million.

The population roughly doubled, and it doubled because the coordination was not broken but intensified. Plague was eliminated; malaria was brought under control; cholera ceased to be routine; average life expectancy reached around sixty by 1945. Over half the arable land came under dam-fed irrigation, culminating in the Chianan system. A rice strain bred for the island's conditions raised yields; imported chemical fertiliser raised them again; a railway ran the length of the island and moved grain between districts that had previously starved separately.

Apply the metabolic-death test to the conquest of 1895 and it returns almost nothing. Japan broke no subsistence system. There was no famine following the taking, no epidemic loosed by the collapse of a granary administration, none of the demographic catastrophe that conquest produces where the conquered order *was* the food supply.

But a note not called is not a note discharged. By 1945 there were six million people living on an island that had supported perhaps half that number two generations earlier, and the increment was standing on four things: an irrigation system a state maintained, a fertiliser supply that arrived by sea, a disease-control apparatus staffed by trained men, and a market for the export crop that existed in exactly one country.

Every one of those was owned, operated or guaranteed by the conqueror.

That is the debt. It is not a moral figure and it is not an accusation; it is a structural fact about what happens when coordination succeeds. **A preserved order does not default at the conquest. It accumulates, and what it accumulates is people — who are owed, by whoever holds the coordination, a continuation of it.**

When it fell due

Not in 1895. Not in the bombing, though the bombing did the physical damage: by 1945 agricultural output stood at about half its 1937 level, industrial output was down by a third, three of four power stations were destroyed and only about forty per cent of the railway was usable.

It fell due in the eighteen months after the handover, and the mechanism was not damage. It was policy.

The Japanese price-control system for food collapsed when the administration that ran it was repatriated. The new authority imposed the mainland's monetary system on the island, and with it the inflation of a civil war being fought a thousand kilometres away: monthly rates above thirty per cent during 1946, and a consumer price index rising by over three thousand per cent in the year to 1947. It monopolised rice, salt, sugar and tobacco through state bureaus, which produced hoarding, withholding and a black market. The fertiliser did not come. The sugar had no buyer, because the buyer had been Japan.

The rice price series compiled for the period tells the story in four stages: stable in August and September 1945; rising from September 1945 to May 1946 as the shortage set in; easing from May to November 1946; and then spiking from November 1946 to April 1947, before falling again after May. The scholarship that assembled that series calls the period a famine, and identifies the final spike as a major driver of what happened on 28 February 1947.

So the note fell due, and it fell due on the successor's watch, and the people who paid it were the people the first order's public health had kept alive.

Where a colony changes hands with its coordination intact, look for the metabolic default in the eighteen months after the transfer, not in the eighteen months of the taking — because the coordination survives the conqueror, and what a successor inherits he can also mismanage. And note what this one was denominated in. Not acreage, not drought, not a broken granary. A currency decision, a monopoly board and a war in another country.

The column that falls on women

The seed of this study instructed that a survey of what a colonial order prohibited will systematically miss the prohibitions falling on women, because those leave no abolished office, no extinguished income and nobody with a position who lost one. It is right, and the entries run in both directions.

On the credit side, footbinding. It had bound the feet of a large proportion of Han Taiwanese women and it was ended — not by ordinance in the first instance but through Taiwanese natural-foot societies encouraged by the administration, and then through the *hokō*, the collective-liability apparatus, around 1915. A girl born in 1920 walked. That is a real and enormous benefit, and it is invisible to every instrument this method owns: no office abolished, no revenue extinguished, no arrests, no compensation claim, nothing in a budget.

Also on the credit side, and equally invisible: girls' schooling. Under three per cent of school-age girls enrolled in 1905; sixty-one per cent by 1943.

On the debit side, and appearing in no colonial ledger whatever: between one and two thousand Taiwanese women, Han and indigenous, in the military comfort-women system, more than half of them minors and some as young as fourteen — recruited variously by financial pressure, by sale, and by deception about the nature of the work.

Both halves of this column are structurally invisible, and for the same reason: they concern a population that held no offices, earned no recorded income and appeared in the administrative record only as household members. An accounting that counts what the state counted will report neither the liberation nor the trafficking.

Who paid for what was built

The works are real and must be credited at full weight: some 4,456 kilometres of road by 1935 against about 164 before the conquest; a railway from Keelung to Kaohsiung; two modern harbours; the Chianan irrigation system; hospitals, a medical school, hydroelectric plants, and by 1944 primary schools reaching seven in ten Taiwanese children.

Then ask the question the framework requires, which is not whether they were built but who paid for them.

Japan subsidised the colony for its first years, some thirteen million yen amounting to over half the colonial government's cash receipts. That subsidy ended. Thereafter the Government-General was required to be self-supporting, and it was — out of the land tax fixed on the register the survey had made, out of the monopolies in opium, salt, camphor, tobacco and liquor which supplied between a sixth and two-fifths of revenue depending on the period, and out of the sugar economy.

Which is to say: **the roads, the harbours, the irrigation and the hospitals were bought with the taxes and monopoly payments of the people who live in Taiwan.** The metropole advanced the seed capital for a decade and was repaid many times over in captive-market sugar and in a possession that cost it nothing.

That is not an argument that the works were worthless. A road is a road. It is an argument about the grammar of the transaction, and the grammar matters, because the works are the strongest card in every defence of this order and they are habitually described as something Japan *gave*. **Where a colonial administration is required to be self-supporting, everything it builds after the subsidy stops is purchased with the revenue of the governed, and what looks like investment is a reallocation of their own money by people they did not choose.** The test is available in almost every case: find the subsidy figure and find the year it stopped.

Refusing the syllogism

The defence of this order is not that it was gentle. It is that it worked: that the population doubled, that plague ended, that the harbours and the irrigation are still in use, and that the fifty years produced the foundation of what came after.

Most of that is true, and the module has counted it.

The syllogism to refuse is the one that runs *order is necessary, therefore this order was.* A doubled population proves that this administration performed real coordination. It does not prove that no other arrangement could have, and it does not price what the coordination cost the people who received it — a monopsony on their cane, a five-yen franchise, a school system that reached a twentieth of the boys for twenty years, a collective-liability system that applied to them by race, and a guardline with mines behind it for the people the settlement gave nothing to defend.

And the sentimental mirror is equally to be refused: that the price proves only cruelty, and the works were therefore nothing. A child who did not die of plague did not die of plague. Both things are true at once, and the whole discipline of this module is holding them in one hand without letting either dispose of the other.

Reading the accounting against the framework

First, a preserved order does not escape the metabolic note. It accumulates it, and the accumulation is the population increment. The corpus's metabolic-death test is designed to fire at the moment of conquest and it returns near-zero here, which is correct and misleading. What Taiwan shows is the debt building silently for fifty years — six million people standing on an irrigation system, a fertiliser import, a disease apparatus and a single foreign market, none of which they controlled. **A conquest that improves coordination does not avoid the metabolic reckoning; it enlarges it and postpones it.**

Second, and this is the module's principal contribution: where a colony is transferred intact, the note falls due on the successor. Not at the taking, when there was nothing yet to lose, but at the handover, when a functioning system changes hands and the new holder does not know or does not choose to run it the same way. Here the default was denominated in a currency decision, a monopoly board and a civil war in another country, and it was severe enough that the scholarship calls it a famine and identifies it as a driver of the rising. **Look for the metabolic default in the eighteen months after a transfer, not in the eighteen months of a conquest.**

Third, the works are paid for by the taxed. This one had ceased drawing subsidy within a decade and financed everything afterwards out of a land tax, five monopolies and a sugar economy. **The strongest card in any colonial defence — what was built — should always be turned over to see whose revenue is printed on the back.**

Fourth, the accounting has a column with no figures in it. There is no total for the indigenous dead of forty years of mountain campaigns, because the state that kept the records was counting its own casualties and its own confiscated rifles. This is the corpus's own warning working exactly as stated: the powerful leave paper and the powerless leave silence, and a method that mines the paper will report the silence as an absence. **Where a study finds a population that generated no casualty statistics, it should enter the missing column as an item rather than omitting it**, because the

reason it is missing is itself the finding — that population was not, to the record-keeper, the kind of thing that gets counted.

Fifth, the same null applies to women, in both directions. The ending of footbinding and the schooling of girls are among the largest changes in the lived experience of half this population and appear in no ledger, because they abolished no office and extinguished no income. So does the comfort-women system. **An instrument that registers only commissions against office-holders and income-earners will miss the largest entries on both sides of the women's column**, and reporting that as a limitation of the instrument is the only honest thing to do about it.

One thing remains. This module has counted. What the case confirms, complicates and refutes in the corpus, and the strongest argument that none of it was a conquest at all, is the last question.

A note on sources.

This module quotes nothing. Its figures are assembled from the earlier modules of this study and carry the cautions attached there; the ranges are reproduced as ranges and none has been narrowed.

Nearly every number above was produced by the Government-General, which is to say by the party being assessed, and there is no independent series for most of the colonial period. That is not a reason to discard them — they are detailed, internally consistent and were compiled for administrative rather than propagandistic purposes — but it is a reason to state their provenance every time, which this study has done.

The post-war material is newer and its provenance should be given precisely. The four-stage rice price series for August 1945 to March 1947, the identification of the November 1946–April 1947 spike as a major driver of the events of 28 February, and the characterisation of the period as a famine, are from the recent quantitative work of Chen Huai-de and Yang Hai-liang, reported through the Taiwanese press and the paper's own abstract; this study has read the abstract and secondary reporting rather than the full paper, and the price levels quoted in different parts of that reporting are not obviously consistent with one another, so no specific price is given here. The inflation figures — monthly rates above thirty per cent in 1946 and a consumer price index rising over three thousand per cent annually by 1947 — and the imposition of the

mainland monetary system and the state trading bureaux are from the general post-war literature.

The war-damage figures, the population series, the public-health and life-expectancy figures, the road and irrigation figures, and the school enrolment figures repeat those given in earlier modules with the same sources and cautions. The comfort-women figures — between one and two thousand Taiwanese women, more than half of them minors, some as young as fourteen — follow the scholarly literature on the system in Taiwan. The footbinding chronology, and in particular the role of Taiwanese natural-foot societies and of the *hokō* in the campaign around 1915, is given from the reference literature and would repay a documentary check, since the module rests a finding on the mechanism.

One flag of the first importance. The absence of any total for indigenous deaths in the mountain campaigns is asserted here on the basis of this study's own failure to find one across the English-language and accessible Chinese-language literature. It is possible that a reconstruction exists in Japanese or in Taiwanese indigenous scholarship that this study has not reached, and if so it should replace the null. The claim being made is about the colonial record, not about the state of present-day scholarship.

Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited: George Kerr and Murray Rubinstein's edited history for the colonial demographic and public-health record; Chou Wan-yao on the war years; Chen and Yang on post-war rice prices; and the Taiwanese scholarship on footbinding, on girls' education and on the comfort-women system.

MODULE 12

THE WIRE AND THE REGISTER

Convergence and divergence: what this case confirms, what it bends, the one thing it breaks, the single finding built across twelve modules — and the strongest argument that none of it was a conquest, stated at full strength and answered.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What the case was for

Taiwan was taken up because it is the control on almost every axis for the two Japanese cases already in this collection: the same state, in overlapping years, with overlapping personnel, running an island it governed outside its own constitution rather than inside it. Several of those earlier findings were carried in as hypotheses to be broken. Most survived. One did not, and its failure is worth more than the survivals.

Where it runs with the corpus

Stated compactly, because confirmation is cheap and should be reported as such.

A conqueror who inherits a working revenue system captures it rather than inventing one: no hut tax, no poll tax, an inherited land tax, inherited monopolies. A preserved order arrives with its surveillance already installed and appears in nobody's budget — here so completely that the administration's own measure of success was that the police force never had to grow. The cheapest robe is one the conquered wrote for an earlier conqueror. A co-opted elite's maximal public demand marks the boundary of the default and concedes the conquest — fifteen petitions in fourteen years, none of them

asking for anything that did not presuppose Japanese sovereignty. Inside a constitutional state, exclusion is administered by exception rather than denial, and the justification offered is true because the state manufactured the disqualification. The residue of liberty requires a forum. A colonial status that is not resolved does not dissolve but migrates into whatever question is left open and lives there. And structural change is elite: this order ended because a cabinet two thousand kilometres away lost a war the colony could neither fight nor influence.

Where it bends the corpus

Five refinements, each of which changes an existing instrument rather than adding one.

The settlement fictions gain a fifth. Vacancy dispossesses, recognition binds an elite, divisibility manufactures a market. The 1904 extinguishment of the large-rent right does none of these: it took a genuine multi-layered tenure, abolished all but one layer, and *paid* the abolished party — in order to make the ground legible enough to tax at a known rate annually and permanently. Call the job fiscal legibility, and note the diagnostic that inverts a habit: **a conqueror who compensates is buying a permanent register, and the register is cheap at the price.**

The co-optation family gains an instrument. The grant that binds an elite is normally land or office. Here it was a government security, and the tie is tighter, because a bond cannot be defended locally, cannot be hidden, cannot be worked, and is worth nothing the day the arrangement ends. When the paper began to fall the state bought it back to protect its own credit and pressed the holders to borrow against it; within a year the dispossessed rentiers of central Taiwan had founded a bank. **A landlord can detest a government and keep his land. A bondholder cannot detest a government without detesting his own holdings.**

The empty column inverts. In the European cases censorship faced inward and the metropolitan end was governed by inattention. Here the censor was busy — Taiwanese were not permitted to found newspapers, and even a Japanese-owned opposition sheet had its permit cancelled — and the metropole was the *free zone*, so the opposition printed in Tokyo and shipped itself in. The rule survives with a different axis: **censorship is calibrated by the reach of the audience**, by language in Indochina and by geography here.

The metropolitan sensor fires on the cheapest correction, not the gravest fact. Musha removed four senior officials in eleven weeks, which looks like conscience and is not: the dead who mattered were Japanese, and sacking a governor-general costs a voter nothing. Thousands of Taiwanese dead at Tapani in 1915 produced no resignations.

And the seam has a third end. A state that took a colony in order to be admitted to a club of powers must manage that club's opinion, and on this evidence that is the seam it defends hardest — tolerating four years of constitutional demands and dissolving a party for writing to Geneva.

Where it breaks the corpus

One finding failed, cleanly, and should be withdrawn.

The Hokkaidō study concluded that the Meiji state assimilated the Ainu because it was in the middle of assimilating everybody, and predicted that **a conquest made by a state still assembling its own nation will impose formation, while one made by a finished nation-state will withhold it.**

Japan in 1895 was the same unfinished state, four years further on from Okinawa's language campaign, and in Taiwan it built two separate school systems and reached five per cent of the boys.

The replacement has two terms and both must hold for formation to be imposed: **the conquered must be few enough to absorb, and must carry no formation apparatus of their own.** Fifteen thousand Ainu with an oral culture met both conditions. Three million Han with a literate canon, an examination tradition and a functioning private school system met neither. And Taiwan establishes this rather than proposing it, because the colony contains both cases under one governor-general in the same decades — formation withheld from the Han for forty years, imposed on the mountain peoples until their enrolment in 1944 exceeded the Han figure.

The one thing this study found

Twelve modules and one finding, which is the right ratio.

A single administration, holding one island, wanted two different things from two different populations — and that one fact generated the shape of everything else.

Off the plain it wanted a flow: rice, sugar, camphor brought down from the hills, a taxable population that had to be alive and working next season. Out of the mountains it wanted the ground and the trees standing on it, and the people there were in the way.

Run the modules and the fork appears in every one of them, always along the same line.

The floor was laid twice: a criminal ordinance, a household register and a police post in every locality on the plain, ending around 1902; a moving fence with outposts every two hundred metres, mines and artillery in the mountains, still producing bodies at Musha in 1930. **The settlement** used two fictions: a compensated buy-out and a register where the want was a flow, and a declaration of vacancy — forest and unreclaimed land declared state property in October 1895 for want of documents — where the want was the ground. **Formation** ran through two agencies: the civil administration for Han children, the police station for mountain children, in the same building that held their fathers' confiscated rifles and the barter counter. **The cost column** was sorted by an exemption clause naming who was outside the collective-liability system. **Extraction** ran as a rate on the plain and as clearance in the mountains. And in **the default**, every link in the chain from the metropolitan treasury to the cane grower had something the arrangement's collapse would take away, while the mountain peoples had no link at all — no exemption, no title, no licence, no seat, and no vote at any date.

Which produces the study's sharpest single instrument, and it is the reason for the module's title. **The default's coverage map and the floor's expense map are inverses of one another.** Wherever the settlement gave a man something to defend, the order was cheap and needed no persuading. Where it gave nothing, the order paid in soldiers, permanently, for forty years. A wire in one place and a register in the other, and the wire is there precisely because there was no register.

So the practical instruction, and it belongs at the front of the method rather than in the sixth module: **settle in the landscape what the conqueror wants off each population, and the rest is largely predictable.** A study that discovers the fork in its extraction module has done five modules of work it could have done once.

The strongest counter-position

Now the case against everything above, stated at full strength, from the argument that is actually made — because a reader who wants a handle will take the one left lying about, and it is better to pick it up first.

It runs like this.

Call it a conquest if you like, but look at the ledger. In 1895 this was a frontier of the Qing empire with a small uprising every three years, no reliable census, plague endemic, malaria general, roughly a hundred and sixty kilometres of road and a land tax so leaky that a quarter of the cultivated ground was not on any register. Fifty years later the population had doubled, life expectancy stood near sixty, plague was gone, seven in ten children were in primary school — a rate second in Asia only to Japan itself — and the island had a railway from end to end, two modern harbours, the largest irrigation system in the empire, a medical school, a university, and an economy that had ceased drawing subsidy within a decade and was remitting.

It was governed by law. Its enabling statute was debated in a parliament for twenty-five years and amended twice. Its courts heard Taiwanese plaintiffs and Taiwanese sometimes won; a sugar company was made to apologise publicly over false weighing. When its administration failed at Musha, the Diet removed the Governor-General, his chief civil administrator, the police chief and a prefectural governor in eleven weeks. Its statistics were published, in detail, annually, including the ones that were embarrassing.

There was no plantation slavery here, no Congo rubber quota, no Algerian *sénatus-consulte* dissolving collective title to seat settlers on it, no removal of a majority population. The land the plains cultivators worked was confirmed to them by name in a register, and made mortgageable for the first time in the island's history.

And then comes the part that is genuinely hard to answer, because it does not come from the colonisers. It comes from the colonised. This population was ruled by a second conqueror within living memory and compared them out loud, and the comparison was 狗去豬來 — the dogs go, the pigs come. The dog guards; the pig only eats. Within eighteen months of the transfer there was a famine driven by policy, an inflation of three thousand per cent, and a massacre that destroyed the island's educated stratum. Present-day Taiwanese opinion of Japan remains among the warmest in Asia. If the people who were there preferred the arrangement, on what authority does an

outside analyst, eighty years later, insist it was a conquest whose costs they have failed to notice?

That is the case. It is made by serious scholars, it is made by many Taiwanese, and it is not made in bad faith.

The answer

Take it in four parts, and concede each one that should be conceded.

Conceded, without qualification: the works were real and the mortality figures are not extraction. A child who did not die of plague did not die of plague. That entry stands in the ledger at full value and nothing in this study reduces it.

But the works were bought with the taxes of the people who received them. The metropole advanced some thirteen million yen in the first years and then required the colony to be self-supporting, and it was — out of the land tax fixed on the register the survey had made, out of monopolies in opium, salt, camphor, tobacco and liquor supplying between a sixth and two-fifths of revenue, and out of a sugar economy in which a grower could not choose his buyer. The roads and the harbours are a reallocation of Taiwanese revenue by an administration Taiwanese did not choose and could not remove. That does not make them worthless. It makes them not a gift.

Refuse the syllogism. *It worked, therefore it was justified.* Durability is a fact about incentive structure, not a verdict. This arrangement worked because the settlement gave nearly everybody in the chain something to lose, and that is precisely what the study has been describing. An order can be well-constructed and still be a taking; the two are not alternatives, and the whole method exists to hold them together.

Refuse the rigged comparison, and name the foreclosed alternative, because it is in the record. Japanese rule against Nationalist rule is a comparison of one conquest with another, and it is not the comparison the argument needs. The alternative that was foreclosed exists and can be named at three dates: the Republic of Formosa of 1895; the Taiwanese parliament asked for fifteen times between 1921 and 1934 and refused every time; and the local councils of 1935, half elected on a five-yen franchise the metropole had abolished for itself ten years earlier. Something else was possible, people asked for it in writing, and the answer was no. And in December 1914, when over three thousand Taiwanese joined a society asking to be assimilated outright, the leaders were arrested,

the members detained and the society dissolved within weeks. **A demand to be admitted is the cheapest thing an order can ever be offered, and an order that arrests the people making it has told you the exclusion was the arrangement and not a stage.**

Refuse cynicism, which is the last and easiest error. The Taiwanese who remember the Japanese period warmly are not confused and are not dupes. The public health was real, the schools were real, the order was real, and a built thing that became real is more genuine for having been built, not less. The men who came out of the colonial medical school and then wrote the colony up as a patient suffering from starvation of culture were not victims of false consciousness; they were the most acute readers of the arrangement that it ever produced, and they used its own instruments to say so.

And there is one thing the counter-position does not mention, which this study is obliged to put beside it. Every item on its ledger — the doubled population, the schools, the harbours, the courts, the published statistics, the resignations, the comparison the population itself makes — describes the western plain. There was a second population on the same island, governed by the same governor-general in the same decades, that was declared to own nothing for want of documents, held outside the ordinary administration so that the government's own laws did not apply to it, schooled by its own police, confined behind eighty kilometres of electrified fence and minefield, subjected to a sixteen-million-yen five-year campaign, bombed with mustard gas in 1930 in breach of a protocol Japan had signed in 1925, relocated to about an eighth of its ancestral land — and never given a vote of any kind at any date.

There is no total anywhere for how many of them died. The administration counted its own casualties and the rifles it confiscated. It did not count them.

The counter-position is a true account of the register. It is not an account of the wire, and both were the work of one administration in one decade on one island.

What the reader is left with

The arithmetic is on the page. A population that doubled and a column with no figures in it. A register that made a peasant an owner and a wire that made a hunter a trespasser. Four senior officials removed in eleven weeks when Japanese schoolchildren died, and

no resignations at all when thousands of Taiwanese did. A parliament asked for fifteen times and refused, and a franchise extended in April 1945, four months before the empire ended.

The reader is also in a position — with hindsight no one in this record possessed, and a formation of his own that makes some of his conclusions feel like observations. The sum is his to reach, and this study does not write it.

A note on sources.

This module introduces no new evidence. Every fact in it is drawn from the preceding twelve parts of this study and carries the sources and cautions recorded there; the ranges are reproduced as ranges and none has been narrowed.

The counter-position is assembled, in substance, from the position actually taken in the literature and in Taiwanese public argument — most fully in the developmental-economics and colonial-modernity scholarship that credits the Japanese period with the foundations of Taiwan's later growth, and in the popular comparison with the Nationalist takeover. It is stated here in this study's own words rather than quoted, and no scholar's phrasing is borrowed. Readers who want it in its authors' own terms should go to that literature directly; it is substantial, it is serious, and it deserves to be met rather than summarised by an opponent.

The political caution stated at the outset applies with most force here. The assessment of the Japanese colonial period is a live domestic argument in Taiwan and a live international one, and material exists in Chinese, Japanese and English written to serve present positions on every side — including the position that Japanese rule was benign by comparison with what followed, and the position that it was not. Where this study has rested on a claim bearing on that argument, it has quoted the instrument, reported the competing readings as each side states them, and declined to adjudicate. The saying 狗去豬來 is reported with both of its readings and no verdict.

Three matters remain unresolved across the whole study and should be recorded here rather than buried. The petition texts of 1921–1934 have not been read; they are the single most valuable outstanding document, and the characterisation of the demand as presupposing Japanese sovereignty, though uncontested in the literature, rests on secondary accounts. The order in which the 1895 adviser

memoranda and the draft of Law 63 were produced has not been established from the drafting record, so whether 1896 records a selection from a menu or a ratification of a decision already taken is still open. And the absence of any total for indigenous deaths is asserted on the basis of this study's own failure to find one; if a reconstruction exists in Japanese or in Taiwanese indigenous scholarship, it should replace the null, and the finding being made is about the colonial record rather than about present-day scholarship.

Modern copyrighted scholarship relied on across the study is paraphrased and credited in the individual modules. The principal debts are to Tay-sheng Wang on law, John L. Hennessey on the trans-imperial adviser question, Caroline Ts'ai on the *hokō*, Ming-cheng Lo on the professional stratum, Leo Ching on assimilation and imperialisation, Paul Barclay and Wen-kai Ye on the indigenous frontier and colonial land, Chou Wan-yao on the political movements and the war years, Wu Micha on the land survey, and Murray Rubinstein's edited history throughout.